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OF P ROPE RTY AND ANTIPROPERTY
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INTRODUCTION

Private property is widely perceived as a potent prodevelopment
and anticonservationist force. The drive to accumulate wealth through
private property rights is thought to encourage environmentally destructive development; legal protection of such property rights is believed to thwart environmentally friendly public measures. Indeed.
property rights advocates and environmentalists arc generally described as irreconcilable foes. This presumed clash often leads environmentalists to urge public acquisition of private lands.
Interestingly, less attention is paid to the possibility that the government may prove no better a conservator than private owners. Government actors often mismanage conservation properties , collaborating with private developers to dispose of government property at
submarket prices and encouraging inefficient development on conservation property. The federal Bureau of Land Management, for instance, came under fire in a recent congressional report for its sale of
seventy acres of Nevada land to a private developer for $763,000; the
developer sold the land the next clay for $4.6 million. 1
The reasons for potential government mismanagement of conservation lands should be familiar to public choice theorists. First, government dccisionmakers are often influenced by the desire to extract
I. Joel Brinkley.;\ U.S. Agency Is ;\ccusc:d of Collusion in !"wul Deols. N.Y.
Oct. 12.2002. at Al6.
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re nts.2 Thu s. dccisionm a kcrs may dispose of gover nm e nt prope rti es at
subm arke t prices in ord e r to ob tain benefits for themselves in th e ir
pri\' ate ca pacities-' Co nse rvation lands are particularly vuln e rab le to
thi~ ph e nomenon wh e n they produce widely dispe rsed public benefits.
but. it' deve loped. wo uld produce smaller. highl y localized benefits."
Second. clecisionma ke rs o ften fall prey to fi sca l il lusio n. leadin g the m
to fa il to acco unt fo r public benefits o r costs that do not appear clircctiy in th e governme nt bucl ge t. 5 Toge th er. th ese fac tors lead to a
hi gh li ke lihood that co nse rvation properties wi ll he misman aged even
in go\'crnment hands.
O ur proj ec t in thi s A rticl e is to design a ne\V p ri vate prope rt y re gim e ca pable o f prov iding optimal prese rvat ion in ce nti ves to bot h
lllctrk t:t part icipants and political representat ives (>
We beg in with th e observation that. notwith sta nding the press ures
to develop conservation land, not every park or ope n space on valuable land succumbs to such political pressures 7 Ce ntral Pa rk in tvlan hall<!ll. fo r c ~.;a mp le. occupies some o f the most va lua ble acreage in the:
world.' Ye t. despit e the enormous potential for com me rcial ga in s to
politi ca ll y influential developers, th ere is very li ttl e chan ce th a t the
Park will be converted into luxury property. How does Ce ntral Park
fe nd o ff its potential predators, while other gree nbelts so frequ entl y
fall prey to the preda tions of urba n development ?''
~. S ee. e.g .. Richard E. Caves. Eco n o mic models of po liricu l chuice: Cu nadu's rariff'
srmu11rc. ':! C..\N . J. ECON. 278 . 2S5-89 (1971'i) (d isc ussi ng ev idence of rent-seekin g in co ntex.t
n f t:l ri ll-se ttin g): E ohert E. McCo rmi ck & Robe rt D . T olliso n. L egislurures as Unions. S6 J.

POL. E CU\J . l'i:> . ii5 -71 (1978) (exa min ing evi de nce that whe re legisl a tors set the ir ow n compe nsa ti on. the y ex tract extraordi na ry extra-competi ti ve salarie s) .
_1. See in.fi'ono te s l7o-lK2 a nd accompanying text.

-+. Sec ge n cmllv Willi am W. Buzbee. Spmw/'s Poliricai-Eco nonzy and !he Ca se fii/· a Merm;, o lillln Green Space Jnir iurive. 32 URfl. LAW . 367.373-74 (2000).
:i. See infi·,z notes 60-6 1 a nd acco mpanying tex t.

l'i . .-\s we disc uss in Part Ill. infi"a . our goa l is to deve lop a regime th a t wi ll pro tec t com nwzb whclSC ideal use ha s a lready be en ide ntifi ed as conse t·vatinn . We do not deve lop a
mc~Jtl S fur id cn titving such commons in thi s A rti cle.

7. While tile: .c\rti cle focuses on pre se rvat ion o f green space , th e analysis and po li cv rccommcnd <ltiu ns app lv with eq ua l fo rce to prese rva tion of hi sto ric dis tri cts and ot he r land ma rks. Hi sto ri c dist ricts diffe r from th e pro to typi cal case desc ribed in th is Art icle. inso far as
the re ma\· be pe rsons with pri vate prope rt v inte re sts within th e zo ne o f th e pro tec ted space.
Th <1t is . wh ile urdi narily the re will be no pri vate prope rty in tcrcs ts in a city park. for exam ple. th e re will he numerous pr iv;lt e property ow ne rs with stak es in a ne ighbo rh ood with hi sturi cctll\· si\! nificant architec tur e. This fact doc s not. however. ultimatclv alter ou r ana lvsis or
cunclu ;iun~.
.
C:. In ad dition to Ce ntral Par k. man y othe r pa rks - such as C ra tlt Park in C hicago.
Fa irmo unt !'ark in Phi lad elphia. a nd Colden Cate Pa rk in S;ln Francisco - h;Jvc· evade d
Ull(k sirc·d ckvc: loprncnt. \Ve do not sugges t. of co urse. that all deve lopm ent is uncil: sirahk. <IS
\\<.:discuS> i11/i'u . in Part s Ill -!'/.
'J. Th e n1 ost famou s hi storic example of undesirable deve lop me nt is th e ccsc o f New
York Citv 's Pe nn Station. Th e majestic sta ti on was dcstnwed lo ma ke: room i'llr Madiso n
Squ~uc Cia rdc n and the o ffi ce hu ilcli ng tha t sits a to p the spo rts are na. T his act not nnlv de -
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Th e answe r to thi s qu es ti o n. we posit. li es in an unr ecog ni zed but
poten t hyb rid o f cle facto publ ic and ck jUre propert y ri ghts. Ce ntral
Park is surrou nd ed by luxury properties whose owners enjoy th e
amenitie s and views o f th e adjacent park. 1" Form ~1 ll y. the Park is
owned by the pub lic as ope n-acce ss commo ns . and p rivate ow ners
have no forma l propert y inte res ts in it. Neve rth eless. owne rs of real
es ta te abu t tin <~ th e Pa rk benefit in wavs diffe re nt than th e ge ne ral
publi c. For th~ ab uttin g ow ne rs. th e P8rk is a lu strous fro nt )ra rcl . a
pa noramic view. an acou sti c barrier. ~mel an air frL·s henc r. Adj ace nt
prope rty owners thus possess a de facw qu~1s i-pro p e rty interest of co nsiderab le v::1 luc . This uniqu e inte rest transfor ms the ow ne rs of prope rty in close prox imi tv to the Park into th e Pa rk 's .. pub li c gua rdi a ns ...
and parla vs into a polit ic"l force in favur of co nse rvat ion by providing
a n incenti ve for these owners to protec t the open space .l ·w hil e th e de
fac to caseme nt is not abso lu te - ab utting owners do nut ha ve veto
power over nong:reen uses- in some cases it suffi ces to block ha rmful
de ve lopm e n t. :.:
Yet , at prese nt. aside fro m extremely rare insl <1 nces we di sc uss
later. 1' th e prope rty inte rest can only be e nforced through politics. Although thi s cle facto in terest displays the sa lient features of an ease ment appurt e nant- it is a nonpossessory in teres t th a t attach es to parti cular parce ls an d run s wit h the Janel - th e prope rty owners have no
formal lega l cl aim. 14 Agg ri eve d adjace nt prope rty own e rs can on ly e n1

strayed th e station itself. it a lso dest royed the preL·xisting a rch itec to nic sy mmclrv be tween
th e stat io n a nd the Pos t Office bui lding across th e strec l - a sv mm L· try th ;~t may still be seen
in Philade lp hia. Th e d es tr uct ion or Pen n S ta ti o n pro mpted a ma ss ive pub li c o u tc rv a nd was
cl irect lv respo nsibl e fo r thc e n:1c tm ent of the c it\··s Preserva ti on Ordina nce. Sec .l ohn N iva la.
Tl1e Future j(n Our J>ust: Prcsuving Lu/({lfllurk Prc.\·eiTU/ion. :\ N.Y.U . [NVT L. L.J. ~:<. S<J
(I ':l<J6) ("'New York Cit v cnac kd it s lan dmark prese rvat io n ordinan ce in d irect re sp onse tu :1
sin g le incid e nt: th e razing o f Penn S tat io n to p.: rmit co nstruct ion or a new M adison Sq ua re
Ga rde n ... ).

lll Sec Al ison Bea rd. G/nhol ln• ·csling: Ne11· York ·s \Vm/rhr , \pur!IIIL'//1 f-l u mas Arl'
Sf>Oiil fur Choice . F l;\. T i\ IES . .lul v LJ. 2002. a t 27. 1mtiluh/e rll 2001 WL 2.1X47024. Afte r review ing approxima telY 30 empirical stud ies . ~~ rc cc nt art icle sug~csted that for policy ana h ·sis. it sh oul d be assume d ~t s a ··p oint o f depa rt ure" th~tt pa rks h a ve a posiu,·c impa ct o r 20%
o n p ropert y va lue s abu tting or rt'<lnting a p;ISsi,·e park. J o hn L. Cromp t<>n. Ti1 c f llif!UC/ of
!'arks u n Propcrt\· \lulucs: ,. \ l?cl'it' ll' of rl1c Ftnf>iricul [l'idcncr. JJ J. LEISL:R E RES. I. I
(2001 ). Th e T r us t fur Pub lic Land. a nnnprn fit u rganizati o n dedi cate d to consen·a ti o n. es ti mate d that Go ld e n Ga te Pa rk in S;1 n Fra ncisco "inCI'<::<~ses the V;1 luc o f ncarbv prope rt v bv
an est ima ted $500 mil lion to j; I billion. in th e process gc n e r<~ting S5-S I IJ mill ion in annual
property taxcs." See The E conomic Benefits ur Open Sp~lCC . Ill ht!p:l/ww\\ .opc n sp<ICC l.org/
Opc nSp<~c c /I SSUES/cc onomi chc ndit o pcnspace.htm (Lis t visited Sep t. I <J. 2002).
II. In de e d. th e de: f;~ct o in teres t p ro duce s" strong in ce ntiv e for <t butting homeowners
inves t in th e upkeep o f the park. See in/i-u note 2?. 1.

w

12. See infi-u notes ':l<J - 102 ;\lld acco mpanving tcxl.
13. Seein/i-u P;trt l !. D.

1-+. Ind eed . ;tbsc nt ksisLt tion ror mall\·

r cco~ni;.i n"

such inte res t;;. co urts mi ~hl no t rcc-

,, ~ nizc them as v;llid casement s. lJnde r the traditi on~li~En~ li s h ru le. th .: rc ~t re o n!~· four \'a lid
t\~pcs or ncgati\·c c:>Sc m en ts: " [Tihe ri~ht tu stop vour neighbor fr<llll (I) blocking vour wi n-

5

rurcc th e ir de fac to inte res ts by exe rting th eir politi ca l influ e nce: if
th eir po li tica l in flue nce fall s sho rt of blocking undesi red deve lopment.
·e~s is often the case, th e ow ners ca nn o t assert a ny cognizab le de jure
property interest in the par-k's prese rv ation in court. i-' As repeat pla yers in th e po liti cal p roc ess without signifi ca nt coordinat ion cos ts. deYclope rs ge nerall y ha ve a leg up in th e po lit i c~tl a rena. 1"
To re medy the political disparit y. we propose to formalize th e
neighbors · cle facto interes ts into fu ll -lledgccl prop erty interests . Such
ILH maii za tion wo uld prod uce two desi rable res ults. First. fo rm ed lega l
r•xognitiun of the neighbors· interest5 would enahk them to press
th•..:ir an ti -de vel opme nt claims in co ur t. Se cond. and more im porta ntly.
iurrn ctli zing the neighbors· interests in to iornul neg<1tive ease men ts
creates " new ele ment in conse rva ti o n ul tl1t: threa tened park: a ne two rk or illlliprop erry right s.
Antipropcrty righ ts are veto rights mer the use of a n asset that are
gra nte d to a large num be r of pri vate actors - su large a number. in
Ltct . that clue to holdout pro blems ctncl trcln sact ion costs , it is highly
un likel y tha t th ey will ever voluntarily aggr c~a te to alte r us e of the asse t. In our case. formali ze d nega ti ve ease ments (w hi ch we labe l a ntiprope rt y ease me nts) in th e hands of neighbors are lik e ly to prod uce a
regime in which it is pract ica lly impossibl e fo r unwant ed deve lop ment
to threate n conse rva tion of the clefcndccl property.
Our proposa l to form ali ze antiprope rt y ease me nts gives ri se to
seve ral important insights - both prac tic al an d th eoret ical. First. and
co unt e ri ntu itively, we show that in creased transaction cos ts can be a
va lu able policy respo nse to mark et failures . T he accep ted lore amo ng
bw and economics scholars has bee n th at wh e n transact ion cos ts are
positive, "'the prefe rred legal rule is the rul e that minimizes th e effect s
of tran sac tion costs .'' 17 We introdu ce a coro ll ary : when tran saction
cos ts may no t be minimized by legal rul es. the solutio n may be to consc iously crea te addi tion al transaction costs. Where transaction costs
sys temati ca lly bias the market in favo r of one outcome. and it is to o
cost lv to elimin ate th e transaction cos ts. th e best optio n for decision-

dtl\\ S. (1) i n tc:r fe rin ~ with air riPwin g to vo ur land in a de fin ed chan ne l. (-') re mo vi ng the
support uf nl ur build ing (usuall v by excavat ing or rcnwv ing a suppo rti ng 1vall). ; lll d (-+ ) in t ~ rfc:rinc: with the fl ow o f water in ;l!l arti ficia l stream. ·· J r:;S F D t.KE:\tJNIER & .l r\\tE S E.
J..:.r<IER.-PR OI'CRTY S55 -5o (5th eel. 20111) (fo c, tn o tcs omiticd). In th ~ tna in. thi s position has
bee n ad opted in the United States . a ltho ugh .. now and then a new t\·pc of ncgati,·e easement
is recog nized ·· /d. a t S:'i7 .

I :'1. Sec inji-u not es 11:5 -12') and accompanvin g text. Th e importan ce -- and relative fra gilit\· - ·of de facto po litica l ri ghts in prom oting e n,·ironmcnu l prot ec tion has been not ed
previouslv. Sec·. e.g.. Ja so n Scott .lohnston. On rl1c ,\Iarke' lin· EcnS\'.\'IC/11 Co;u ro/. 21 V,\.
Ewn LJ. t2Y . LN-4 1 (2 002).
16. Sec gcnc r{f//y . in.fi·u note s 63 -60 and

~tcc o n1p:tny in ~ k.\t.

17 .·\. 'dtTCt iELI. POL\ i\SKY. AN li"Tt\ODL 'CTION
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makers may be to create countervailing transaction costs. 1' The i\rticlc
thus points to a new way of resolving market flaws. applicable even
bcvond the context of conservation.
-Our second insight relates to the literature on private property and
commons. Existing~ theory recognizes three cardinal prototypes of
prop e rty regimes: public, commons , and private propcrty ~ Public
property, as we have discussed , may be prone to mismanagement clu e
to political failure. Theorists have also identified a paradigmatic shortcorning that plagues each of the latter two regimes: the tragedy of th e
commons·'" ancl the tragedy of the anticommons. ' 1 The former plagues
cornmons property, leading to overexploitation of commons resource s.
No one own e r fully internalizes all of the costs associated with the
commons. so all users have an incentiv e to overuse. The tragedy of the
anticommons. conversely, is emblematic of private property regimes.
In an anticommons. ·' multiple owners are each endowed with the righ t
to e:\clude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective
p:-ivilcge of use.''" The result is that resources are undercxploit ecl . In
this Article, we herald the existence of a fourth prototype that avoids
the problems of mismanagement, overuse, and unclercxploitation: a
hybrid conservation commons that incorporates aspects of the three
pure regimes. We explain how th e existence of a group of property
owners that receives positive externalities from an asset often eviscerates the ordinary concept of commons, creating in its place a hybrid
commons with e lements of private property. 23
1

l S. Our proposal here may be seen as a proposal for a second-best outcome. in which
economics seeks the optimal result given the constraints of irreso lvable market distorti o n s.
as w e ll as res o urce constraints. On second-best theory. sec Karla Hoff. The Second Tileorc111
of rile Seco nd Besr. 25 J. PUB. ECON. 25 (1994); R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancast e r. Fil e Gencm!
Theurv of rile Second-!Jesl. 24 REV. ECON. STUD. II ( 1956).
l'! See J EREP.IY WALDRON. THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 37-42 (I 90S); cj:
Daniel H. Cole, Clearing rhe Air: Four Prop osirions Abour Property Hig/ir.y !llld Ln<·imn·
nz cnlill Prorecrion, 10 D UKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y f. 103 (1999) (arguing that a ll environmen ta l problems must be solved within the framework of the traditional property trilogy).
flur see Michael A. Hell e r. llze Dy namic ; \nalvrics of Pro pertl' Law. 2 THE O RETIC A L
Ic;O U IR! ES L. 79 (2001) (arguing for a distinction between pri va te and a nticummons propertv. and for the inclusion of anticommons as a fourth type ) .
20 . (jarrct Hardin. Tlze Trugedv ofrlze Conunum. lo2 SCIENC E 1243 ( Jl)6:-;).

21. See Michael Hel le r. Tl1c Trugedv of rile 1\nriconun ons: Properrv in rl1c Trunsili<'!l
timn ;'v!un ro Mark ers. ll J H,\R V. L. REV. 621 (ILJ'.!SJ [h crc inafkr H e ll.c r. Tlz,· Frug ccl\' of
rlz e / \nricnll/JJIO!Is].

22. ill. at 624 .
23 . Ellickson was the first to n o te that anticommons may be a useful p o licy tool when
the go al is non-u se. Robert C. Ellickson , Prop erry in Land. 102 YALE LJ. 1315 . 1322 11. 22
(llJ93). Yet. h e con c luded that ·'[b]ccausc anticommonsc s yield no pmfits. the y :<rc: tvpi ca lll
o wn e d by e ither governments or nonprofit o rganization s:· !d. This conclusion ignores the
pos itive e xterna!itics tha t anticonunons re girn es can generate for privat e prope rty ownL·rs.
\Ve show th a t insofar as parks a nd open space are concerned. a properly ta il o red a nti cu m rn o ns reg ime vicld s real benefits to adjacent propertv owners. as wel l cts th e pu bl ic ctl l~tr"c.
dnd is thu s pcrl'cctlv suit a ble for private ownership.
,
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Third. our analysi s reveals a s urpri sing symbiotic dynamic betwee n
private deve lopme nt on th e fringes of gree n space a nd e nvironm e ntal
conservation. Specifically. we sh ow that public parks enhance th e
value of pri va te prop e rties ab utting th em, which in turn creates abut tin g owners' stakes in park pres e rvation.'.) We harness this insi ght to
provid e a ne w blu e print for co ns erv in g ope n spa ces in areas expecting
aggress ive ancl und esire d d eve lop me nt.
Fourth, a nd finally. we submit that formalizing antiprope rty ease me nts adds a kga l dimension to th e alrea d y-prese nt political right. and
cr ea tes the dynamic uf Yes [n M y Back Yard ("Y IMBY')." The a nti pro perty ease me nt pro vide ;;; the inverse of a nuisa nce s uic where nuisance a llows p ro ximat e-pro pe rt v own e rs to cou nte ract negative e xternalities affe ct ing the enjoyment of their prope rty. e nforc e ment a ctio ns
base d on antipro pc rt y eas e me nt s can preserve positive ext e rn a liti es
be nefiting their p ro perty. Th e antiproperty ease m en t thus pe rmit s the
correction of in dficiencics crea te d by e xt e rnaliti es. Formalizin g the
ease m e nt all o ws the courts to be come a n addition a l are na (in addition
to legislat ive . exec uti ve, and admini strati ve bodies) in which a butting
owners can light to preserve th e positive ex ternaliti es produced by
gree n space .
Th e Article proceeds in five parts. fn Part I , we describ e conventio nal theori es th a t pre dict und e rprovision and overexploitation of
parks and green spaces, and urge gove rnm en t inte rvention to re so lve
th ese difficulties. W e the n sho w how th ese conventional theo ries
overlook the corollary problem of conse rving parks and gree n sp aces
conseq ue nt to government int e rvention . Lobbying b y deve lopers may
in many cases prompt the government to succumb to political press ure
a nd pe rmit developm e nt of previously designat ed green areas , even
when develo pment is undesirabl e.
In Part Il , we discuss th e e mpirical evidence of the existe nce of de
facto antiproperty easements and their importance in preserving open
space. We th e n es tablish th e det a il s of our proposal for de jure formalization of such ea sem en ts, and employ public choice theory to
de monstrate the desirability of our proposal.
In Part I II , we bro aden our analysis to demonstrate th a t our approach to hybrid public-private goods has importa nt implica tions for
th e concept of com mons in prop erty th e ory. We show that antiprope rty regim es build on the co ncept of a nticommo ns to add a fourth
method of go verning co mm ons to the ex isting three m echani sms: pri-

24. See in/ia Part [ I.A.
25. Y IMBY is th e o pposite of th e more famous NIMBY ("Not In My Back Yaru.'). For
a di scussio n of N l MB Y. see W il liam i\. Fisch e l. V01ing. Risk A version , an d 1h e N 1/vf BY S\'1/ drmn e: A Co nun m r u 11 f<obcrr N elson's "Pri vari zing :he N eighhorhood. ·· 7 GE O. JVL\ SO~ L.
REV . 881 ( 1999): Ba rak D. Ri chman. Mandaring N ego riario ns ru So lve !h e NIM BY Prohle111:
/ \ Crerui ve Regula/On' l?espun se . 20 uC LA J. Ei\ VTL. L. & Po L· Y 223 (2001 /2002) .
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va tiza tio n, reg ulation , a nd reliance o n public norm s . Spc:ci fi ca ll y, we
demonstrate that antiprop e rty syste ms crea te a unique: hybrid of
commons a nd priva te property. a nd id ea ll y prese rve conse rvation
com mons .
In Pa rt IV , we ex plore th e flex ib ilit y offered to policymakers by
a ntiproperty easeme nts by co nn e ctin g o ur ana lys is to e ntitlement th e ory. Specifica lly , with re fe r e nce to o ur p rev ious writin gs on th e law o f
27
e ntitl e me nts , including takings. 2" givings a nd pli ab ilit y rule s . ~' we
s how th a t antiproperty case m e nts ca n be a d apt e d to changin g circumst ances a nd a vari e ty of polici es.
Fina ll y, in Part V. we di scus s pot e n tial obj e ctions to our p ro posa l.
e xamin e the alternatives to antipropcrty reg ime s, and illumin a te th e
int e rplay betw ee n our proposal ancl o ther proposa ls in prop e rty a nd
e nviro nme nt al law. W e co nclud e tha t antipropcrty re g im es w ill ofte n
o utp er fo rm regulation , judici a l e nforct:mc n t of the p u bli c- tru s t doctrine. a nd conserva ti on easements in e ns ur in g con se rva ti o n.

I.

PA RKS: TH E GOOD. THE BAD . A~ D THE TR ACIC

Parks a nd g ree n sp aces are uniqu e goods within th e world of prop e rt y the o r y. Th e y are , on the on e hand. in1pure pub li c goods, thought
to be subj e ct to uncl e rprovision by th e rnarket. 29 The traditional reme d y for this problem is gove rnme nt pro vision .30 On the o ther hand ,
pa rks are commons pro p e rty, typi cally ope n to th e p u b li c at la rge, and
thus suscep tible to the problem o f overexploitat io n.-' 1 Th e s tandard re -

26. Ab raham Bell & Gideon Parchomov sky. /'uk ing1 f< ~ussess~ d.
( 200 I) (he rei naft er Bell & Parcho movsky. Ta k in gs Reassessed] .
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27. Abraham Bell & G id eon Parchomovs ky. Gi1·in gs, Il l YALE L.J. 547 (2UUI) [h c: reina ftcr Be ll & Parchomo vsky, Giving.,· ].
2~. Abraham Bell & Gide on Parchomovskv. Pliability Rules. Wl MI CH. L. R EV. l
(2002 ) [he rei nafte r Bell & Parcho movsky. Plia bilit\' Rul~s] . .

29. Sc:e infi·a no te 3-1 for a defini ti on o f pub lic gouds. S ec alsu J AMES i'vl. BUCf-IA\'AI'.
T HE D EMAND AND SUPPL Y OF PUB LI C GOO DS -1\1 -7-1 (l\16~) : RI CIL-\ IW A . MUSGRA VE &
PE GG Y B. iVIUSG Rr\VE. PUBLIC FINANC E IN TH EO RY .-\i\D PR.-\CTI CE -19-85 (5th e el . 1\18\1) :
Barton H. Thompso n. Jr .. Conservmion Options: To 11·1ml a Grcrua Privm~ Role . 21 V .-\ .
ENVTL L ..l. 2-15, 252 (2002) .
~ 0. S ee . e. g .. Willi am H. Oak land. Puhlic Goods. Perfect Competition. a111 / Underpro duction. 82 .J. POL. ECO N. 927 (197 -1 ).

31. See Frank f. Mic hc lman. Ethics, £cono111ics. wul th e L i iiV of Prupcrrv. in ETHI CS .
ECONOM ICS. AND THE L\W: NO!vi OS XXIV 3. 5 (J. Roland Pennoc k & Jo hn W. Chapma n.
eels .. 1982) (A commons propert y is one in which ·' there J rc nev er any exc lus io nary rights.
A ll is p ri vil ege. People arc lega ll y free to do as they wis h. and are able to do. with wha tev er
obj ec ts (co nceiva bly including pe rsons) are in th e [commons j.'') . E linor O st rom defined a
"cummon-po ol resource " as ·'a natural o r man-m ack re so urce sys tem th at is sufficie ntlv
la rge as to mak e it cos tlv (bu t not imposs ib k) to exclude po tenti al beneficiari es from obtain ing be nefits fr om its use ." ELINOR OSTRUM. GOVt::R NIMi THE COM!YIO NS: THE
[VOLUTlO\J OF [NST ITLiTIONS FOR CUL LECT/V[ ACT I\J\J 30 (1900)
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sponse to such tragedies of the com mons is privatizatio n": This tension between the two demanded soluti on s -- gove rnm e nt prov ision.
on the one: hand. and priva te mvn ership. o n the o th e r - sho uld not
obsc ur e the source or both unclerprovision and ove rnpluitati on . Bo th
underpro vision a nd ovc rexp loitat ion ste m from a C(lllcc ti vc ac ti on
prob lem. '' ln both cases . the allocation of ma rgina l costs and benefits
leads incli viclu al us ers a nd produ cers to ma ke dec isi ons th at detract
fro m ne t socia l welfa re . whi le a collect ive dec isio nm a l;:ing app a ratu s
would lc:acl to opt imal pro vision and prese rvation.
In thi s Pa rt . we exa min e th e co ll ective acti on pr ub lcm posed by
parks ancl brin g to light an im portan t element that hds e lud ed traditional theory. Any ana lvsi s of publicly provided goocl s must incorruratc an e\aminat io n o r the ques ti o n of pu blic clec isionm a king. In o the r
wo rds. it is not e nough lu note simply th at mism at chc:d incentives will
lead a privatel y ordered market to welfare-d imi nishin g Lk cisiuns. We
must also wk e account of the fact that mi smatch ed incen ti ves mav also
k <tcl public decisi onnwke rs to ma ke simila rly welfare -d iminishing decis ions. Fo r exa mrk. prodevelopmen t interes t groups nwy. O il <Iecoun t
of inh erent coordination advantages, captu re the politi ca l process in
order to effect inefficiently development o f parks and other gree n areas. Thi s probl e m may be labe led mismana ge me nt.
In th e foll ow ing sections. we aim to desc ribe fully the trio uf collecti ve act io n problems associate d with parks: uncl e rprov ision. uve rcxploi tati on, and mismanagem ent. We discu ss the q uestion of th e timing
of each probl em. noting which proble ms ar ise ex ant e (p rior to provision of th e pa rk ) and whi ch arise ex post (aft e r prov isio n). Since o ur
goa l in this Part is to se t up our discussion of ex post . rather than ex
ante. soluti ons to th e challenge of park provision and ma inte nance , we
pay cl oser att e ntion to overex ploitation and ex post mismanagement.
We begin our di scussion by laying o ut th e theory of public gou ds and
co mmon s property.
A.

Trudilional U/1(/erswndings of Public Goods

Pure public gu ocls. in economic parlan ce . disp lay tw u salien t charac teristi cs: lack of ri va lry in consumption and non e\c luclabi lity o f
be ndits 3 4 Non rivalry impli es th e ine xha ustibili ty of the good . For

.o2. S1.'c Hardin. supra no te 20. at 12-+7: see also . e.g .. Cuo t Ro>c:. 1h e Cu111 edr of' r/re
Conu nuns: Cus/UIII. Cununace. an d lnlraellll\· Puhlic Pmperry. 53 U. C lll. L. R EV . 7tl. 7-+1>
( Jl)t\6) (d isc uss in g th e pr ivat iza tion uf sho re li ne tn preve nt the uvc-rL'\p lni ta ti on o f fish).
-'~· T he classic wo rk on co llectiv e
COL.I. cCT I VE ACT IO\ ( tLJ7J ).

acti on pro blems is M AN CUR O t.SO'i . TH e LOC tC Of'

~-+ . Th e preci se de finiti on ul pu bl ic good is :1 matt e r of some cuntrCl\'t: rS\ . tl :tr cJ id Dc·msc tz has argu~cl th at 1.1 good is a public good so lely' on the ground s o f IH li lri,· cdr llllS cu nsum p·
ti<>n. Tu De msc tz. a pub li c guud ~Vh i c h sa ti sfi es the addi tio nal conclitiun u l nonL'\C luda bit it y
tS :1 "cul k ct ive ~uud ... Harold Demsd z. Tire /' riulle l're>ducrie>ll of l'ul>/ic ( ;'""Is. I~ J .L. &
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example , J a ne can brea th e all th e air she wants w ithout 1rn p mgin i!:
upon Ka re n 's usc o f th e air . Non cx clud a bility rete rs to the m ab d1t y o t
public good owners to limit use of the good . For exa mple , 1l Laura
were to buy all th e clea n a ir in the wo rld, sh e would not be ab le to
limit Jan e's and Karen's a bility to breathe it. Th ese twin character istics
are respo nsib le for th e lo ng-r-ecog ni zed p roble m of und e rpr ovis io n o f
p ubli c good s . ~ 5
No nexclucl ab ilit y prevents producers from capt urin g the full marginal benefit of providin g a product. e ven thou gh they b ea r the full
marginal cost. Fo r examp le . suppose tha t Laura would li ke to e njoy
the b enefits of a clean pub li c street. If La ura were to pay for stree t
cl eanin g. however. she co uld not preve nt J an e and Karen from e nj oy ing th e aest he tic plc<isurc of J. clean street free of charge . LaurJ.. in
o ther word s. co uld not bloc k Jan e's and Karen 's a tt e mpts to e ngage in
fre e-ridin g. In this case. no individu a l would clea n the street s in ce the
clean stree t wo ul d be use d fo r fre e bv a lL while the stree t clea ner
wo uld bea r th e cos t. Thus. from a n ex a nt e pe rspective , no nexcl udability un derm in es the provision of public goods.
Th e public goods prob le m m ay be e xpressed in game theoretic
fashion as a '·Prison e rs' Dilemma.·'·'" Coordin at io n of all conce rned
parties leads to th e m os t adva ntageous result. Abse nt such coordination , howeve r, publi c goods a re und e rprod ucecl 37
Th e traditional so lll[i o n to th e problem of und e rprodu ctio n of
public goods is governmen t interv c n tio n:'s Indee d , for economists, the
provision of public goods is so close ly co nnected with government that
one defi niti o n of public goods is ·'a ll those effects which a government
has on th e m e mbe rs of soc ie ty.•·YJ Ge nerall y, gove rnm e nt h as eithe r
subsidized or provided p ublic goods in order to make up for unde r-

ECON. 293 (1970): see also RI CI I.-\RD COR N ES & TODD S;\ND LER . THE THEORY OF
EXTER NA LITI ES. P UBLIC GOODS. .-\ND C L UB GOODS 6-7 ( l ')86).

35. Im portant ly. the ch;1r;Kt<: ri zatio n of goo ds as public depend s in large pari on te chnology. Ne w tec hnologie s allow fo r exclusi on fro m goods that were previ ous ly dee med
'·public. " The most famo us example of th is phenomenon is the inven tion of barbed \vire. Elli ckson, supra note 23.
36. Set: AI..L.-\N M. F ELmi.-\N . WE LFA RE E CONO~I I CS AN D SOC I AL CH O ICE THEOR Y
112-14 (19S0): DON A LD P. ( i REEN & lAN SHAPIRO . PATHOLOG I ES OF RAT ION ,\L C H O IC E
THEORY 72-77 (1994) : R USSI-:1.1. H AR DI N . COLLECT IVE A CTI ON 16-28 (1982): DENNIS C.
MUELL ER. PUBLIC CliO IC E I l 9- 15 ( 1989): EDNA 1.JLUvL\N l' -!VI .-\RGALI T. THE EMERGE NCE
or NOR\ ·IS 49 -53 ( 1977) : D;>phna Lcw insohn -Zami r. Consumer Prefert:nces. Cili ~t:n Preferences. and 1i1 e Pro1·ision nf Puhlic Goods . 108 YALE L.J. 377 (l9LJ ~) . The Prison.cr's Dilemma
is o ft e n demons trated tabularly in the form o r a two-pla yer matrix.

37. See Oakland. s upra note 3U.

38. Se e id.
39. WALTE R NICIIOL SON.
EXTEl'S IONS 40-l (1972 ) .
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production: the costs of these measures. however_ are born e by the
public at large. through taxation."u

B.

Tragedy of rhe Commons

Alongside the traditional problem of underproduction of public
goods. lies the different, but no less acute , dilemma of overexploitation of publicly owned goods. Garrett Hardin's Tlz e Tmgcdy of rlze
ConunullS ramously unveiled this problemJI Hardin illustrated the
phenomenon with the example of an open rural pasture. He posit e d
that shepherds would a llow their herds to overgraze the pasture since
eac h shepherd only bears a small fraction ot th e marginal cost o f eac h
use . while e njoying the full marginal benefit. T he re su lt is th e tragedy
of the commons: property held in common will be overe xploited-'"
Hardin's oft-cited conclusion was that '·[f]reedom in a commons brings
ruin to all. ··.J'
For the sake of clarity, it must be noted that Hardin was not re ferring to public goods, but rather to commons goods. Indeed , Hardin's
tragedy would never arise with respect to pure public goods , since
pure public goods are inexhaustible. By definition. a pure public good
may never be ove rexploited; the pu re public good of information is
never depleted, for example, and consequently is not susceptible to
overexploitation. Impure public goods , however, may fall prey to
Hardin's tragedy.
Within the realm of impure public goods, Hardin presented an important counterpoint that calls for government provision of goods.
Traditional public goods analysis focuses on the ex ante problem of
provision: the inability of producers to appropriate the full marginal
benefit of provision leads to an ex ante decision not to provide. Once
the assumption of inexhaustibility is relaxed, an ex post problem arises
as well. As Hardin noted, the mismatch between beneficiaries of
commons goods and those who bear the marginal cost of each use will
eventually lead to the "tragedy'' of overexploitation.~.J

.HJ. Since it is often infeasible to measure acc urately individual usc uf public goods. the
government cannot cal ibrate tax payments to actual use of public goods. and thus cro s s~
subsidization results. S ee . e.g .. Shubha Ghosh. Pills, Plllenrs, a111l l'o wer: Swrc Crearion o(
Cra\' iv/arkers m 11 Limil on Palen/ Righ1s. 14 F l_.-'\. J. lNT. L L. 217. 226~2 7 (2002) (noting tha.t
wh e n a public good is provided by the government an d financed through taxes "some will
pay more and some less than the ir valuation of the public good").

41. Hardin. supra note 20.

42 . !Ju1 sec Ro se. supra note 32.
43 . Hardin. supra note 20. at 1244.

44/d
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Wi th regard to overexploitation, publi c pa rks are ge ner a ll y eon sicl erecl pub li c goods tha t m.ay acquire characte risti cs o f pri vdte goods.~ '
~\common exa mple of such hybrid izati o n is the im pos iti on of fees o n
park users. 4 " Th e fee r eq uirement e limin ates the str ict non cxc luclabil itv of the park. On ly paying users may enter the park and enjoy its fa ci liti es. Si mult aneo usly, o th er as pects of th e park re main non e xclud ab le. For instance, eve n for no np ayers, th e park produ ces cl e:m
a ir and p leasant views. Parks are not alone in th t' ir hybrid na tur e :
re nown ed econom ist J a mes Buchanan posits th at --r he ek:me nts or
demand for any goo d whe ther thi s be class ifi e d as who ll y. p;nt ia ll y. or
not at all ·publi c· by th e sta ndard criteria, may be Ltc torecl dow n in to
private and collective aspects. -- 47
A n exa mple may he lp illustrate th e problems of overcxplo it:lt ion
;mel uncle rpro vi~ion with respe ct to parks. Ass um e tha t th e co nstru ction ot a park in the city of Sprin gfield will cos t $750.000 and e nh anc e
the we lfare o f the co ll ec tive citi ze nry by $1 million. fo r a net soc ieta i
g"in of $250.000 . The land on whic h th e park is to be built. however. is
privately owned. and th e o wner est imat es that onl y $5 0{J()(JI) co uld be
co ll ec ted in fe es fro m pote ntial p a rk users; the o th e r be nefi ts tak e th e
fo rm of clean a ir and aes thetic beauty access ible to non payers from
outside the p ark. Absent governme nt interve ntion - or some oth er
form of co ll ec ti ve ac ti on - Springfi e ld will not build th e park . providin g a classic illust rati on o f unde rprovisio n.
Suppose, th e refore, th a t Springfie ld takes th e property thro ugh its
power of eminent dom a in and creates an open-access park , fu nded by
taxes imposed e qually on the enti re popul ation - say, a tax of $ 1 pe r
pe rson o n a population of 750 ,000. The ex an te problem of underpro vision is assuaged by gove rnment interventio n, but an ex post problem
of ove rcxploitat io n is cre ated in its stead. Under an ope n access
regim e, all Springfield resid e nts will usc the park , eve n th o ugh ove ru se
mean s tramplin g vegetation, tearing up turf, and ge n e ratin g litter be yond the city's ability to clean. Any individu al Springfield citize n will
pay $1 regardless of whether he or she uses the park , a nd th erefore th e
marginal cost o f each indi vidual use is $0. On the other ha nd. eac h use
provides enjoym e nt to the citizen, creating a margin al ben efit greater
than $0. Springfi e ld citi ze ns will therefore use th e park until its de -1 5. Felt· a n analysis of parks and open spaces as public guods, see . for example. Marla [.
iVIa nsfic:ld. When ··Privme .. Riglus i'vlee/ "Public" Rig111S: The Prol!lems of Laheling and
R egularoJT Takings . 65 U. COLO. L. RE V. 193 .203 (1994) (ex tendi ng .. pub lic goods .. a na lysis
to sound ecological managem en t). C.J Thompson. supra note 29. at 252 (sta ting that
.. [a]lth ough no empiri ca l study has been conducted. th e bu lk of the benefits from most la nd
cunservati on ma y not cons titute publ ic goods') .
46. S~<! J M.tES i\·1. BUCHA NAN . 4 TH E COLL ECTE D WORKS OF J .V-.JES i\ 1. BLTII A'i .-\N:
PL;flLJC F l'iANCE IN D EMOCR ,\TTC PR OCESS: FII'AN CIAL l /\ST ITLT!O NS .-\'iD INDI VID L'AL
CI IOIC:E 2 l(l99'J).
-17."'
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stru ction. Importantly. rai sing taxes will no t so lv e th e probl e m or clisto rt c cl p ersonal in ce nti ves . No ma tt er ho w high taxes a re , th e margin a l
cos t o f ea ch usc will rem a in ze ro sin ce there is no re lationship betwe en
tax liability a nd us e . R es id e nts will continu e usin g th e park so lon g a s
their m a rgin a l be nefit is positi ve ."'

C.

Th e Anri-Co nservurion Rios

Pa rk s a rc Impure publi c goods on two co unts . First, man y par ks
ma y be fe nce d in to exclud e nonpaying us e rs. Admitt edly , with respect
tu so me park s. exc lusio n is not cos t-effe cti ve. E spe cially with res pe ct
to la rge par ks . the cos t o f e rec tin g and maint a ining fe nces may o ft e n
o utwe ig h th e be ne fit s.-"' Moreove r , many wo uld oppose a limit e d
access reg im e fo r par ks o n d ist rib ut ive a nd id e ol ogica l gro und s 511 Th e
d is tributi ve con ce rn is thclt limite d a ccess to parks would in vari a bl y
exclud e th e lea st-w e ll- o ff m e mbers of soci e ty , de priving them of re cre ati o na l o pp o rt uniti es a nd natur e . Th e ide ol ogica l oppositio n is th a t
na ture must re ma in access ible to a lL free of the res traints o f pri va te
pro pe rty 5 1
Seco nd. parks admit or nonri va lrous uses o nl y to a ce rt a in po int.
Whil e low int e nsit y uses in m ode ration, s uch as bird watchin g, are
nonrivalrou s_ uses beyo nd a ce rtai n inte nsity o r fr e qu e ncy are incompatible. For exa mpl e , inten sive hunting is not lik e ly to b e compatible
with inte nsi ve hikin g within a confine d area. Indee d , conse rvation - if
defin e d as prese rvin g na ture in its pristin e sta te without hum an interfer e nce- is lik e ly to rival e very other use. 52
On the surface. conse rva ti o n , as an anti-use, a ppe ars to b e a lo wint e nsity use th a t see ms to be inve rse ly symme trical to othe r uses of
und evelop ed pro p e rty. Th e symme try is fals e , h owe ver , since many
use s are comp a tible with o ne a no the r, while conservation is incompatible with all. 5-' T o illustrate this furth e r, it is helpful to re turn to the
trage d y of the comm o ns. Sta ndard analysis of commons prope rty
a lw ays posits a gro up of users who wish to e xpl o it the resource s in
some wa y - be it lo gg ing , graz in g, farmin g, or mining. The ine vitabl e
-1 1-\_ or co ur:;e_ co nsidc ra bk ta x incre ases ma y lead vote rs to press for a di ffe rent gov ernment dec isio n reg:1rd ing the pa rk. We adcl n: ss th is iss ue in in fi-a Part LD .
-19.

Sc~

Ell icksu n_supra note 23.

)()_ We remai n agnosti c wi th respect to th e coge ncy of th e two conce rns.

5l. Sec Carol !vi. Rose _ The Several Fwu res of Prop erly: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales.
1-_-lllission Trades tuu/ Ecos_vsiC!iiS . 83 M INN . L RE V. 129. 163 ( 1998) .

52. In thi s defin it io n of conse rva ti o n. we do not me an to e xclud e no-impa ct an d lo wimpac t us.:s .
53. W.: prc:s um.;_ for simpli city's sake·. th a t all oth e r uses involve " human inte r rcrc: ncc"
inc o mpati ble wit h c1 ur cl di niti o n of co ns.: rvation. For a ge nera l di sc uss io n or th e fa lse :1 \Jurc
or SVII1111clry in desc rib ing righb. sec Daphn e Barak -Erez 8.: Ron Shap ira . The /)e/u sili/1 of
s_,.llli nc lrlc 1\/glli.\ . l 'J OX FO RD .1 . L lC,-\L ST UD. 297 ( 1999) .
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result o f this ass umpti on is that ho lding prope rty in co mmons is in exor<J bl y accomp a ni ed b y e xcess ive usc of resource s. The sta nd a rd story
fail s to cons id e r the possib ility of a preference lor conservation (or
other highly de manding use) . If one ass um es that so me of th e comm on
owners wish to conserve rat h e r to co nsume . a very diffe re nt probl e m
mi se s. Si nce conse rvat ion is in co mpatible:: wit h any mode o r exp loita tion. co nservationists and exploit e rs will find th emse lves on a collisio n
cours e . Since a co mmons regime pe rmits eve ry grou p m embe r to use
th e property as she wishes , h oweve r, conse rva ti o ni sts will a lm os t certainl v lose . Nonco nservationi sts, howeve r. will not nc cessarilv lose
sinc e their competitors ' use will often st ill leave e nough of th e reso urce for th e m to use , a t least in th e short te rm . !ro ni ca lly, th e conse rv~Hio ni s t s ' sure loss occ urs desp ite th e fact that conse rvatio n as a n
anti -use is th e o nly prefe rence that doc s not lead to d e pl e tion. a n d
thu s averts the tragedy of the commons.
H e nce, in an o pen access reg ime. conse rva ti o n is s ure to lose o ut ,
join ed o nly by the mo st highl y clemancling uses . And yet at the same
time, co nservation is al so the on e use that , if universa lly shared. aligns
indi vidua l and gro up we lfa re. In a comm o ns. it only takes o ne perso n
w ho fa il s to share th e conse rvat ion preference to undo the conserva tion eq uilibrium.
D.

Conserving Govern!llenr-Provided Public Go ods

Whil e traditional th eorists d ebate ex te nsively the m eas ures re quired to ensure the pro vision of public goods , th ey ge ne ra lly do not
connect the discussion to an eq ually ex te nsive exa min ation of the
quest ion of how government actu ally makes choices. Rath e r. the traditional disc ussion of public goods has trea ted govern m e nt as a n idea lized provide r in accord a nce with the co llec tive interes t. 54 T his id ea lized view of gove rnme nt is belie d by th e more complex politi ca l
realiti es as ca ptured by th e te achings of public choice theo ry. Public
choice teaches that gove rnme nt , no less tha n a ny o th er in stitution , is
an are na in which participants see k to maximize th e ir welfare.
Accord ingly, the decisio ns m ad e by go vernm e nt are d riven by
rent-seeking, and such decisions o ft e n fa il to coincide with the collecti ve good. 55
Th e re are va rious vi ews as to which rent-seekers gen e rally dominat e the po liti ca l process - agents (t he polit icians) , interest groups. o r
5-l. See . e.g .. \V! L UA;vl A. F I SC HEL. R EGU L ATORY TA KIN C S: LA W. ECONO WCS r\ND
PO LITI CS 203 -IJ-l (1995) ( noting that this view is oft e n labeled. not e ntire ly accurately. a s

'·Pigovi8n·· or ·' Pigouvian").
55. Sec . e.g .. DA N I EL A. f A RB ER & PHILIP!' f'I!I CKEY . LA W ,·\ N D P UB LI C CHOI CE : A
CR ITICAL h T ROD U CT ION (199t); William N. Eskri dge. Jr.. Poiilics W il/wu/ i<.omlll lce: 1111-

plicillions of f'u hlic Theo rv .for S1murorv illlap r!'lalinn. 7-l Y ,\_ L. R EV. 275. 29-l -95 (J LJXSJ
(de scrib in g the social cos ts o f re nt-seekin g s ta tu te s) .
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maj o riti es. for simplicity" s sake, sup pose a world in which deci sions
arc made a ccording to th e ne t va lue of ca mp a ign co ntributi on s. Let us
su ppose fu rt he r th a t campa ign con tri bu li o ns a re macle on th e basis o f
voters' perceived self-inte re st. While esc hew in g th e que sti o n as to
wh e th e r a ge nts, majoriti es , or interes t groups arc likel y to domin a te
th e political process, we posit th a t th e di stortion s produced by rent driven clec isionma k in g m ay undermin e both the production a nd pres e rva ti o n of parks -'"
Conside r aga in ou r earlie r example of th e pote nti al park in the city
o f Sprin gfie ld. Assume that th e pa r k is now est a blis hed, a nd that it
provides a net bene fit of $1 million to th e 750,000 r es id e nts of Springfie ld . i. e ., a ne t be nefit of $1. 33 pe r res id e nt. Concre te Jungle, Inc. , a
pri vate construction company, es tima tes that if it could build a parking
lot o n the space occ upied by the pa r k, it wou ld ge ne ra te a profit, net
of b uil d in g and ot he r expe nses, o f $200,000. In a n id ea l world , the
propose d p roj ect would no t be b uil t sin ce it is a less cllicicn t use .
!Vla int a inin g the pa rk be nefi ts soci a l wel far e by $1 m illi o n, wh il e
building th e project yie lds a ga in o f o nl y $200,000: thu s. the ne t effect
of b uildin g th e project is a soc ial loss of $800,000. fntr od ucing publi c
cho ice the o ry , howe ver, de monstra te s the perils of re lyin g upo n overly
simplistic mocl e ls.57
To exp lo re th e insights of pu blic choice theory, let us now add
three ass umpti o ns to the sto ry. First , supp ose that eac h p o tential beneficiary o f the la nd us e will m a ke a cam paign co ntributi o n up to the
leve l of he r net benefit. Second , suppose th a t clue to ad minist ra ti ve
cos ts, no campaign contribution of less th an $5 will be acce pted . T hird,
suppose th a t o rganizi ng citizens into lo bbies cos ts $5 pe r p e rso n.
Given this political structure , Co ncrete Jungle will be able to go forward with its ineffici e nt plan. C o ncre te Jungle will be read y to contribute up to $200,000 in campaign con tributi o ns in o rd er to lobby for
th e lan d use change it desires. By contrast, conse rvat io ni sts will no t be
able to contrib ute even one penny. Individual r es iden ts of Springfield
wo uld e ach be re ady to contribute up to $1.33 in cam p a ign contributions towa rd co nse rvation of the park. Their contributi o ns wou ld no t
be acce pted by politicia ns or lobby ing gro ups , how ever, given admini strat iv e and organi za ti o n costs. And, given coo r din at ion costs of $5
aga inst a be nefi t of o nl y $1.33, no resident will unde rtake to o rga nize
her own lobby. Thus, in a syst e m in which votes reflect campa ign contributions , C onc rete Jungle will de feat conservationists .
56. Our mode l is lo osely modc kd o n th e observa tio ns of Man cur O lso n. See O LSON.
sup m no te 33: see also T OWr\RD A T HEORY OF THE R ENT-SEEK ING SOCIETY (Jame s M. Buch ~m a n eta!. ~ d s .. 1980 ): G eorge .1. Sti gle r. '/h e Th eon >of Econ omic l<egulariun . 2 BEI.I. .1 .
E CO 'i. & MG YIT. SCI. 3 ( ISill).
57. For simpli city"s sak e. we do not yet ta ke acco unt of di spari ti es among res idents
ab il itv to e njoy the pa rk's positi ve exte rnalit ies. Fo r d isc ussion basccl upon re laxa tion o f th is
assum pti o n. se~ Part 11. ;\.

16

,'v/icl1igun Lr!i\'

(~cviell'

Naturallv. the result we obtained in our Sprin gfie ld example depe nd s on our assumpt ion s. including th e pre sumed cos t structure and
adm ini s tra tive expenses. Neverth e le ss . the exam pl e s hows that o rdinary political decision structure s may lea d to decisions und erminin g a
be nefi cia l dec ision to provid e pa rl-s I ncl cc d. th e re is amp le rea so n to
be li eve that c1 ur hypoth et ica l example is L:mble matic of the political
cho ice s tructure rega rdin g rark s. P~uks p rodu ce widely diffu sed be nel'it s . whe re m o s t bc nelici arics enjov a re lati ve ly small gain. The co mpe ting development interes t prucluces a conce ntrat ed ben efit. where
e ach be nefi c iary e nj ovs a large ga in . Given th e e xi s te nce of organi zation cos ts. conservation intere sts ope rat e und e r a subs tantial clisadv(lntage.
On e mi g ht obj ect to o ur a na lys is on th e ground th at Man cur
Olson's tr:tclitional minoritarian model ol politics. under which sma ll
interest groups wit h lmv coo rdin a tion costs ha ve an inh e r ent advantage ove r larger. yet more clitlu s<.:: g rnu ps . is ove rly simplistic. After a ll.
vo te s a lso matter. and d e mocr~ttic elections favor majoritie s. Thi s objecti on has not esca ped th e att e n tion of public choice theo retici a ns.
Inde e d, som e p ubli c choice scholars have rej ecte d the int eres t group
mod e l of political d e cisi onmaking and deve lope d an a ltern at ive m o del
und er which the o ut com e of th e politi ca l process is shape d by two
co untervailin g for ces : th e min or itari an for ce and the majoritarian
force. "" Th e minoritarian fo rce re prese nts th e influe nce int e res t gro ups
e xert ove r th e political process through sup erior organization a nd
funding. Th e majoritarian force embodies th e a bility of the majority to
a ffect political decisionm a king through voting. Because the two forces
often pull in opposite direc tion s. the outcomes of political proc esses
ca nnot be det e rmin e d in th e abs tract. Rather , it depends on the int e rplay among various factor s such as int ens ity of prefe re nce s. the distribution of b e nefit s a nd costs. and th e severity of the coordin a tion
proble m fa ced by the majority.
It is important to uncl ers tancl, how eve r. that th e incorporation of
the m a jorita rian force docs no t guarantee op timal decisionmaking.' ''
The majorit a rian force mitigat es to some extent the ab ility of int e re st
groups to capture the political process. but it does not eliminate the
inhere nt adv a nta ge of orga ni zed groups. Wh e n th e ga in s from d eve lopm e nt arc substantial. the group pursuing d e velopment can increase
campaign contributions to offset th e potential loss in popularity.
Moreover, th e organized group can pa ss some of the ga ins to members

5K. See N Ell . 1...:. 1\. 0 \I ES .\!{. 1\IP I:'Y F J:: CT ALT E I\\XIIVJ::S: CHO OS I/\G INST ITLJTI O\S 1\

L\ w. ECO'\JO!\IIC'S. \\ Ll Pr.:nuc I'OLICY

:.v:n ( l'J9.J ). :1 nd ~u thorit ic s cited th e r·c in.

59. lmkcd. :1s Ken net h r\tT<JI\' de mun :< tr<J tc:d in "'hat h <IS co me to be kn m 1·n a> hi s .. im possibilitl' thcurc m ... there is no sv qcnl Pi' co llecti ve choi ce th:1 t consistently produ ces cuhercnt choice s in <Jccurdan cc with Vlltcr< ~1rck rc: n c.:s . KE N\CTH ARROW . SO C ic\L C H O ICES
.·\\D I ND I \ ' I D L'.'\L V .\l .: q: s i. ::'d cd . 1'){,3).
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of the maj o rity - either in th e form o f cas h or in -kind be nefits - to
a m e liora te th e ir opposition to th e proj e ct. Thus. a t the e nd of th e da y.
th e incorporation of the m a jorita ri a n force into th e mod e l affects the
magnitude of the distortion cause d by int e res t gr oups. hut it ce rtainly
d o e s not imply so cially optimal o ut comes.
More ove r, whe th e r s ubj ect to minori ta ri a n or maj o ritari a n domina tion, distortion s in gove rnm en t deci sio nm aki ng. s uch as fi sca l illusion , are lik e ly to make par ks vu ln e ra ble. Th e standard a ccount o f fi scal illusion predicts that governm e nt dec isionmak e rs will ig nore a ll
social cos ts and be nefits that cl o not specifica ll y a ppear in th e governm e nt a l buclget 6 0 Accordin gly. w he n considering pa rks. muni c ipa l cl ec isio nmake rs are dis pose d to look in g at re ve nu es [rom ta xes . fine s . and
ot he r sources, o n the o ne hand. a nd op e r<llional costs . o n the ot he r."'
This limit ed prism disadvanta ges p uhlic pa rks in two compl e me nta ry ways. The fir st is the high maint e na nce cost of pa r ks . Fl owers
nee d wate ring, trees a nd shrub be ry necess ita te trimmin g, trail s re quire
upk ee ping, and the g rounds as <I whole de mzmd cons tant cleanin g and
monitoring . These se rvic es impose a sub stanti a l burden on the
municip al bud ge t, and turn park s, es pec ia ll y in tim es of economic
distre ss , into prima ry candidates for th e bud ge ta ry axe .
Th e second disadvantage is th e pe rce ived negative e ffect of parks
o n municipa l tax bases. Public parks a nd gree n space do not contribute to the pool of tax able resources. On the contrary, parks occ up y
va lu a bl e proper ty whose developm e nt into resid e ntial a nd comm e rcial
proj e cts could substantiall y incre ase th e muni cipa l ta x bases. Thus , the
de velopment of pa rks not only e liminates a budgetary liability but al so
promises more revenues in property taxe s 62 Fiscal illusion can be particularly devastating to decisionmaking whe n be n e ficiarie s of parks
and those who fund the parks ' continued exist e nce come from differe nt jurisdiction s.
Finally, the possibility th a t the age nts- gov e rnment d ecisionmake rs - may m ake decisions based on illicit rents cannot be ignore d.
Sadly , government corrupti o n may m a ke publi c a ssets vu lnerab le, as

60. See . e. g .. La wre nce Blume & D a niel L. Rubinfcld. Coni[J enwrion Ji u· Takings: 1\ n
Econ omic Analysis. 72 CA L. L. Rt:v. ~69 . 62 1 ( 1984) .
61. See Cromp to n, sup ra note 10. at l -2.
I n co ntras t to th e e nha nced tax rc::vt.: nues acc rui ng from deve lop m e nt. co ntempo ra ry convc n·

ti o na! wisdom am ong many electe d offici a ls and decis io n makers is that ope n space a nd pa rk
lan d is a cost ly in ves tme nt from w hi ch a com m unity rece ives no economi c re turn. Th e soc ial

merit of such inves tm ent is \vi dely accep te d. hut soci 'li merit ~1menit ie s frequ e ntl y ar c re ga rded as being of secu ncla ry importance wh~n budge t prioritie s arc es t3hl ishcd.
/d .
62. See id. at l ("Gove rnme n t o fficials o ttc:: n seek to enh a nce t h ~ tax ba s..:s o f th~ i r
co mmuni ties by en couragin g d ev el op m e nt. T here is a wi d espre ad be li ef th a t this strategy
raises a ddition a l reve nu es fro m prope rt v ia xes . whic h then can he use d to improve co mm unit y SL'rvi ces withou t in cre asing th e taxe s or exis tin g re~i dcn ts . '·).
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clccisionmakers sel l of f public assets for pr ivate ga in. The case of the
B urea u of Land Management is illustrat ive. Part of the Int er ior
Department , th e B urea u of Land Man age m e nt is res ponsible fur uvcr
260 million acres o l public land. A major function of the Bureau is to
.. trade parcels with private landowne rs who want to acquire government Janel for commercial developm e nt. " 6 ' For yea rs. federal auditors
ha ve ex pr essed concern th a t the agency cons isten tl y uncl e ra ppra ises
gove rnme nt Ja nel in trades with private d eve lop e rs -"~ For examp le . in
one trad e in Nevada. in volving seventy acres of public land. the age ncy
appraised th e la nd tra nsferred to the d eve lope r at $763,000: yet. th e
develo per so ld it th e nex t cla y for $4 .6 million , for a profit of 6UO 'Yo(''
In an o ther recent case , the Bureau hired ''an e mployee of a pri vate
developer to work in th e land manage m ent office as a n ag e ncy offici a l.
His job wa s to manage land exch a nges being pursued bv th e
dev c loper.·· r,,
Last yea r, the App ra isal Foundation, a pr ivate group authoriz e d by
Co ngress to se t appra isa l standards for gove rnment age nci es . [ina ll y
launched a n in ves ti ga ti o n into the pract ices of th e Bureau of Land
Management. The findin gs were so alarming th at. in its re por t, th e
Fo und a ti o n sa id that ·' the bureau 's appraisa ls we re so often th e subject of political influ ence and potentia lly criminal abuse th a t th e
age ncy should no longe r be allowed to carry th e m o ut.' '"' The Found ation furth er suggested a n immediate m o ra tor ium on all Janel ex changes. adding that the Bureau's "past a nd currently proposed lane!
exchanges, and the ir implications for th e public trust , clearly warran t
comprehensive investiga tion from outsid e the D e partment of th e
Interior. ,.r,,,
·while th e Bureau of Land Managem ent 's case by no mean s im pli es that all other gove rnment agencies a re g uilty of the same co nduct ,"Y it does suggest that public officials m ay not be the bes t g ua rdia ns of public p arks and open space. Ind eed , there is ample reason to
believe that , like any o ther agent / 0 no twi thstan din g the law , pu bli c
63. See .J oel Brinkky, II U.S. !lgencv Is A cwsed of Co !!u.,ion in !.and f)eu/.1. N.Y.
Ti:'>IES. Oct. 12.21102. at A l 6.
64. !d.

o5. rd.
00. It!.
67. !d.
l'i~ .

!d .

6<J . ln clee d . a s imilar in ves tiga ti o n into the pra c ti ces of the Fo res t Sen·icc did no t revea l
any im proprieties . See id.

70. On agcncv problems , se c·. fo r e xample. An11 c n A. ;\lch ian 8.: H arold D emsctz. !'rod ucliun. Inj(mn ll1ion Cos1s, oil{/ Econ omic Organ i ~arirm. 1)'2 A :VI. [CO!\ . RE V. 777 (I ':!72).
and Michael C. J ensen & William H. Meckling. Tl1 eo rv of' rl1 e Finn: Manm;eriu! !l clwvior,
1\ gmcv Cosrs and 0 1vnersilip S1mcr ure. 3 .l. FIN~ ECON ..30~ ( 197ri). See u!so .EIIick su n. sut>m
note 23. at 1327-28 (exp la ining ho w pri\'atc prope rty reg im es lowe r monitoring costs) .
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officia ls ma y seek to max imize the ir own utilitv. rather than that of
th e ir principal. the public at large .

E.

Public G onds and Pigo u

In thi s P~1rt \V e ex pl ained why, ex ante. prov ision of public goods
requ ires gove rnme nt inte rvention; fo r exa mpl e, no nrivalrousn ess and
non exclu cl<tbility of air may req uir e government prov ision of clean air.
We then dem ons trate d. howeve r. that an initia l governme nt de cision
to prmick an impure pub lic good does not necessa ril y se cure its ex
post prese rvati o n. Two e ffect s arc liab le to produ ce thi s unhappy re sult. First. the tra ge dy of th e commons predict s that open access
spaces a re prune to overexploitation and, ultim{ltely. de str ucti o n.
Sc cnnd . distortions in th e political process creat ed by politici an s· fi sca l
ii lu:; iun . re nt-see king . and citi ze ns' coord inatio n costs are apt to cause
th e political process to bow to antipreserva ti o n forces (both ex pos t
a ml e \ an tc).
The tailing of traditional models to account for ex pos t di s torti o ns
can he traced to a common [ailin g of Pigovian mo del s of c! ecisio nm<lking." In th e Pigov ia n mode l. th e gov ernm ent is assumed to make
decisions that maximize publi c welfare 7 " Unfortunately, this romantic
assumption do cs not represe nt reality. Modern political th eorists
widely agree that the inte rests of government actors a nd the interest of
th e public are not perfec tl y a ligned. Public choice mod els posit that
governmen t acto rs may seek to maximiz.e their own welfare, lead in g to
dec isions th at are suboptimal for th e public n Thus, whil e a Pigovian
gove rnm ent would ca refu lly preserve parks and other impure public
goods fo r public use, a public choice government is likely to cater to
th e prefe rences of interest groups or self-interested politicians.
!I.

TH E SOLUTION OF ANTIPROPERTY EASEM ENTS

G ive n th e ex pected fa ilings of the political process outlined in the
prev ious Part. one might wond er how any parks or o pen access gree n
sp ac es survive in urban areas. Afte r all, developm ent interes ts have
low coo rdin ation costs a nd a clea r incenti ve to draw the publi c spaces
int o th eir private realms. Ind eed, one would expect deve lopment
inte res ts to benefit from particularl y low tran saction costs in th e
doma in or politics , as th ey are well-organized rep ea t playe rs who a re

71. T he name P ig ovi ~111 co m es from th e fa me d economi st A. C. Pigou . w ho is co n1rn o nl y.
if in :>cc ur<ilt' ly. thought to have hec n loya l to a mode l of the governme nt as a neu tra l se rvan t
of th e pub lic· goud. Sec i\. C. PI GO LI. TH E E cO!\O W CS CJ F W ELFARE (2J eel. 1924) : sec o!so
F ISCI I J:L.

Sll f !UI

11<ll<: 54. ;H 203 -0.J.

72 S,·c FISCH EL.
73.

Sllf!ril

not e )4 . at 2ll0 -04.

Se,· F .-\R B ER S: FR ICKE Y. supm note) ) . at 22.
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intimate lv fam ili a r with the political process. Ye t. th e e mpiric a l res ults
fai l th e theory. In many Am e rican cities. no tw·ith sta nding th e obvious
pecuniary be ne fit s of developm e nt. large public gree n s paces thrive.
despite being op e n access 74 Wh a t expi J ins this se e min gly an om a lous
re sult '!
VI e posit that the exp lctn a tion for g ree n space pre se rvatio n lies in
th e exis te nce of ano th e r co mmo nl y o ve rlooked in kres t g r o up: proximate-property owners. U nliJ.:: e th e publi c at la rg e for whom the bene fits fr o m pa rJ.:: s are re la ti ve ly sm a ll and coo rdination costs a re oft e n
prohibitive. proximate-property owners receive suffici ent ly s ubst a ntial
benefit from gre e n space to ove rcom e in ert ia. Ope n s paces be ne fit
adjacent homeown ers in wa ys dist inct from the puhlic at large. W e ex am ine thi s phenomenon by ex pl o ring. first, the e viden ce [or e nh a nced
value of neig hb o rin g prope rti es (known as ··proximat e -prop erty
va lu e .. ). and . th e n . th e politi ca l res ult s of that valu e. We th e n show the
sh o rtcom in gs of the cur rent de fac to system or co ns erva ti o n pro tecti o n , and de mon s tra te tha t th ose sho rt co min gs can be re solved by
formalizing a syste m of a nti property ri ghts.
A.

Prox inwre- Property Valu e

Previously. we assumed that a ll m embers of the public are eq ually
s ituated to co nsume pu blicl y provided goods. In o ur Springfield h ypothetical, for insta nce, we assu med that the park provided eq ual benefits to a ll m embers of the public a t large , albeit in two differe nt capaciti es: first, as direct use rs of park se rvice s, and, second. as beneficiaries
of cle an air , aest he tic beauty. and the like. Ln rea lity. ho weve r , members of the public are no t similarly situ ate d to e nj oy th e benefits of the
pa rk. Proximate -prop er ty own ers beca us e of their loca ti o n d erive
unique benefits unava ila bl e to the public a t large . They may e njoy
park se rvices m ore e asily an d more frequ e ntly. The park's aesthetic
beauty is p articularly be nefic ial to th ose \Vho e njoy it every d ay by
r eason of their proximity. Fin a lly. the park provides proximateproperty owners with publicly provided substitutes lor private ya rd s
a nd aco ustic barri e rs . Naturally, as we not ed . th ese ad va nt ages are r efl ected in property valu es .
Numero us empirical studies show that pa rks and ope n spa ces contribute to the value of s urro undin g rea l es tate. A lth oug h pa rks and
o pen spa ces are not private goods th at arc suppli e d by market s, the y
represe nt a ·'capitalization·· for prox imat e la ndowners. and thus their
economic effe ct is refl ec ted , to so me de gre e , in the valu e of nei g hborin g properti es . T he aclcle cl va lu e o f abut tin g parks. while not independently m a rk etable, may be m easure d by a comparison of proper74. T o be sure. in so me a rc<b . g ree n >pace hc1 s no t fare d c1 s we ll. Se c
in Sec ti on ll. C.7.
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tics t ha t ab u t pa rk s w it h th ose th a t do n ot. In eco no mi c pa rl a nce. thi s
va lu a tion m e th od is ca lled '·h edonic p ricin g ."''
T he --p rox im a te -p ro pe rty p rin c ip le, ·· w hi ch posits t h a t propertie s
in p ro:.:im ity to par ks e nj oy enh a nc ed va lu e . ac hie ved fa me th a n ks to
Fred rick La w O lm s te d. O lmsted s uccess fu ll y in voked thi s prin ciple to
co nvin cc the city o f N e w Y ork to m ove forwa rd wit h hi s p la n fo r co ns tr uct ing Ce nt ra l Pa rk 76 W hil e a t th e tim e th e s tud y o f s ta ti s ti cs was
ins ullic ient lv cl evel ope cl to offer a re li a bl e me thod lo r iso la tin g the clkct of p a rk s o n prope rt y va lu e fr o m o th e r eco nu mi c dft.:c ts .n it wa s
w icl e h be li e ved that the pos iti ve im pa ct of a b utt in g parks was co ns iclcr ~I blc.' ' I ndee d , th e hi g hly publi cized s uccess o f Ce ntral Park
p romp ted call s for co nstr uc tin g par ks th ru ughou t the cuuntrv <It the
t u rn ol th e twe n tie th ce n t ury 7 9
Th e lirst ri gorous e m p irical s tudi es on th e eco nom ic effect of par ks
appeared in th e 1970s. Th e overwhel min g majo rity o f the st udi es re ported a s ignili ca nt p ositi ve e ffec t in b o t h urlxlll a n d rura l a reas . For
c:-;ampic. a 1974 s tud y a n a lyzed th e dfec t o f Pen n vpac k P<tr k in nort heaste rn Ph ilad e lphi a o n 336 n ea rby p rop er ties .''" Th e study fo u nd th at
th e park <!Cco u n tc d fo r 33% of th e va lu e o f th e la nd t ha t was 40 feet
a way from th e pa rk . 9'Yo of th e va lu e o f th e pr ope rt y ;1t I ,000 fe e t and
4.2'1,, o f t he lan d va lu e at 2.500 fee t:' 1
A noth e r o ft-cit ed stu dy fr om 1978 exa min ed t he effe ct o f gree nbe lts u n properties in Boulde r, Co lora cl o .'c Th e regress ion a na lyse s rc ve ak cl a $4 .20 pr ice d e crease for eve ry foot o ne m ove d away fro m the
g re e n space."' In p e rce ntages , t his m ea n s th a t th e gree nb e lts were re -

75. S ec Crumpton. supra no te 10. at 2. Th is means. of cuursc . that th e nega ti ve c ll cct o r
pa rb :1 nd open space on m uni cip<diti cs' tax bases is smalle r th an com mon ly th ou ght. The
incre ase d val ue or prope rties ncar p:1 rks im pli cs highe r prope rt v taxes . T hus. thc change in
prupen v valucs created by pu bl ic spaces partia ll y offse ts th e fisc:d illu sion tha t unde rm ines
the crea ti on of pa rks. Ct: sup ro no tes 60-61 and acco mpanv in g te.\ l.
76. Cr0111pton. supra note 10. a t 7. lncleed. O lm sted was so persuasi ve tha t in a lcu e r
from 1~56 . th e New York C ity Co mptroll er wrote . "' the increas e in taxe s bv rea so n of th e
c: nhan cc men t o f va lu es att ri bu table to the park wo ul d affo rd mo re tha n suffici e nt means fo r
the inlL'rcst in curred fo r its purchase and improve ment with out am· increase in th e ge neral
r<llc lll taxatiun ... /d. (quoting M ETROPOLI TAN COi\F ER[ \ CE CJt- CITY A l\D ST X I" E PAR!-;
A L"TI IORJTt ES 11 (1926)).
77. Th e firs t suphi sti catc d met hod th at enabled resea rchers to iso la te the d fect uf parks
from ot he r c'Co num ic facto rs was pub lished in Cha rles He 1Tick . Th,· EJ.)i'crs of l'u rks Upon
Lun d 111111 1\ ~u lf:-.,·tutc \lnlues. 5 Pt_AN '!ERS. J. Sl) ( 1939).

70. S ec Cromp to n. supra not e Ill. at 7-S.
7<.J. /d. <It <J.
011. Th o lll<h R. Hamme r d a !. . Th e E}fect of a Large Urh1111 Park on R eal Estute \lalue.

-Ill J.

; \ill.

01

1\ST P L A\N [R S 27-1 ( 197-1 ).

id.:Jt277 .

02. f\;[ark R. Co rrell et a!. . "/h e EJ./('cts of G reen belts on 1\esid,·ntin/ 1-'n.!J)(Tt\. llct!uc·s:
S u n t,· Fi1tclin gs 0 11 the Puliticll l E w n o tll\' uf Opm S[lucc. 5-I L\ ND E CU\ . 2ll 7 ( llJ7S ).

0.>. !d at 21 I.
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sponsible for a price in crease of up to 32% in th e va lu e of adjace nt
prope rti es, re la ti ve to prop e rtie s locate d 3,200 feet away.
Likewise. a Massac husetts st ud y from the ea rly i 980s on the
im pac t or [our parks on n earby properti es re ported thaL o n avera ge, a
house locat ed twe nty fe e t avvay from a pa r k so ld for $2.675 more th a n
a house locat<::cl 2.000 feet away -'-' Th e study furth er fou nd that 80% ol
th e aclclecl value was captured by properties wi thin 500 fee t fr o m the
park. ~' No dlec t \vas observed for prope rti es more than 2,000 fee t
away from th e park.'"'
A 1985 study from Ohio ec hoed th e previous findin gs.' 7 Tht: st ud y
focusedun two petrks: Cox Arboret um in Day ton and \V hetsto n e Park
in Co lumbus. The results in dicated that a one- foo t remove from the
park repre sented a price decrease of $3.R3 in the case of th e form er.
a nd a $4.07 in the case of th e la tter." The ave rage pa rk premium was
5.13'/'o for properties in th e Cox Arboret um subdi vision. and 7. 35%
for residential prope rti es in the vicinit y of ·w hetstone Park.'"
Sur prisin gly perhaps. e mpirical studi es a lso indi cate tha t parks and
ope n spaces C<\11 e nhance property va lu es eve n in nonurban areas. For
exam pl e . a L978 study o[ the va lues of pr iva te ly own e d properties in
th e Adirondack Forest Preserve in upstate New York re ported th at
be ing adjace nt to state land increased property valu e by $20 per acre/'
which re prese nt ed a 17.5 % in crease in valu e .Y1 Similarly. a 1993 stud y
fr o m Maryla nd sho wed that the preservatio n of a signi fica nt tract of
fores t land increase d the value o[ houses in Baltimore Co unty (within
o ne mile of th e site) , by at least 10°/c), and houses in th e neighborin g
Carro ll and Howard Counties by at le ast 8% ancl4% respectively.'12
No t all e mpirical studies support the p roximate-prope rty principle.
For instan ce, a 1986 study of We stch este r County, New York , con -

~4. 1. H age n e t a!.. Rmefits Fmm Open Space and Recremional Parks: 1\ Case Sruclv. I I
J. NORTHEA ST ER\/ AGR IC. ECON . COUI'C IL 13 (19R2): Thomas A. Mor.; c t al.. Til e Ecnnolllics of' Urban Parks: A !J enctir! Cosr Analysis. P.-\RK S & RECR. EATI00i. Aug. I Y::i2. at 3133.

05 . Hage n. supm note 0-f: :VI ore. supru note

~-f.

::i6. Hagen. supm note ::i-f: :Vlorc. supm note 84.

07 . Crompton. supm no te !0. at "17 (ci ting M. Kimm e l. Par ks and Prop<.: rty Va lues: An
Empirical Study in D:tyton and Co lum bus. Oh iu (1Yo5) (unpub li shed i\ilaster·s thes is. Miami
Univc rsitv. Oxford. Ohio)) .

8S. !d. (citing KimmeL supru note S7) .
89. !d. (citing Kimmel. supru note 87)
90. See Dav id H. V rooman. An F.'111piriwl ;\ nulysis of Detcnninanrs of /_an d Valu es in
rhe Adirondack !'ark. 37 !\>vi. J. ECON. & Soc. 165. l 73 (i97K).

YJ. Crompton. mpru note HI. at 23.
92. !d. (citin g R.E. Curtis. Valu in g Open Space in Marvlancl: A n Hedonic Ana lvsis
(1993) (unpub li shed \'Iastc r" s thes is. Unive rsitv of Mmyland)).
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cluclecl th a t p a rk s have no imp ac t o n the va lu e or prox imat e prope rt y.·;;
Such studies, howeve r, repre se nt th e minority vi ew. In a comp reh e nsive review of th e extant empirica l lit e rat ure . C rompto n rep o rt e d that
twen ty out o f th e twe nty-fi ve studi es he re viewed we re s upporti ve of
the prox im ate- pro pe rt y principle.'J-1 Crompto n further note d th at of the
re mainin g fi ve cases, fo ur m ay have proclucecl " ambivale nt findin gs''
as the res ult of "me th odo logica l limit a tions ... "' In summarizing th e
em p iri cal findin gs, C rompton wrote:
[I ]t is su gge sted th at a positive im pact or 20'1.:, 0 11 pro pc ny va lu es a butting o r fr onting a pass ive park a rea is :t n:~tso n a blc starting poin t guideline . If th e pa rk is la rge (say over 25 acrc:s). we ll -maint a in ed. attra ctive .
a nd its use is ma inl y passive, then thi s fi gure is lik ely to be low. lf it is
smal l and embraces some acti ve usc. th e n thi s gu idel in e is lik e ly to be
hi gh. If it is a heavi ly used pa rk inco rpora tin g such rec rea tion fa ciliti es as
at hlet ic fi e ld s or a swimm in g poo l. then the pru xim <tte va lu e inc rem ent
may be minimal on abuttin g propc nie s but mety rcach l U% on prope rti es
two o r three bloc ks away w,

As we show, this proxima te- prope rt y va lu e th a t acc ru es to nearby
nei g hbors substa nti a ll y affe cts th e con tinu e d e xi stence of th e park.
T he uniqu e stak e of a pa rti cul ar g roup in th e park cre at es a set of pri vate owne rs who ma y play a sp eci a l role in co nse rv a tio n .'n

B.

Th e D e Facw Righ1s of N eighbors

To see how the sp ecia l inte re st of proximate ho m eowners aids co nservation ancl changes the pre dic ted an ti- conse rva ti o n outcome
prophesie d by the a na lys is of th e previous P a rt , let 's r e turn to o ur
Sp ringfiel d hyp o the tica l. So far , we ass um e d the park produced net
public be nefits of $1 milli o n , spre ad e ve nly among the 750,000 residents of the city. Given this distribution , a nd the cos t o f o rga nizin g
politically, we conclude d that be ne fici a ries o f the pa rk wo uld be
unable to fend off the ineffici e nt d eve lo pm e nt proposa l of Concre te

'!3. Crompton. supm note lO. at 27 (c iting J.A.Yo.: gc l. An Inquiry Into the: Impact of
Pa rk Land Loca ti on Upon Single Fa mily Res ide ntia l Prope rt y Va lues in Midd le and Upper
Income Co mmu nities in West che ster Co unt y (ll)/\6) (un published Ph.D. dissc rta ticm. New
York University)) .
l):l. !d.

at 28.

l)). /d.
l)6. Ma t 2l).
l)/ . Th ere mav be.: ra re cases in whic h there is an inh e rent clash betwee n th e in te re sts of

proxi ma te ·proper ty ow ne rs an d thos e o f the pu bli c a t large . Fo r exa mple. there may be in·
sta nces in whic h th e prox imate- proper ty owne rs all despi se a ce rta in histo ri ca l site (such as a
sports stad ium which produce s noi se and crowds) . while the more di sta nt public enjoys and
suppclt'ls the conti nued exi stence of the site. In such c1ses. obvio us ly. proxima te property
ow ne rs do not serve as good proxi es of th e pub lic intcrc:st. and a ntiproperty casements. J S
we shall desc ribe them . will not be useful policv to ols.
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Jungle. Inc .. whose project would produce a net benefit of onlv
$200.000.
Let us now change the example by incorporating a more realistic
distribution of benefits. Assume that the thousand nearest neighbors
of the park capture 25°/c, of the bcnctits produced by the park. Under
this distribution, each of the thousand nearest neighbors stands to gain
S25U from the existence of a park. The other $750,000 in benefits are
divided among the remaining 749.000 residents of Springfield, giving
each a benefit of slightly over $1. We retain the premise that only
camp,ugn contributions of $5 or more will be accepted, and that decisions are made strictly in accordance with the amount of money rece ived. While under a uniform distribution of benefits Concrete
Jungle could move forward with its in e fficient construction plan.
Concrete Jungle would be unable to implement its development proposal under this more realistic distribution of benefits. This is because
each of the thousand nearest neighbors will make campaign contributions uf up to $250 to preserve the park and stop construction.')' In
turn. the S250,000 in total contributions will outweigh the maximum
amount of $200,000 Concrete Jungle would be willing to pledge. Thus.
the existence of a concentrated group of property owners who benefit
disproportionately from the park may secure the economically efficient result and benefit the public at large.
The phenomenon of a small group of proximate-property owners
blocking inefficient development may also be illustrated by some realworld examples. Recently, in south Florida, neighborhood residents
successfully thwarted an effort to convert a planned park expansion
into a commercial clevelopment. 9 ~ In Glastonbury, Connecticut, residents came together to oppose the construction of a large shopping
center on nearby property, demanding that the property be used as a
park or open space. 100 Motivated by a concern that the proposed
development would affect, inter alia, "extremely fragile wetlands.''
some residents "are waging a campaign to kill the proposal" currently
pending before the local conservation commission. 101 Likewise, a
group of neighbors and business owners from Grand Rapids ,
Michigan, formed a united front to oppose the development of John
Ball Park and Zoo,w 2 ultimately defeating the plan.
LJS. Of course. our e xample includes many simplifying assumptions. and ignores su c h
Ltctors as coordination costs and collective action problems. We address these factors in the
next Secti o n.

99. Sec Jeremy Milarsk y. Building Near Park Rejecred. S. FL\. SU N-SENT!i\EL (Ft.
Lauclerdak). Feb. 6. 2002, umiluble al 2002 WL 2945260.
1110. Eric R. Danton. Neighbors Fighr Shopping Cen/er; Developer Addresses Concems
11i1il f'hm10 Prolecl Weiland. H .A RTFORD COURA NT . May 22.2002. at B2.
lOI. M

I 02. Kvla King. Group Forms 10 Oppose Zo o Plan: The Residems and Business Owners
\Vul/[ lu f'resenl u "Unired Fmnl, " l)R .AND RAPIDS PRESS. Dec. 12.2001. a t A20.
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The Slwrrcolllings of D e Facto Rig!Hs

Th e ab ove example s illustrate that some times proximat e -pr o per!~~
owners· spec ial int eres t in conservation is strong enough to bar inclfici e nt deve lo pm e nt of la nd s. At oth e r times, howeve r. proximat eproperty owners ' efforts a t conservation are thwarted by a compl e x se t
of strat egic co nsiderations th a t ge nerat e a co ll ective act io n problem -'"'
To illuminat e these difficulti es. let's revisit o ur Springfield example
and our bas ic ass umpti ons: the park produces public benefits or SI
million for th e city 's 750,000 reside n ts , 25% of which arc capt ured by
th e nea rest l.OUO ne ighbors. Concrete Jungl e wishes to convert th e:
p::1rk into a proj e ct th a t will produce $200,000 for th e corporation.
Po liti cal d ec isio ns ar e made in acco rd a nce with the magnitude of cam paign co ntributions. a ncl no contributio n of less than $5 is accep ted .
Earli e r. we sugges te d that th e nearby ne ighbors would be abl e to
defeat the inefficient d eve lopm e nt schem e . Ignorin g iss ues of coOI·cii nation, we sugges ted th a t th e ne ighb ors could pledge up to $250,000 in
campai gn contributions - a sum that would ou tweigh Concrete
Jungle 's contribution of $200.000.
Th e introdu ction of strat egic consid era ti ons into the discussion.
ho weve r. changes the r es ult considerably. Thus, we now consider six
differe nt strateg ic problems that may und e rmine th e ne ighbors' que st
to save th e ir p ar k: free-riding, the ne ed for an e ntrepre neur or organ izer, age ncy problems, insufficient group size , skewed distribution of
benefits o r burden s, and th e likelih oo d that developers arc repe a t
pl ayers.
1.

Free-riding

To und e rst and the free-riding problem, consider th e case of
Fre ddie Freeloader, on e of the nearby neighbors. H e knows that if
Concrete Jungle succe eds in developing the park , his property will lose
$250 in value. Naturally, if Freddie knew that his contribution wendel
b e decisive in th e campaign aga in st th e project he would donat e up to
$250 in ord e r to preserve th e p ar k. As his n ame suggests , how ever.
Freddi e is a fre e loader, a nd would prefer to le t others do the job for
him. H e knows that his 999 ne ighbors also stand to lose $250 each, and
if they each contribute $200.21 o r more, Concrete Jungle 's initi ative
w ill fail. Thus, Freddie will ke ep his money and let his ne ighbors mak e
th eir co ntributi o ns. Of cours e , Freddie is not an outlier; he is th e pro totypical se lf-int e res t m ax imize r. Where enough n e ighboring owners
are lik e Fre ddi e, Concre te Jungl e will succeed in d estroying the park.

IU3. For an alt ern a ti ve cli,c uss iu n o f th e political failures of e nvi ron me nt a l protect ion.
se e John sto n. supra note 15.
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Each of the neighbors wi ll prefe r to le t th e ir fellow ne ighbor co ntribute, and thu s. no contributions will be made to prese rve the park. 1114

2.

Enrrepreneurs and Org({niz ers

Th e fr ee- riding pro blem might be solved by e nforcem ent mechani sm s such as soc ia l norms - the co mmon nan1 e fo r info rmal soc ial
r ules e nfo rced by socia l co n\Tntion s s uch as the norm of tippin g at restaurants - or altrui stic behavior. 1n5 And yet the conse rvation effort
may falt er eve n with such enforceme nt me chanisms in place . For a
conservation effort to succeed. it is not enough to have the goodwill or
the n e igh bors and th e ir wi llin g ness to contribute campa ign fund s.
Someone must orga nize the effo rt and spearhead the politica l campaign. The activists must he instru cted where to contribute their funds
and wh en; a common lll<:ssage must be drafted; connection s with local
politicians must be cstabiishecl: meetings must be held to coordinate
acti on: a nd someone mu st give fe edback to th e act ivists to he lp them
monitor th e dfectivcn ess of the ca mp a ign . Obvious ly, the organizer uf
thi s campaign will h ave to e:-;pencl effo rts we ll beyond those of the
rank and file, and tho se effo rts may well exceed he r person a l pec uniary stake in the disp ute. Moreove r, the need for an entreprene ur or
organize r exace rba tes th e free-riding problem ; e ven where n eighbors
see fit to con tribute funds, few will wa nt to bear the high costs associated with the lead e rship role. H ere, again, unl ess a collective mechanism is developed for se lec tin g and compensat in g the organizer, the
conservation campaign may never get off the grouncl. 106
To illustrate , we re turn to Sp rin gfie ld. Ass ume tha t Robin
R a bblero use r contemp la tes lea d in g the co nse rvation effort. She est imates the expected cost in time and e ffort at $5,000. Yet, her persona l
stake in the park is a mere $250. Un less Robin can someh ow be compensated for the rema ining $4,750, she will shy away from th e leadership rolc. 107

l0-1. On free-rid ing and its role in fc) i\in g politica l organ iza ti on. sec Joseph P. Ka lt &
Mark A. Z upan. Caprure all!! ldcologv i11 rhe Eco11olllic Th eory of Polirics . 74 i\\1. ECO'I.
REV. 279.285 ( lLJS-1) .

105. See Russell !·Ltrdin. / .u11 · uud So cial Norms in the Large, So V c\ . L. R EV. l t:2 L liQ l
(2000) (demonstrat in g the usc: uf soci:li nurms to preve nt fr ee -ridin g for tax ation): Richard
H. Mc;\clarns, Coo pemrion 1/1/{f Co ntlici: Th e Econo mics of Group Swtus Pro ducti o11 {///1/
Race Discriminlllion. l OS H .· \RV . L. RE V. 1003, 1027 (1995) (descri bing socia l norms as a
non-lega l me th od of p reven ting undesi rab le ac tio ns lik e free -ri ding) .
106. On th e im porta nce of an organiz tn g e ntre prene ur. see T ERRY M . MOE. Til E
OF 1:\TERESTS ( l <JXO)
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107. Th e co mpcn,ati on nuv he: Jl"·c·hi c "'we ll as pecuniary. wh ich mav exp lain whv. in
son1e cases. entrep reneur:.: do c 1ne rge nut\Yith ~ta nding the ab~cn ce of a p:1yrn c nt mec hanisn1.
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Th e n eed for a leade r a nd oth e r s pecia li ze d role s in va ri a b ly in trod uces a n a ge ncy prob lem in th e co ns e rva tioni st cam p. E ac h pe rson
w ith a speciali ze d role fa ces a diffe rent ut ilit v fu nction -and th e refo re a different set of incent ives- th an the res t of th e group. Robin
Ra bble ro use r , for exa mpl e, mu st consi der not o nlv th e co st of ca mpa ig n co ntri bu tion s a nd th e be ne fit o f park preserva ti on : s he must a lso
co nsid e r th e cos t of h e r leade rship role an d th e be nefit or her comp e nsa tion sc heme . Thi s creat es a dan ge r th8t she ma v decide to und e rmine t he conserva ti on effort in o rd e r to adva nce her persona l benefit.
Fo r in sta nce . C oncrete Jun gle may prom ise to pay Rob in $20.000 to
se nd in acc ur ate signals to the ac ti vis ts. This sum wo uld d wa rf the
$4 ,750 in comp e ns<J tio n th <1 t indu ced h er to tak e o n th e kaders hip ro le
8ncl th e $250 in park benefits th at a rc at sta ke for her. Robin may a lso
acce pt co mpro mi se proposa ls th a t benefit he r b ut not th e group a t
l::nge. T he exi stence o f an age ncy p roblem cr ea tes th e nee d for m o nitor in g, to be ca rri e d o ut by ye t a new se t o f agents. Th e need for multiple agen ts impo ses a dditional cos ts to the con se rvati o n effort, and, at
a minimum. crea tes di strust a mong the co nscrv at ioni sts. 11 ''
4.

G roup Si ze

Th e co nse rvation e ffort will obv iously also be affected by th e size
of the group of n e igh bors. As th e group grows in size . it becomes
increas ingly difficult to coordinat e actions am o ng th e group. To act in
conce rt , th e conserva tioni sts will need to int rod uce mech anism s for
intragroup communication. To m ake m at te rs wors e, as th e group size
grows be yond the abi lity of the m embe rs to know on e ano the r, social
norms a nd othe r in fo rmal regulatory m echanisms beco me less effective. Thi s imposes two m o re se ts o f tra nsa ction cos ts within the conse rvati on ist ca mp: co mmunica tion costs a nd m on itorin g costs. 109

5.

Skewed Distributio n

The patte rn of di s tribution of ben efits fro m the park is cl ose ly
relate d to th e que s tion of gro up size, and it too m ay hinder e ffec ti ve
coordination . R e turning to Sprin gfield , ass um e that th e re ar e only I 00
proxim a te-propert y ow ners, and th e ir s hare of th e be nefits is o nly
10%, rather than 25% . In such a cas e, the nearby ne ighb o rs wo uld
each enjoy a be nefit o f $ 1,000 eac h , wh il e oth er reside nts o f th e city
wo uld ea ch e njoy a be n efit of approxim ate ly $ 1.20. T he group of co n-

lOR. See .l'llpm note 70.
lO'J. See genemllv Hardin . Sllflru note .1o (d iscu ssing ro le o f group size in ove rcoming
collective ac tion p ro b lem s ).
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sc rvationi sts wou ld rai se - assuming no ot her coo rdination prob le ms
- $ 100,000 in campa ign contributions. Thi s sum would be in s uffi cie nt
to count e r Conc re te Jun gle 's expecte d cont ri bu ti o n of up to $200,000 .
Thus. th e ex iste nce of a group of specially ben e fited hom eow ne rs is
not enough in itse lf to protect the park. In addition to all its oth e r diffi cul ties . th e gro up must re prese nt a collective interest sullicicnt ly
large to o ut\vc ig h the int e rest of th e competi ng clcvc lopc r 1111

6.

R epeat Players

Fin a ll y. we mu st co ns ider the poss ibilit y th a t there will be repeat e d
rounds of political dccisio nmaking. \Ve have assumed thus fa r th at
eac h deci sion of the city was discrete and base d so le ly on c::llnpaign
contribution s re la te d to the specific deci sion a t ha nd. But in re a lit y.
the cit y mak es many de cisions over th e course of time, a nd de c isionm ake rs motiv ated so le ly by campaign cont ributi o ns will h ave to ca lculat e th e effec t of the ir decisions o n future fundra is in g drives in add ition to th e prese nt ro und of co ntributi ons. Ge ne r a ll y. ab uttin g
ho m e owners will not be repea t pla yers in the political process. as th ey
will ra re ly have inte res ts at stak e th a t a re sufficie ntl y large as to
wa rrant repeated ca mpaign contributio ns. On th e o th e r hand. deve lop men t companies a re more like ly to have a number of int e res ts that
warrant co ntinu o us participation in th e political ar e na. 111
Concrete Jun gle, for example, is an ongoing concern, and its int e rests are not res tricte d to this single park . Concre t e Jungle has deve loped oth e r prope rti es, and it will have futur e de velopment proj ec ts
that willle a cl it to shower contributions up o n fri e ndly politicians. P o liticians ma y wa nt to avo id alienating Con cre te Jungle to avoid jeo pardizing future campa ign gifts. Thus, even though in our exa mpl e
Concrete Jungle will want to contribute o nl y $200,000, aga ins t
$250,000 in co ntri b utions that abutting owne rs will muster, politicians
ma y decid e to tak e Co ncrete Jungle's sm a ll er contribution in o rd er to
assure access to future contributions from th e develope r.
Repea te d plays in the political a re na may affect potent ia l outcomes in another way. As repeat players in th e political process,
developers and politicians are conscious of the signals th ey send to

11 0. Str ictl v s pea king. skewed di s tribution as we have desc ribed it in the t.:o:x t docs not
consti tu tt: a slra/egic d iffi cu lty.
Il l. On re pea t p layers. sce . fo r exa mpl e . G uid o Ca la bresi a nd J e ffrey 0 Coope r. Nc11·
VA L. U . L. REv. 85'J, 863 (J9'J6) (obse rvin g th a t tort refo rm is
con trolled by repea t pl aye rs) : Dennis S. Karjala . Copyrighr Proreoion of Operaring Sofi~tw·e.
Copyrig/11 Misus e. and Anrirrusl. 9 CO RCJEI..LJ.L. & PUB . POL'Y 161. 179-80 (l'N9) (desc ri h·
ing the pi vota l ro le of repea t playe rs in sha p in g co pyrigh t law) . The cbssic artic les ana lyz ing
the inh e re nt advantages of re pe at players are lvlarc Ga la nter. A(renvord: Expluiniug Lirigu·
rion. lJ L\ W & SOC'Y REV . 347 ( 1975). and Marc Ga la nte r. Wh y rh e '·Hm e.1 .. Con 1e Our
/\/i e{l(/: Sf'ecularion on rl1 e Linrirs of Legal Change. lJ LA \V & SOC" Y R EV lJ5 (I 'J74 ).
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ot he r p layers a nd poten tial pla yers. D eve lopers m ay find it in th e ir in te res t to '·ove rin ves t" in ca mpa ign co ntri b uti o ns for a deve lopment
proj ect in ord er to det er anti-d e velo pment forces from organizin g to
block future projects. In ou r exa mple. Concre te Jungle may decide to
invest more th an $250.000 in campa ign contribu tion s, eve n tho ug h its
pot e nti a l profit is o nly $200,000, in order to se nd a s ign a l to hom eowners that it is no t wort h organ izing to li ght Concr e te Jungle deve lopments. because Concrete Jungle will always invest ··w hatever it
takes ." If the signa l saves Concre te Jun gle more than $50,000 in th e
future. it will be worth the in ves tment 112

7.

Sum11wry

A s a result of th e speci a l burde ns and costs confronting preserv<ltioni sts, p rocleveloprne nt int e res t gro ups wi ll ofte n prevail in their effort to push forw a rd ineffi cie nt p ro jects. no twithstanding th e opposi tion of proxima te-property own e rs. Accord in gly. the de facto intere st
of ne ighbors in preserving green space wi ll freq uent ly fall short
of ach iev ing th e opt im al equilibrium be tween deve lopme nt and
prese rvation.
The sho rtcomings of th e status quo , in which proxim ate-property
ow ners la ck formal lega l pro tection for th e ir int erest in prese rvation .
may be summarized und er two hea dings. First, preservationi sts rather
than deve lopers bear the lion 's share of transaction and coo rdinati on
costs. T he preserva ti on int erest consists of wid e ly scattere d stakes. and
each of relatively small value, while the d evelopme nt interest is ge nera lly unita ry, politically savvy, a nd o f re lati vely large va lue. 113 Second.
the benefits of d eve lopment genera lly find fu ll expression in the po litical are na , while the political arena does not fu lly account fo r the ben efits of preservation. The unit ary developer fully interna lizes all of th e
benefits of its proj ect and will in vest up to th e full value of the benefits
in o rd er to reap a profit. Many preservationists, howeve r, e njoy too
sma ll a benefit to wa rran t participation in th e political process. Th ey
will sit on the side li nes , as the po litical process ignores the benefits the
conservationists co ul d potentia ll y enjoy. 11 .j

11.2. For exampl e, in an effort to forestall futur·e li tigat ion. toba cco co mpan ies fre qu e ntly ex pend m ore liti ga ting a claim than they wo uld have to e xpend if they were to simply pay the cla im without cont esting it. See Ma ry Ann K . Bosac k. Cigarelle A cl Pree111prion
- Refining !he Analysis. 66 N .Y.U. L. REV . 756.757 n. S ( 199 1) (characterizing tobacco liti ga tio n cos ts as between $600 mil lio n and $3 b ill ion a s of 1988).
J 13. For a con trary vie w of the im pac t o f strategic fa c to rs o n politica l orga ni za ti on. sec·
Gary S. Becker. A Th eorv of Comperirion A11zo ng Press ure Cro ups for Poliricrrl lnjluence. 98
Q.J. ECON . 371 (1983 ).
114. See also Thompso n. supra note 29. a t 25S-n2 (discussi ng ri sk that gove rnment actio n will .. crowd out"· a ltr ui s tic environmenta lism) .
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U nfortunatel y, our a nal ys is o f the po liti ca l dccisio nm ak in g process
ts n ot me rely th eore tica l; it is borne o ut by reality. Fo ur rece nt
exa mp les demonst rate the nati ona l influ ence or fiscal ill usion in
underminin g conservation, and th e potential wea kness of proximateprop e rty owne rs. In 2001, the city o f Las Cruces, New Mexic o ag ree d
to sell 3.2 acres of undeve loped ci ty-ow ned land - one o f th e las t such
parce ls re ma ining in th e area- to a co mm e rcia l co rporation tor a reported amoun t of $694,000, despit e the protests of p roximat e-p rope rty
mvners 11 5 In explaining the deci sion, city man ager Jim Erickso n said
tha t th e on ly consid eration weighed by the city was " to look at the
hi £hest and best use. " 111\ H e added t hat ·' leavi ng the la nd vaca nt wo ul d
co~ t th e cit y to maintain the Janel . cleaning weed s a nd tra sh. '' 11 7
In a similar ve in , lea de rs of D aytona Beach. Florida "are discuss ing
a plan that co uld pu t the city's l<tst swa th of undi st urbed green sp ace
o n th e Halifax River on the au ct ion bloc k. " 11 "' Re s id e nts who oppose
the p lan desc ribe th e pro posa l as ·· a se ll ou t of public prop e rt y to priva te deve lop me nt ,'. clai ming " th at thi s tim e D ay to na B eac h is p utting
a price tag o n its characte r. '' 119 Y e t, for the local po liti cian s, th e logic is
simpl e: "M ore marin as, more restaurants and more co ndominiums on
the ri ver mean a mo re vibrant dow ntow n and new tax mon ey to shore
up finances." 120
Fin a ll y, the city of Novi, Michi ga n rea lized th a t the re mu st be more
than one way to appease a deve loper. Facing a $70 million judgment.
the city decided to settle the case by offe rin g th e p laintiff-d e ve loper,
Sandstone Associates, ninety-five acres( !) of park la nd. 121 R espo nding
to criticism from loca l conse rvati on ists, city officia ls explained that this
extre me measure was necessary to '·save th e cit y from big tax
increases and cuts in services ." 122
Fittingly, however, the "gold medal " for allowing politica l failures
to trump co nservation inte rests goes to the Golden State , Ca lifo rnia,
thanks to the "inge nuit y" of the city of Palm Springs. In 1986, the city
of Palm Sprin gs "eagerly acceptcd " 12 ' thirty acres of undeve lope d land

115. Chri stop her Schurtz. Co uncilors Qucsrion \V hy L as Cmccs. N1vf.. Is In Lanti-Sulc
Business . L\S CRUC ES S UN- NEWS. .June 27. 201li.

lto. !d.
117. !d.
II 8. Matt Donnelly, D owmown Day rona: \Vhar Nex1? ,ifany Angry on:r Talk of Land
Sale: Prores!Ors Try ro Sa ve Rive rfronl Pro perrv. ORLA NDO S ENT li\ EL. F e b. 3. 2 002. at Kl.
119. !d.
121} !d

121. See Matt He lms. Plann ers 10 D ecide 0 11 Park Giveaway: Puhlic // cu ring.
Wedn csdo 1· in Nuvi. DETI~OIT fREE PRES S. Ja n. 7. 2002 . a t I !3.

122. !d.
123. Palm Springs v. Living Deser1 1\escnc. 70 Ca l. r\pp. -li h (i 13 . 629 (199\J ).
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on th e exp re ss co ndition that the property be used 1r1 perpe tuitv as a
desert wildli fe preserv e a nd an equestrian ce nter 12 J The g ra nt explicitly sta ted th a t if the condi tion was breached th e la nd wou ld pass to
.. the Living D ese rt R ese rve ... a nd grantee shall forfeit a ll ri ghts
th e re to .'"1" Less than three years later, th e city dec ided it would be
bette r se rve d if th e land was de ve loped into a go lf co urse.' "" To e ffec t
this plan. the city exercised its eminent domain powe r to condemn th e
reversionary int e rest in Living D ese rt R ese rve. 127 ;\mazingly. th e city
convinced th e trial court not to awa rd a ny compensa tion . since th e
possibility of breac h of condition by th e city was too "re mot e a nd
speculative.'' and thus th e future interest was value less for the purpose
o f condemnation compensa tion .128
Th ese a nd o ther examp les 129 illustrate the syste matic di sa d va n tage
of con se rvation interests in the political are na.
D.

Formalizing Neighbors ' Amipropen y Rights

Having cl e monstratccl both th e ben efits and th e shortcomings o f
the de facto right s of nearby ne ighbors in green space . we now show
how formaliz in g those rights in de jure a ntiprope n y easeme nts pre serves the bene fits of the de fact o rights, while drastically reducing the
shortcomings .
We propose to gra nt e very proximate-prope rty owner a formal
legal e ntitlem e nt to the preservation of gree n space . Specifically, each
property own e r situated within a certain distance of the designat e d
green space - say 200 yards - will be gra nted a negative easement
appurtena nt in the park, which we call an '' antiproperty eas ement. ''
This would vest in each of the property owners the right to veto any
development or destruction of th e green space. Thu s. und e r our pro pose d regime, a develope r see king to build on the green space would
have to obtain permission, or acquire the right from the neighboring
own e rs. As with all other easements, antiproperty case ments would be

12-l. /d. at 61 R.
125. ld
1~6. /d. The Ca lifo rnia Court of Appeals a ttribute d the ci ty's in co nsiste nt behav ior c i·
ther to a '·promissory fraud or :1 subsequc:nl cha nge of heart ... /d. at 6.30.

127. /d. at 618.
12il. /d. a t 62-l-25. In response t<l thi s a rgument. th e Ca liforn ia Co urt of Appeals said:
··the decision to assert that position did not display the: high degree o f fa irness . justi ce . and
virtue that should cha racte riz e public entities. Such in e quitabl e be havior mu st not be: reward ed ... !d. at 630.

129. It turn s ou t th a L on occa si on. eve n the co urt sys te m poses a threa t to pa rk s. Co nsider th e C<1Sc of Hardy Par k in Fort Laude rda le. Florida. Desp it e oppos it ion from ne igh·
bors. 1hc pa rk mi ght be destroyed to mak e room fo r a new SlOO mi llion c11 urt hclliSC:. See
Brittcmy Wallman . .fudge Rega im Favored Co urr Sire: Fede ral Plans Ups er Residcnrs. FLA.
SE:\TI 'ICL ( Ft. Lauderda le). Sep t. 5 . 2002, at l.B.
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formal legal rights enforceable in a court of law or equity: holders
would be en t itied to injunctive rei icf against building without consent.
As we explain in greater detail in the next Part, however, antiproperty easements differ from standard easements. Ordinarily. casements appurtenant seek to optimize land use between two property
owners: the dominant parcel owner (the beneficiary) and the subservient parcel mvner (the henefz1ctor). Moreover. standard easements. like
other known property rights. may be transferred voluntarily at the sole
discretion of the easement holder. 13° For instance, Ollie. the owner ol
Oceanside. may give Grace. the owner of Graceland , an easement
appurtenant to cross Oceanside to get to the beach. One would expect
that Fannv Faraway. who lives on the other side of town, would enjm·
no benefit whatsoever from the transaction. as her own beach acces:-; is
not affected bv the case ment grant. Further, if Ollie changed his mind.
and then convinced Grace to annul the transfer, there would be nu
practical difficulties in eliminating the access privilege created by the
caseme nt. In short. easements typically affect only two parties who
fully internalize. usually contractually. the costs and benefits created
by the easerm::nt. 1 ' ;
The antiproperty casements we propose are quite different. Thcv
are aimed primarily at ensuring benefits for third parties and designed
to be practically (albeit not formally) inalienable. In economic parlance, the purpose of antiproperty easements is to create a unique.
positive externality.~' ' The formalization of antiproperty eas e ments
will ensure the continuous existence of parks and green space, which
will benefit not only the casement holders but also the public at large.
And by dispersing rights among multiple owners, antiproperty casements create a regime that makes it exceedingly unlikely that property
owners could ever aggregate to alter or annul the negative easements.
To illustrate these critical differences, let us change slightly our
previous hypothetical. Suppose that Oceanside is a public park (not a
private estate) and that it is abutted by 100 private property owners,
each of whom enjoys a negative easement appurtenant (an antiproperty easement) blocking any development in Oceanside. Let us now

130. Se c REST.-\TDIENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
DUKDIINIER & KRIER. Sllfl/'11 note 14. at 830 .

~~

4.6(1 ). :'i.S (20011 ):

131. Se e Thomas \V. Merrill & Henry E. Smith. Op1inwl StandardizMion in the l .<llt of
Propert\': The Numcmus Cluusus Principle. I 10 Y,\LE L.J. 1 (2001): see also. e.g.. Esture o/
Thomson t \Vudc. 50l) N.E. 2d 309 (N.Y. l')S7) (holding that an easement cannot be reserved
in favor of adjacent prope rtv previously owned by grantor). Bur see RESTATEI\IENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: SERVITUJ ES. 2.h(2) (2000) (stating that an easement can be created in favor of a
third partv ).

s

132. Sec Juli e E. Cohen. Lochner in Cv berspi!cc: The Ne w Econ o 111ic Orrlwdo.n · of
"Riglzts Mww geni eu('. '!7 MICH. L. REV. 462. 542 ( )l)lJ8) (defining positive externalitie s as
"the presence of i lfl
valuccl institutional structure even where thitt structure is

wc!Lne" ).
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s uppose that Donny is ~~ deve loper wh o wis he s to build a ta ll gla ss
rower o n O ceans ide (a s he did in seve ral loca les in New York Cit y) .
W e fin a ll y assume that m ost ci tize ns o f th e tow n. P lac icl vill e. e nj uy th e
usc of Oce an side a nd prefer to kee p it in its p ristin e state.
Th e first thin g to notice about t he ne ga tive easeme nt s is that th ey
benefit th e Pl ac icl vi ll e c it izenry as a w ho le. not m e re ly t he 100
p roximate- prope rty own e rs. Second . th e negat iv e ease men ts make de velopment of Ocea nsid e Par k virt ual ly im poss ibl e. In ord er fur Donn y
to bring hi s plann e d d eve lopment to fruiti o n. he mu s t acquire a ll 100
a ntiprop e rty ease ments. If even o ne outstan din g a ntiproperty casement rema ins un acq uirecL Donny \V iii be ba rre d fr om proceed ing \Vi th
h is pl a nn e d tall glass towe r: bu yin g nin e ty- nine easemen ts is as goud
as bu yin g non e .
Donny will a lmos t invariably fa il to acquire th e ne gat ive cas ements. howeve r, since he is facin g a pra cti cclily in s urmountable holdo ut probl e m. Buying a ll th e nega ti ve ease me nt s req u ire s Do nn y to
en gage in a seque nce of tr a nsact ions with th e easeme nt hold e rs. E ac h
o l th e case m ent hold e rs is clfe ct ivc ly a mono poli st since she hold s a
uniqu e asse t that cannot be purchased e lse where: there is no spot
ma rk e t and no s ubstitut e good. Eac h monopo list ease me nt owne r w ill
seek to extract th e entire pro fit of the d eve lope r in exchan ge for relinq uish ing the veto power.
A ss ume th at Donny expects a gross profit ( net of a ll cos ts save
ea sement acqui sition) of $100 million. a tact pu blis he d in th e lo ca l
mecli a.t 33 Looking forward, Donn y expects a n average profit of $1 million from each easem e n t transactio n. less th e pr ice he actu a ll y pays the
ho ld er. Eve n if limit ed in a bilit y to pred ict the ou tcome of negoti ations. the fir st easement hold er appro ache d by Donny, as a se lfinteres te d profi t maximizer , will ask for t he fu ll $1 million L' 4 The seco nd ease ment ho lder to be approache d , however. w ill ask for mo re .
Now that Donny has p urcha sed o ne ease ment , he mus t p urch ase
ninety-nin e ea sem e nts to enjoy th e $100 million, crea ting an ex pect ed
p rofit of $1.01 million pe r tran sa ct io n. This is beca use Donny ri ses
above th e sunk-cos t fall acyl 3 ' and ignore s the price he has a lr eady paid
in th e previous easem e n t transaction. Th e seco nd c ase ment ho ld er will
t he refore ask fo r the full $1.Cll milli on . This process w ill go o n until th e

133. We mak e thi s assumpti on for sim pl ici tv·s sa ke. O f course . in manv cases there are
information problems that may make th e like li hood of co nsensual transfer Je ss or mo re
likelv.
13-l. 'vVe assum e tha t each ease ment owner will seck to ~~lin the maximum sha re of th ~
profit th at " ·ill all ow the proj ect to go forward. and th at ea~-h wi ll ass um e >imilar beha vior
from o ther owne rs.
135. Unde r th e sunk-costs doc tr ine. "L'<)Sts in currc· d in the: p;1st.
should not be
Cl) Lint ed as cos ts of prese nt or futu re: dec isi on>... D ~"·id R. Steck . N o ;ick 011 Su11k Cosrs. IIIIi
ET III CS (105 . n05 -06 (1096) . Peop le who irrati ona llv fai l to upe ratc:: under thi s ruk ha\C fa ll e n
pre\' to thc sun k-cost [a! lacy.
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hundredth ease me nt owner- who will hold th e kev to the fu ll S IOU
milli on in pro fit - as ks a price of $100 million.
Worse ye t fo r Do nny. because of th e dra mati c di spa rit y in ba rga inin g power be tw ee n th ose who sell earl y and th ose who se ll late .
eas ement owne rs will hole! out unt il th e e nd of the process in urd e r to
maximi ze th e ir profits. Thi s. of co urse. increases transac ti o n costs eve n
furth er.
In deed. the re a re prob <tbl y no barrie rs to easeme nt holde rs· ab ilit y
to pred ict th e co urse of neg oti at ions. A precocio us fir st ease me nt
hold e r will therefo re decl ine to make the modes t req uest of $ 1 mil li on.
and instead ask for th e S<tme $ 100 milli o n as the hundred th ease me nt
own er. Rea so nin g bac kw a rds fr om thi s dauntin g outco me. Do nn y will
lik e ly shy away from the projec t a nd devo te his fun ds to th e ea~ i er l<tsk
of building tall gl ass to wers on nonpark land in New York C ity _~,,,
A.lthough th e objective tot al valu e of th e an ti property e<tse rn e nt s
o nl y rc prese nts th e sha re of th e a butting homeowne rs· inte rest in th e
co ntinu ed existence of un ckvel opecl par ks , as a practical matte r the
cost o l acqu iring th e a ntiprope rty ease ments wil l be cons iderab ly
high e r. Indeed , as a genera l matter. th e cost of bu ying up the a ntiproperty ease ments will be pro hibitive. The ho ldout dynamic create d
by th e dispe rse d caseme nts effect ively protec ts th e inte res t of th e
public at large in conserva tion , even though the public·s inte re st isn't ,
techni ca ll y speaking, repr ese nted.
The irony impl icit in a ntiproperty may be de scribed in anot her
way. Conven tion al wisd om suggests that environm ent al goods a re
unc! erproducecl clue to widely dispe rsed positive a nd negative ex ternalities .137 Ove rprod ucti on of pollution, for exa mpl e, is often ascribed
to the ab ili ty of pol luters to externali ze many of th e costs of th eir acti vities to the public. ~ The stan dard policy presc ription , th erefore,
calls fo r forcing th e polluters to intern alize these cos ts , by means of
fin es, for exa mpl e. 1Y1 The policy prescription re lies upon the ass umption th a t tr ansaction costs are too high to allow inte rn alizat ion thro ugh
13

136. O n ho ldout s. see Th o ma s W. Me rri ll. / h e Econolll lcs of Pu b lic Use. 72 CORN ELL
L. RE V. ri l. 10') ( 1986) [hc re in aflt:r i'vkrrill. t>u bllc Use ]. for a desc ri pti o n of G. 'vl." s d iffic u ltv
in buv in~ a large tract in a m ajor urb::m a rc::1. and R ichard A. E pste in. A Clm r View of ril e
Ca rlr cdra/.' ril e Donrlnun cc of Pro perry Rules . I06 Y.-\ LE L.J. 2091. 2 112 ( l <JS7 ). fo r " discus-

sio n of the usc o f e m inen t domain to re solve ho ldo ut p rob le ms.

l37. Sec Richa rd H . Mc A dams. R t'!urlve Prcf ere!lces. IU2 Y AL E L.J. l. 61) (llJ'J2) (cxth e proble m o f free -ri d ing w ith rega rd to rubl ic good s. which in turn k~1d s to un derproduct i<>n ) .

pos i n~

13::;. See Mi chael J. G ergen. Nut c. Tl1 e Failed Pro 111lse of rl1c "Pul/u rcr l'un " F'rin ciplc:
Ecuno!lllc 1\na/_1·sls of Luncfo,ma Lin hi/in· jiH 1-/a;urdous Wusr e. 69 N. Y .U. L. R EV. 62-+.
627 (Jl)lJ-+ ) ( theo ri zing that the: pol lute : s hou ld re imbu rse soc ic tv for cos ts impose d o n
,- \ 11

o ther ~).

139. Sec ld. a t 62K.
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private bargainin g betwee n pollution victims and produce rs 1 4 ' ' On this
view_ tran saction costs arc th e cu lp rit for the mark e t's failur e to curb
suboptimal pollution. And if transa ction costs could only be lowered
sufficiently. presum ably , th e market failures wou ld clissipatc.141
Incleecl. it is fo r this reaso n that law and economics scholars ge nerally
call for policvrn akers to craft mark et me chanisms th a t reduce tran saction costs. in order to pa ve th e wa y fur unimp eclecl bargaining among
mark e t particip a nt s.1J 2
The counte rintuitive goal of antiprop e rty casements is to create
tran saction costs . whi ch in thi s cas e are proclucecl by strategic holdout.
Here, we re ly upon two co mmon observa tion s that are rare lv appli ed
toge ther to the po ll ution dil e mma. First, th e prob le m of tran saction
costs ma y be ~1s sua g ecl complet ely by allocating resources . ex ante. to
th e party who wou ld ha ve re ce ived tho se re sources through th e ma rket if tran saction costs were low. ~_; Second, wh en transe~ction costs arc
insurmountabl y high (so as to mak e bargaining impossible) , the ini tial
allo cation is di spl)SitivtY 4 - once allocated , the asset never mov es .
Combin ed, th ese tw o phe nom e na prod uce th e perve rse out come of
a ntiprop e rty caseme nts. To ove rc ome high transaction costs among
1

1-+0. See Ron al d H. Coasc: . The Prohlcm of Social C os!. 3 J.L. & E CON . I ( 1960) (assumin g high trctn sac tiun cos ts preclude soc iallv o ptimal result s) : Daniel C. Es ty. T o ward O p limal Envimlllnenwl Gut·.:m ancc . 7-+ N. Y .U . L. RE V. I-+ LJ5_ 15-+5 (1999) (ac knuw le d g ing tha t
high tran sact io n cnsts m av le ad to subo ptimal reso urce a llocation s) .
J 41. S ee Coct se . surra no te 141J.
142. Sec R o n ERI' C OOTER & TH O,\ MS lJ LE:-J . L A \V AND E CO NOM ICS I 02 (1 st eel. I LJl'\8 ):
ANTH ONY T. KR ON \IA N & RI Cl-1 .-\RD POSNER. TH E EC Ol\ 0 ,\ I ICS O F CONT RACT LAW 2 54
(1979 ): A M ITCH ELL PO I.I NS K Y. AN I NTIW DU CTIO :-J TO L AW AN D E CO:-.JOM ICS 12 (2d eel .

I ':18':1) (positing that when transa c tion cos ts arc po sitive . " the preferre d le ga l rul e is the rul e
t hat minimi zes th e effect s o f tran sacti o n costs." ) : Eri c L. Tal le y. N o te. Cowracr Renegoria lir>ll, ivlecllllnism O nign. an d 1i1e Liqu ida!d Dam ages Rule. 46 STAN. L. RE v . 1195. 11 91>
n.14 ( 1994).

IH See ROB ERT C OOTER & TII O\·IAS UL EN . L AW AN D ECO NO MI CS 'JO (2d e d. 1996)
(stating th at when tra nsa c ti o ns cos ts pre vent ba rgainin g. "th e law sho uld a llocate prope rty
right s to the part\' who value s th e m the mos t" (e mpha sis omillccl)). P e te r Sc hl ag summarizes
th e la w an d eco n o mi cs <tnctl ys is o f e ntitle me nt s as fo ll ows:

1. Ass ign

c ntitkm c nt~

to the party wh l) must values th e m. 2. If it is no t clear who mos t val -

ues the e nt it le me nt. g ran t th..:; e ntitle ment to tht.! pa rt y w ho

Gi ll m ost che apl y ini tia te a n ex ch ange. 3. \Vh cr..: t r<:~n s<Jct i u n cos ts are low. gran t abst>lu tc t: ntitlc mt: nt s. -1-. \ Vhcre tr:.l nsac-

tion ~os ts

;He

high. stru cture th ~ kgal n. :gimc tu appr oximat e the out co mes that th e pa rtie s

w ou ld h:l\·c rt=< ICht.:d
st ru ~ ture

i! I

5. \ V he rc
to redu ce tran saction C1Jst s.

a zero transaction cost wo rld .

kgal e ntitkrncn ts so

~~ s

t r~ m s: J ction costs a rc hig h. re-

Pet er Schl ag. Tiu' l~m/Jie!ll of Tm nsuCiiun Cosls. 62 S. CA L. L. RE V. 1661. 1663 (198':1) (ci ta tions o mitted) .

1-+ -+. See T ho m as \V . .l o d. Col/l ruCI, l' rop cn y. 11 1/(1 1!1 e R ul<: of M cwplw r in C01p o ra1ions
L oll . 35 U. C D AVIS L. R E\' 779 . :) 13 (1002) (n oti n g t h ~t w he n th e "ini ti al a lloca ti o n of :1n
e ntitl e ment is ineffi cient. tr a nsaction co sts can inhibit o r p reven t th e tran sfe r of the e nti tl e me nt" ): Th o mas W. \ lc r rill. Th e Coi/Siifllfion an d 1i1<: Cl/{flt:drul: Pm fli hi1ing. Purclws in~;;.
und Possi/Jiv Con de111 11ing T o/)llcCO ;-ldvenising. 93 Nw. U . L. R E\'. 1143. 115 1 ( 1999)
(pointing o ut thnt when tr a ns:J c ti o n costs ctrc hi gh " th e e ntit le ment will sta y where it is init ial ly a ll ocat ed no 111 at tc r "· hat trc, nsac li cJ n r ule we sckct " ).
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victims of suboptimal or inefficient development. antipropcrtv easements allocate the right to block such inefficient development to
nearby neighbors. To ensure that nearby neighbors adequately represent the unaccounted-for social benefit of unclevclopcd green space.
however, antiproperty casements arc scattered. creating transaction
costs. and thereby defending the initial allocation.
It is important to note that the mechanism ot antipropcrty easements does not effect a first-best solution. Transaction costs do not go
away- on the contrary. new transaction costs arc crc<lleci. /\ lsu. antiproperty casements do not lead to a full internaliz<ttiun ot un<1Ccountecl-for benefits o[ undeveloped green space. lnsk<td. the il1cchanism of antiproperty easements institutes transaction cnsts a s Z\ ruugh
counterbalance to the unaccounted-for benefits uf conservation. Specifically. these new rights we propose force developers to a clcl s ubstantial transaction costs to their balance sheet as a proxy lor the currently
unaccounted-for component of public benefits from conserviltiun.
Antiproperty easements are not capable - in themselves ~- of
creating a one-to-one correlation between the costs paid bv dev,:iopers
and the accurate benefits of the conservation foreclos ed by development. Rather, decisionmakers should employ antiproperty casements
only where they conclude that the unaccounted-lor public interest in
conservation is sufficiently large to warrant creating transaction costs
that make the status quo practically unassailable.
In our Oceanside example, the benefits from preservation are
often so small and dispersed that the cost of coordinating preservation
campaigns is prohibitive. Put differently , the high transaction costs
created by the widespread scattering of benefits produce a situation in
which it is often impossible for beneficiaries to ensure that their interests in park preservation are taken into account by the political and
economic process. As we pointed out earlier. this means that without
legal intervention, inefficient development is a lik e ly outcome. Practically, however, there is no way to lower sufficiently transaction costs
(in this case, primarily the cost of coordination) on the beneficiaries·
side in order to produce an efficient market. Our proposal. therefore,
employs the next best option: shifting the transaction costs to the
other side by engendering a holdout problemi 45
It is important to note that just such an arrange ment was implemented in Chicago in order to protect Grant Park against development. After the city dedicated land for the park some 150 years ago,
the Illinois legislature enacted legislation providing that:
[a]ny person being the owner of or being interested in any lot. or part of
a lot. fronting on Michigan Avenue [abutting the park], sh<lll have the
right to enjoin .. . all[] persons and corporations[] from any violation of
145. In Part IV.C. inji-a. we offer a first-b es t mechanism th<tt incurp u r<ttc·s antiprupcrtv
casem e nts and the takings powe r.
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the [non-c ncrnac hmc ntJ prov isions o f thi s sec tio n ... ;~ n d bv bi ll u r pe tition in ch ;tnccn'.
e nforce the provi sio ns o f.. this sect ion. a nd rc co Ye r s uc h d~tma gc-; fo r a ny suc h e ncroachme nt or violat ion as the cou rt
shall deem just'"''

In a se ri es ol cases . th e co urts upheld a butting ow ners righ t to e njoin
deve lop ment on ded ica ted par k l an d. ~
A ntipropc rt y ease me nts thus simultaneo usly aim a r goals that are
conside red the h ~1~ is or prop erty , a nd th ose that arc ordinaril y though t
of as antit het ica l to th e prope rty sys te m. O n the one hand. a nti propcrty easc menh . like ordinary prope rty, curb overcx pl oitat iu n by fo rcing the in te rn ali zatio n o f costs. On th e oth e r han d. antiprope n y casc:mcn ts ac hin·L' thi s goal by delibe rately creat ing <t holdout p r o b lem~
a strat..:gic problem th a t man y common ly see as the ba ne of the prop crt\' svskm.
1

E.

7

Puh!ic Clwicc nnd Anripropcrtv Rig/us

As we noted ear li er. success ful co nse rvation po li cies must ta ke in to
:1ccount poss ible po liti ca l fa ilures that may und er min e wn se rvation
reg ime s. First and foremost, we shoul d explai n why po li tica l ac tors
may find it be nefi cial to im pleme nt our proposal. After all. one mi ght
a rgu e that th e inh ere n t predi spos ition of po litica l ac tors to favo r deve lopm ent sho uld preemp t any att emp t at gra ntin g antiprup e rty rights
to pri vate property ow ne rs. A ll the political short co mings and po litica l
dillicul ties we di sc ussed earli er would simply carry ove r. A s we show
in th e proceed ing pa ragraph s, howeve r, the se mbl a nce o f sy mmet ry is
misleading . /-\n antipro perty regime may often avo id th e po litical fa ilur es th a t pl ag ue ex pos t pro tecti on of green space a nd ot her co nse rvation properti es.
fir st. it is importa nt to reca ll th a t conserva tion regimes ma y
eme rge fr om differe nt leve ls of government. f or example. our propos<ll may be adop ted a t th e fed e ral level, the sta te leve L th e co unt y
leve L or th e municipal level. As William Fischel noted. th e influe nce
o f different int eres t groups varies amon g th e diffe rent leve ls of
go vcrnment . ~' At some levels, prodevelopm ent interests may carry a
iot of clout. whi k at o th ers th eir influence may be quite limit ed. Nat urallv. the sa me holds true for proconse rva tion interes ts. T he la tter
gro up. however. will be a betted by a n often siza ble grou p o r prope rt y
1

1-lh. Sec Ci t I ' of Ch icago v. Wa re!. 400 48 N .E. 927 ( Ill. I /;97).

1-17. The fa :<cinat ing hist orv o f Gr~mt Park is di sc ussed in a series of cases known as th -:
e<!S'-" · Sec Ci lv of C hicago v . Wa rd. -18 N.E 927: Bli ss v. Wa rd. 64 N .E 705 ( Il l. 190::')'
\V cm l \' . Fic: ld i'v lu scum . 0l) N.E. 73 1( !11. \ 909): South Par k Com'rs v. i'vl o nt,!Olll ~ n W :ml &
Ct> .. 'i~ N.E. 9 ! 1i ( !II. \9 11). Sec also McC or mick v. C hi cago Ya c ht Club. IC1J N.E. 4 10 ( Ill.
l'i::'C: ): Stc1cn' H,ltc-1 Co. v. Chicago Y:1ch1 Club.l7 ! N. E. 550 (Ill. 19.30).
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owners who sta nd to ga in from th e e nactm e nt o f the antipro pe rt y
regim e . whi c h would in crease the valu e of their rea lty. Therefore. it is
quite possibk th a t th e pruco nse rvation fo rces and th e ir allies will win
th e politi u t! battle at som e le vel. Accordingly. such conservationists
may introdu ce an antipro pe rty regim e in a congeni a l political ar e na in
o rd e r to bl oc k future lo sses o n le ss co nge nial groun d . Thus , th e g ra nt
of a ntip ro pe rt y ri ght s re prese nt s a va luable preco mmitmcnt stra tegy
fo r consc n ·at io nists that will allo w tra nslating a o ne -tim e politi ca l victory into a m o re permane nt defense o f co nservation properties. 1 ~
Second. th e coalitio ns forming aro und a deci sion to grant a ntiprope rt y e:.~se m e nts ma y crea te an entire ly new po liti ca l dynami c a t
a ny leve l o f gove rnme n t. A ntiprope rty ease ments re prese nt an id e n tifiable go od tha t will be di s tribute d to a n identifi a ble (and p oss ibl y
influential ) g roup. Th e pn s:-; ibility of o bt aining thi s good ma y ra lly
proximat e -p ro pe rty own e rs into formin g politi cal pressure gro ups.
eve n wh e re a o ne- tim e ha ttie to save a park from a pa rticular pro ject
wo uld no l. i\ ntiprope rt y reg im es m ay thus cre ate the ir own int e res t
group lo b by ists l o suppo rt co nserva ti o n a nd battl e anticonse rva tion
lobbyists.
Third , and finally , th e g ranting of a ntiproperty easements ra ises
th e valu e of affe cted pro pe rt y by crea ting greate r ce rtainty about th e
continu ed ex iste nce of th e pa rk. By m ea ns of prop e rt y taxes , go ve rnme nts can pa rtl y recapture this value. In a world wh e re fiscal illusio n
distorts gove rnment cl cc isio nmakin g, thi s added m a rginal ben efit in
favor or conservation m ay sometimes tip the scal e s.
9

III.

ANT IPROPERTY Ar< D THE TH EO RY OF TH E C O !vl/viO NS

Havin g described antiproperty case m ents as a pote ntial soluti o n to
the problem of mismana ge ment of publicly owne d conservation resources, we now turn to th e broader qu es tion of wh e r e to place a ntiproperty within th e broa de r context of th e theory of property. A s we
show , an a ntiproperty an a lysis introduces important changes to tra ditio nal und e rsta ndings of property theo ry, espe cially in the r e alm o f
commons pro pe rty.
Comm o ns property regim e s have lo ng been of int e re st to pro pe rty
the orists 1 ' " T raditionall y. th e orists e labo r a ted Hardin 's central proposition: tha t co mmon s pro pe rty is lik e ly to lead to ove re xploitati o n a nd
l-!9. T o he: sure . developm e nt fo rce s may simil ar ly seck th e hi gh political groun d . a nd
th ey too will try to pa rla v the ir vic tory there in to a pe rm anent stru ct ure in a cco rcl ancc wi th
th ei r own prccommit me nt stra tegy. The gra ntin g of a ntiprope rt y rights. however. is not a
too l tha t will ass ist such deve lop me nt forces. Mo reove r. :ts we note in Pa rt IV. inf m . if the
an tiprope rt v reg ime is prope rl v str uctu red. eve n a successful co nfi scation o f an tiprope rtv
ri ghts will not unde rm in e opt ima l conse rva ti on.
150. S ee . e.g .. Hanoch Da g:m & 1v!ichacl ;l... H.: lkr. The L.ih cml Co mmom. !Ill Y;\ L[
L. J. :54lJ. 559-!iCI (d isc uss in g C< llllfl hl ll S propc:rt v in an Aris tote lian co ntex t).
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ex haustion o f rc source s. 1' 1 l'vl ic ha e I H e llcr add uce d an import ant coro llary to H a rdin 's theory h v po intin g o ut that th e opposite problem
co ul d a lso aris e 1 'c Hell e r ~ howed that to o many property right s too
wid e ly dispe rsed m ay kad to uncl e rexploitati o n ancl uncl e rutili za tion
of resources. 15 ' C iting th e d ivision of p ri vate propert y in th e form e r
U.S.S.R. as a n e xample. H e lle r de monstrated th at too many owners
holding veto rights over prupe rt y can lock th e property into indefini te
suboptimal use. or even. no usc at a ll. 15 -' Hell e r aptl y labe le d thi s ph e nom e non "anticommons prop e rty ...
Paralleling Hardin , Heller de scribed the ·' tragedy of the a nticommons·· as a peril to be averted , and
this view ha s sin ce be en a cce pt e d. 1"'
O ur propos e d antipru pe rty ease m ents pr ese nt an important co unterpoint. A s Ellickson Y' ancl la ter H e ller, 15' noted, in sofa r as no nus e
is, at tim e s, th e opt im a l u~e o f prn pc rty. th e scat terin g of prope rty
rights - and the de li be ra te:: crea tion of anticommon s and th e ir attendant high tr a ns ac ti on costs -- is an impurtant po li cy tool that o ugh t to
be conside re d. lncl ee d . we s ugge st a n additio n to H e ll e r 's termino lo gy
to re flect th e fact that som e ant icommons arc des irab le; we propose
the nam e "conse rvation commons .. for common s whose most e fficient
use is n onuse .
A ntiprope rt y, a nd it s use in p re se rving conse rva ti on common s,
thus introduces two im porta nt inno va tions. First, antiproperty is a
q ua sipri vate mec hanism for p u rsui ng goal s th a t are ge nera lly thought
to be parad igma ti c pub lic function s. R esou rce co nservat io n through
antiproperty relics on pr iva te e nfo rce ment by in ter ested private actors, funded by costs im pose d on privat e oppone nts of the public goal.
1

"

15l. See H a rdin. supra no te 20: He nry E. Smith. Sem icontll /011 Properrv Rig/us allll
Scallering in 1/te Open Fields . .?. lJ J. LEGM. ST UD. 131 (2000) : Bruce Yandl e & Andrew P.
Morri ss. Th e Techn o logies o( f' rof' el't\' l?ighrs: Ch o ice A111 o ng ;\/rernrui ve So!urions 10 Tragedies of ihe Colllmons. 21> ECOLOC Y l.O . 123 (:~0 0 1).
152 . H elle r. Th e Tmgedv of lftc A nricn!l tiiWns. supra note 21.

153. S ee id. at 673-77.
154. See id. at 633 -S'J .
.1 55. See id .

156. See . e.g .. Jan e B. Bctr\l n. Th e E.1prcssi1·c Fm 11spu rct tn• of Properrv. 102 C OL.U;vl. L.
RE V. 208. 20:3 n. 3 (citin g Helkr ·s "t ragL·dyo f the an tico mrn ons' ' ): Jam es M. Buchan an &
Yon g .J. Y oo n. S)'llllnerric Tro gcdics: Coll tlllol\s 1111d ;\n rico!IIIII OIIS. 43 J .L. & EC ON. l. l n.l
(2 000) : Fra ncesco Pa ris i. f:'tllrnfl' in l'rr>t!.-rl\' . :iO .-\,\1 .J . C O:Vl. L. 595 . 613-61 4 (2002) (d iscussing reunifi cation mec hani >lllS de si gned to ove rcom e the· problem of a ntic omm o ns in
prope rty la w): Francesco Pari si & Ca th erine· Scvcc nk o . Lessons j i·om 1fte A ll/icomm ons: Tit~
l:.'co nomics of Ne w York Tim es Co . v. Tasini . ')II KY. L.l. 295. 3 10-15 (2001-2002) (d iscussing
the anticomm ons problem UIH.krl ving the c: Jse of Ne "' Y ork Tim es Cu. , .. Tasini. 533 U. S.
483): J.H. Rei chman & Jonctth a n ;\ _ Fr<1nklin. f' rivlllei,· L. eg is!med fnrell ecru a/ Propeny
Rig/us: Reco n ciling Freedom of Cunrm<'l 11·irft f' uhlic G ood Uses of /n fr>n nmion. l-1 7 U. P.->..
L R EV. 875. 914n.l7l) (ci ting Hclk rl.
157. See Elli cksun. supro no te
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158. Sec He ller. Tlte Tmgetl1· of rh e .·\nriumlltwns . sup ra no te 21. a t 6oX.
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i\s we will show. reso urce co nse rvation effected in thi s way has importan t practical implicat ions as wel l as the o ret ica l ones . Antipropcrty is <1
fl exible too l th at mav be used for conservation o f assets or to r
con trolling the rate of their exp loitation. by means of the mark e t a nd
cuurts ' 5'' The seco nd adva nce embod ied in a ntiprope rt y is a fle shing
out of a new category of e ntitlement- <1 ve to e nti tleme nt that ensures
nonuse a ncl nonexploitation by virtue of its part in an a tHic o mm ons.
Transla tin g E llickso n· s and Fkll e r' s obse rva ti o ns abo ut potent ia l virtu es of ant ico mmo ns into a co mp re he nsive stru cture o f a ntiprope rt y
demo nstrates a co ncre te ma nn er in wh ich ant ico mm o ns m ;w he
exp loitee!.
A.

Siruuring A nriprupert\' in

Co lll/11!1/1.\

Thco!T

Studies or commons prope rty have. quite na turally. focused on reso lving Hardin' s trage dy o l the common s. The trad itional rem edy is
privatization. 1''' 1 If too many shepherds ruin the C\'Hl1mo n pasture beca use non e has a sufficie nt pec uniar y interest in th e pa sture 's preservat ion. th e difficulty ca n be eas il y reso lved by giving mvnc rship of th e
past ure to one of the she phe rd s, or by d iv iding the past ure among
the several shep he rd s. Each she ph e rd ca n th en be co unted on to pro tec t he r financial interest in th e Janel by blocking ove rgrazing a ncl
properly balancing th e benefits of grazing aga in st th e costs of pasture
depletion. 1" 1
A second common re medy for the traged y - ofte n cited in th e
field of environm ent al law - is regul ation. For exa mple. to prevent
she pherds from overgrazing the pasture, sta te reg ulators can limit
grazing hours, or th e number of sheep with access to the fi eld . Indee d,
reg ul a tion is an e normously popular remedy for co mmons abu se in
such diverse contexts as hunting,1" 2 logg in g, 1" 3 and air H·.l a nd water
pollution. 1"' Yet, regul ation has drawn its critics. as it is viewed as
cumbe rsom e, costly, and in ellicient 16' '
159. Sec i11fi'u Part IV .
1GO. Se c Hardin, supm no te 211.

1GI. Se c Oemsctz. supm note 3-l.
162. Se e. e.g .. Ala ska Na ti onal intere st Lands Consc: rvat1un ;\ ct. 1.6 U .S.C
( 1994) (reg ubting. /ll(er alia. hun t ing o n kdcra l lands).

~

-'10 1 ct sc: q

!63. Se e, e.g., Nationa l Fores t Ma nage me n t Ac t. 16 U.S. C. S~ 472 ,1. -176 . 500. 51.3 -5 16.

52 1b. 576b. 1600- 1602. 1604 . 1606. 160K- 1614 (2002) : i\•lu ltipk - Usc a nd Sus tai ne d- Yie ld ."\ Ct.
16 USC.§ 52S-3 l ( 1994 ).
164. See. e.g .. Clean Air Ac t. .:1 2 U.S.C. ~'i 7-!0 1-7671 (2002 ).
lfi5 . See. e.g.. Clean Water Act. 33LJ.S.C. ~~ 1251- 1-'07 (20112).
166. Sec. e.g .. Bruce A . Acke rman S: Rich a rd B. S tew,l rt . C llmment. Rcl(mning Dn iLent'. 37 STAl\. L. Rev. 1333 (I '.185): R ubert \V . Hahn & Robert N. Sta1i m.
ln ccllli vc -!Jnscd Elll'i /'011111<'11101 Reg ulurion: 11 Nn1' Em ./Will 1111 Old ldm' . ! ;.; Ec nt .or ;y
L.Q. I ..~ ( 1. 'J') I): l\ath a ni c l 0. Keo han e e t a l .. Tilt' C!wi u <J( Rcguf!II<IIT ! nll/'1/ ll li'lll s i11 r·111 i -
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In he r groundhre<Jk in g work, Governing rh e Conzmons. Elinor
Ostrom de mo nstrated the possibility of a third re med y by highlighting
the importan ce o f soc ial norm s in regulating the com mon s.1'' 7 Ostro m
observed th<lt soci <tl norms ma y lower coord inati o n and ot her tran sa cti on costs to such an ex te nt th a t ove rexploitation will not occur. eve n
without ru ll y rri\ at izing th e commons, or in tro duci ng an extern al govemment regul ~1t\)r . 'n' On the basis of ext e nsive empirica l research.
Ostrom ick ntificcl ancl categorize d a number or d iffe ren t
publi c/pr iva te me chani sms that harn ess social no rms tu bridge the ga p
betwee n commons and ordi na ry pri va te p ropcrty. 1"'1
Ostrom recog nized th at her commons remed ies wer e limited tn
thos e situations in which the gro up accessing th e co mmo ns \V<ts su llicientlv small a nd cohes ive th at it could reg ul a te its cm11 membe rs
th ro ugh soc ial nurms. For examp le, O strom desc rib ed puh li c/privatt:
co mmo ns reg im es gove rnin g uncultivated la nd s near smal l Japa nese
vi ll age s. 17" Philip pine irrigation co mmLmitics. 171 and several Iish c ri es . 1 ~ ~
Our strat egy in proposin g antiprope rt y approaches the problem
fro m a different ang le. L ike Ost rom. we seek to exp a nd the JX)ssibilitics of co mm ons management beyond priva tiz at ion and re gu lati on.
We reso lve th e pro ble m of overexplo itation by creating a new pub li cprivate hybrid. along a different axis than that explored lw Ostro m.
Ostrom desc rib ed situ ations in whi ch th e many users of a co mmon s
resource arc yo ked toge th er by soci al norms and induce d bv soc ial e nfo rcement mec hanism s to e ngage in efficie nt use . O ur aim. by co ntra st. is not to achi eve coord inatio n amo ng all affected use rs. but
rath e r to sin gle out a select group of users, ves t its memb ers with
nonusary property rights, a nd use th e res ultin g a nti commo ns to deter
inefficient use . Im portantly, at this stage, we do not expec t thi s set of
users. or any cohesive group for that matte r, to full y inte rnalize the
cos ts and be nefit s associated with conservation of th e reso urce . Ye t.
we a re able to att ain the desired conservation by taking advantage or
strategic tlaws inh e rent in ce rtain transac tiona l se ttin gs. An important
advan tage of o ur mechanism is th at it may be em pl oyed in situations
where neithe r a full-fled ged regulatory sc heme no r a sc heme of
ruwncii!Uil'o/in·. 22 Hr\RV. E"i\'TL. L. REV . 3 13 (1991':): James E. Krier. llt e frrulionol Nu liunul .'\ ir Quulin· Swllilanls: ,\facru- and Micru - !Yfiswk~s. 22 UC LA L. RE\ '. _~::':> (I '! 7-1 ):
Richard B. Ste wa rt. f:.co nulllics. E nviroii /1/CIII . and 1i1e Limils uf L egu l C"n trul . ':! H AR \.
[NVT L. L R EV. I. 7 ( I':!85).
167 . OSTROM. supra note 3 1.
16S Sec iJ a t 18-2 1.

I n9. See id.

J 71l. See iJ at A5- n'!.
t7 I. Sec id. :1t

17?.. S,·e id.

:lt

~{_l- KS.

!4'1 -71':. O strom noted th:1t several of the fishcrie,; m.:rc unqt cccss ful in

inainl ~l inin s r ~ li abk g~1ve rni ng con1mn ns regime s.
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private property rights is feasible, and in which it is practically impossible to lower transaction costs, even through social norms.
The relative advantages and disadvantages of each commons governance sch e me- and the situations in which each is desirable- are
illustrated in the l'ollowing table:
T i'I.BLE I. COMMONS GOVERNANCE

I
L_
I

Privatization

!J)\\'

l

Monitoring
and Enforcemen!

Share in
Resource

Potential
Drawbacks

I SmalL Lo w

Low. Private

Irre le vant

Negative
Externali rico;

High. Public

1rrc levant

Admini srrativ e RentSe eking and
Capture

I

l

I

Group Size
and Cohcsiveness

Transaction Co~;ts

Goverm.nent

lli!'h

Large ,

LO\V

RegulatiOn

Social

Low

SmalL High

High. Private

Roughly
Equal

Nctrativc
0
Extnnalities:
Limited
Coverage

High

Large. Low

Low, Private

One Special
Interest
Group

Limited Usc

Norms

A nti property

As the table suggests, antiproperty provides an important policy
tool that outperforms its more well-known cousins in certain settings.
1.

Privatization

Privatization works best when transaction costs are sufficiently low
to allow resources to gravitate through market transactions to their
highest-value users. Private property lowers monitoring costs, as the
owner need not monitor compliance by other users of the property,
and only has to guard the property against incursions by others.m
Group size and cohesiveness among group members are not prerequisites for establishing private property regimes. As group size rises and
cohesiveness diminishes, however, transaction costs are likely to
increase as well. making private prop e rty regimes increasingly
I 7:'>. 5f l' [Jiicb(\ n. sufHil note 23.

!
!

I
II
!
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I
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unwieldy. 17 1 It is importa nt to not e that pri va te property does not
elimin ate a ll externa liti es . Pri vate prope rty sc hem es are fl exible with
rega rd to th e all oca ti on of e ntitlem ents: not hin g de m ands th a t all
proper ty owners receive equal shares in th e commons. Yet. private
prope rty regimes ra re ly ach ie ve a full accounting of cos ts among
prope rty owners. 175 Gen e rally. so me negative ex tern alities or prope rty
usc escape ful l acco untin g, cre a ting th e need for som e exter nal regulator y mecha nism such as tort (pr im a ri ly nui sa nce) o r expli cit gove rnment regulation.
2.

Regu!uuon

Regulatio n is a stand a rd response to va rious ma rk e t fa ilures. Whe n
mark ets produce soci al ly suboptimal re sults, the gov e rnme nt is
exp ected to suppl e ment mark e tmech ,ln isms. or even to s upplant them
alt oget he r in orde r to re me dy dcfi cie ncies1 "r, In th e ex tre me , the
re gulator is supp osed to se t up op tim cil standard s for behavior (e.g ..
e mi ss ion qu o tas) , monitor com pliance. ancl prosecute vio lators 1 77
Cro up size is not a n inhere nt li mitation on reg ulat o ry schemes, but th e
cost of monitoring is lik ely to rise with group size. Monitoring and
e nfo rceme nt arc typicall y perfo rmed by gove rnme nt agencies th a t are
set up precise ly for this purpose. Natu ra lly, th is requires th e re gulator
to have adeq uate informa tion a nd expertise for th e task.
Reg ul atory schemes suffer fr o m two majo r flaw s. First, regul a tors
arc not th emselv es mark et participants. and they lac k a direct interest
in th e outcomes they seek to protect. R eg ul a to rs are therefo re susce ptible to being captured by th e ir ·· cli e nt s,., who may promise the
administrators be tter workin g co nditio ns (through the appearance of
compliance) or fut ure benefits (s uch as postgove rnment work in the
industry). 178 Regulators may also se ek to protect the ir own jobs by
instituting unnecessa ry regulati ons to fom e nt busywork and adminis-

174. See He lle r. The Traged1• of 1he A w icollun ons. supra no te 2 1.
17). Sec YORAM BARZEL. E C000\IJC ,"\0 r\L.YSIS O f PROPERTY RI GIIT S 4 -6 ( 2 d eel.

I 'J9 7).
176. See. e.g .. Dani e l C. Esty. Towards Op1i111al En 1·im nlll enlol Gm·em111 1Ce. 7-+ N.Y. U.
fe~ ilurc s throug h th e e nforcement of
enviru nme nt al rights): Michael!\. Fitts. Cun lgn nrnnc e Be DlissJ llll f'e r/eCI ln fin nullion us u
f' osi1i1·e !n.fluence i11 Polilical fnl"fi!IIIiulls. XS :VI JCH. L. RE V. 9 17. 926 ( 1990) (d escribin g gov e rn me nt response to such suboptimal probl ems ~> s free -ridin g) .

L. R EV . 1495. !50-+ (a dvoca tin g the correction ol'ma rket

177. See Ste phen Breve r. ,-\noly ;in::; Regulm utT Failure: Misnuuches. L ess f? eslriCi ive
and Re/(m n. 92 H ,\R V. L. RE\ ". 5-19. 550 ( 1979) (d iscuss in!!. the th eorv tha t gu vc rnnl c nt regula tio n ~o l ves problems in unrcgu la tecl llla rkc·ts).
·
-

.·1/ie m al il·cs.

(,72

17S. See Joclv Freeman. Til e l'ri vale /\ ole iu Puh!ic Gu v alliiii Ct'. 75 N. Y.U. L. R EV. 54.'1.
(20110 ) (disc ussing rhe in terdepe nden ce nf pri ,·a tc· a nd public :~ c to rs ).
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tr<lllve ··creep.-- 1''' Aclclitionally. regulators often lack direct access to
information necessary for monitoring. ancl must therefore rclv upon
their clients to supply the very information ne e ded to limit the clients'
be havior: to say the least . this creates a potential conflict of intercst L"1
finally. as regulators benefit a particular set of clients. they arc likely
to create a dynamic of adverse selection. in which the rcgulC\tors and
clients develop increasingly cozy relationships at the expense or the
puhiic at large. 1'; 1 A second. related flaw is the high cost of government
regulation. Perhaps clue to the regulators· attenuated relationship to
the subject of their work and to the ubiquity of administrative rentseeking. full-flec!gccl regulatory schemes tend to he enormously more
expensive than allocative techniques that use the market 1 0 '

3.

Sncio! Nor111s

One of Ostrom's most important contributions to the commons literature was positive. rather than normative. In her empirical study.
Ostrom observed numerous commons- or common-pool resources.
in her terminology- that managed to avoid ovcrcxploitation despite
minimal government regulation. and notwithstanding the fact that the
commons hac! not been divided among private property owners 1 ' '
Ostrom attributed the preservation to social norms.
Ostrom noted. however. that such norms could onlv be successful
in governing commons under the limite d circumstances in which resource users could be expected to obey social norms. i.e .. where users
constitute a small and cohesive group , with roughly equal shares in t he
resource. 1" 4 Absent the small size or cohesiveness. resource users
would expect to evade social sanctions, and they could safely ignore
the social norms and over-exploit the commons. The utility of socialnorm-enforced commons governC\nce is further restricted by high
monitoring costs among the group of resource users. Like the privC~ti170. See Erne s t G~llhorn & Paul Verkuil. Conlrolling Chcnon-Ba.1erl Dclcgu1ions. 211
C\fWOZO L. REV. 9S9. 1004 (1909) (acknowledging the pruccss of "creepin g " Zh asse rting
.JUrisdiction without authoritv).

1Sll. David B. Spence . T!J c Slwdrnv n( I lie Ra1ional Pnllulcr: Rerlzinking 1/ze !?of,· of Rulionul Acrur Mudels in Lnvirrlii!II CI/IUI f.o1v. Sl) C\L L. REV. '!17. ')27 n.:Z') (201!1). On capture theory. sec gcncrallv. \VJL Ll.,\:vl ;\, N!SK.-'.NE'i. JR .. Bt rt.:L-\ LC'R.-\CY i\'ID REPRC.SFNT.-\II VE GO\'[RN~IEt\T ( 1971 ): Sam Peltzman. To\\'lzrd 11 More Gcncml Tlze otT of Rcgula1inn.
1') J.L. & E CON . 211 (1976) : and Stigler. supm note 511.
lSI

Se e Johnston. supra note 15. at 145.

I 1\2. Se e Eme rson H. Tiller. R esource-Based S1ra1cgies in Lll'V and Posilil'(' Polilical
T/i,· o,T: Cns1-Bnze{i1 Analvsis and 1/ze Like. 15U \J. PA. L R[Y. l-!53. 1460-(,] (2002) (cle~
scribing the expense of pulicvmaking bv rulemaking for an administratin: ag e ncy): Jonathan
G. \Viener. Gloha l Em·irunnz en lill Regulmiun: !nslniiiiCnl C!Joice in !.cgul Collie.; I. 1OS Y .-'.LE
LJ. 6 77.7114-35 (19'!9)
].~:;.

Sec 0STRO'.t. \lljtm note 31.
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za ti on re medy. gove rn a nce ul comm o ns thro ugh soc ial no rm s c tlcc ts
int c rnali z;tti on of costs onl y amon g users (o r own e rs. in the ctse of
p ri vat iza ti o n). and docs nut bloc k th e creatio n of nega ti ve exte rna liti es . Such e:-;tern alized costs a rc left to such de vi ces as tort law or
gove rnm e nt regu la ti o n.
-1.

Anrip r op erlv

CJ overn a nce uf the cn mm o ns thr ough antipro pe rty mech;1ni sms is
rccom rnende d whe n: ( I ) tran sact ion cos ts a re high (a nd co nscquc ntl v.
private orde ring ca nno t be re li ed on to achi e ve th e sociall y desirable
outco me): (2 ) cflectivc ~;oci a l norm s arc unlik ely to dev elop on
accou nt o f gro up size ~lll d bc k o f cohesiven ess; (3) regul a tion 1s eitlw r
e:-; cess ivel y custl y ur im prac tica l clue to inadequa te informat ion : a nd
(4) the id ed ! man age ment ol the commons invol ves com ple te ur ~ u g 
gered co nse r,·;Jti o n. 'Whe n these co nditions obt a in . anti pro perty r: rovi clt: s an att ractive alt e rnativ e to th e traditional mean:s ur common s
go ve rn a nce as it in vol ves negligible se t-up cos ts, requires litt le il1 fu rma ti on, a nd is se lf-e nfo rcing.
Moreove r. ant iprope rt v protection of commons gen era tes positive
exte rn alities to the public at la rge . This is clue to th e peculiar na ture o f
thi s regim e a:s ri ghts de livered to those especially benefited on be half
of a la rger group o f be nefici aries. The protection of the interest o f th e
la rge r pu bli c com es at no additional cost to th e ease ment holders, but
rath e r stems from the dispersion of ri ghts and the concomitant coo rdi na tion cos ts imposed upo n would-be devel opers.
B.

Utili zing Antipruperry

10

Govern Conservotion Commons

The practical usefulness of antiproperty as a re gulat ory tool stems
fr om three fac tors. First ant iprope rt y is a priva tely owned e ntitlement , protected through the ordin ary legal system. If an inte rloper
begins undes ired de ve lopment on th e protected propert y, own ers of
th e a ntiprope rt y entitleme nts will have reco urse to law enforce ment
an d the co urts to enforce th eir rights. The executive organs o f th e
sta te, by co ntrast. will be able to stand aside, and permit th e ordinary
le ga l process to block the und esired deve lopme nt. Owne rs of antiprope rt y ri ghts are lik ely to ove rse e th eir own prope rty and bea r th e
respo nsibili ty of enforcing th eir entitl e ments. Antipropc rt y th e refore
prese nts dccisionmakers with a conservation to ol whose cost is not
born e by th e public purse .
Se cond, antiprope rt y places th e duty to monit or on tho se ac tors
who already have the best access to inform a tion about the protected
reso urces a nd can pe rfo rm this task at th e leas t cos t. The surround ing
prope rty owners a re in con stant contact with th e pro tected green
space: in dee d, it is thi s co ntac t th a t produces for the m the special

46

.\Jic/1igun Lillv l< cvic 11·

[V o l. \11 2:1

va lue th ey attac h to the pari\:. For th ese ne ighbo rs. collec tin g informa tion abo ut th e gree n space is a natural byp rodu ct or their d a il y act ivities and cr eat es no m arginal cost .
Third . sh ilting atte nti on to the hendit side. antipropcrty ri g ht s a rc
ves ted in pre cise ly th ose pe rsons who have the greatest int eres t in
pro tecti ng th e e nda nge re d resource. The easeme nt holders arc sc lcctecl on the basis of a pe cuniary int e res t in the park that se ts th e m
apart from th e pub li c. T he addition o f antiproperty easements . th e re fore. comp ounds th eir incen tive to protec t the int e g rity of gre en
spaces in court.
It is wor th stressin g th ;1t whil e uur proposal in vo lves a hybrid of
public a nd pr iva te rights. th •.:: com bina tio n is uni q ue ly s uit ed to prese rvation of con servation curmnun s. The pub li c-private hyb rid we d ev ise
re sts on combin ing differe nt types of nonpossec.;;ory pro pert y rights
ves ted in different actor~. fn aclclition. the pri vil ege d g roup memb e rs
a rc not e ntitled , by law. tu a ny spec ia l use be nefits . Nor can th e y e xclude outsid e rs fro m e nju ying the be ne fit s produ ce d b y co nse rvat io n.
Hence, th e term " antipro pe rtv ...
Th e th ree most im portant rights in the " pro pe rty b undle " are the
rig ht to exclude, the right to use . and th e ri g ht to tr ansfe r 1 05 Antiproperty easements are nonpossessory. practica lly inali e nable, and co n fer
no special -usc rights. In add iti on. in sofa r as th ey are e xcl usive (o nl y of
developers), this attribut e is necess a ry to ac hi eve a predominantly inclusive regime in whi ch the ge ne ral pub lic may ve ry well enjoy the
lion's share of benefits. Thus. whil e the easements may techni ca lly
be classifie d as property - mainly beca use of the almost infi nite
t1exibility of the term 18r' th ey a re better vie wed collecti ve ly as
"antiproperty. "
Th e extant co mmons lit e rature has hitherto foc used primarily on
possessory and usary ri ght s in comm o ns. This focus has limited the
<malysis to three paradigmatic cases: (a) priva te owne rs hip and private
regulation ; (b) common owne rs hip a nd public regula tion ; a nd (c)
com mon ow ners hip and pr iva te reg ul atio n . We show. however. that
conservati on commons may be preserve d with hybrids of both ownership and regulation. In ou r paradigmatic case, private antiprope rty
rights work alo ngs id e commo n own e rship , and private market dynam;cs s uppl e ment public decisionmal\:ing. Thi s res huffling of the
traditional e le ments o f commo ns a na lys is produces an ironi c but
highly desirable result. By e mploying priva te nonpo ssessor y e ntitle-

1 ~5.

For di sc uss io n of the " b un dle of rig hts'' th co rv of pro pc rtv. see ge ne rall v.
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m e nts. dec isio nm a ke rs e ns ure limited ope n access comrn o ns. 1' ' a nd
g uar a ntee e qual usc rights to all membe rs o r the public regarcl k ss of
t he ir proximit y to the park.

C.

Tlz e Hidden Virrues of Tmn soction Cu.\ I S

A key co mpon e nt o f our propos;ll is th e clelibe rd tc c re ati o n o f
tran sac tion costs - ge n e rall y co nsid ere d th e ba ne o r efficie ncy - in
or der tu re me d y ineffi c ie ncies in th e m a rke t fo r co nse rvatio n. Two
n ott:: s a bout this str ategy a re in order. First. we arc aware o f th e dange rs inh e re nt in usin g tra nsacti o n costs as a proxy fo r una cco un ted for
publi c ben efit s or co nserv a tion. There is no di rec t co rrcb tio n betwe e n
th e two valu es. a nd ina cc urat e es timat es of th e tw o ri~ urTs co uld lea d
to to o mu ch co nserva ti o n. Th ere fore , it is impe ra ti ve to in tro du ce
fle:-..:i bility into antiprop e rty ease ments - a ch;dkn ge we ad dress he acl
o n in th e ne xt P;ut.
Second , it is wo rth m e ntioni ng oth e r cont c:-..: ts in whi c h tr a nsac tion
costs have bee n use d as a proxy in re me d yin g mar ke t L11l urcs . For instan ce , th e National En vironm ental Prot ec tion A ct ( .. NE PA' ' ) requires envir o nm e ntal -impact sta teme nts to be pr oduce d lor m any
publi c proj ects.''' A s int e rpreted by the courts, N EP A 's re quire m e nt is
mai nly procedural. The r e levant agency must full y e xa min e e nviro nm e nta l imp acts and issu e a repo rt; if th e rep o rt is fo und in a d e qu a te by
th e co urt s, th e age ncy need onl y study th e impact further , a nd produce
a n ew rep o rt.' "') Y e t, many environme ntal pro tecti o n advocat es have
hail e d th e substanti ve effects of NEPA . 1 ~11 On e poss ible way of und e rl S7. ln p ri nc ip le. the reso urce is su bj ect to ope n access . A s we e xpla in e d. in clusicl n o l
th e p u b lic at large li e s a t the hea rt of antipro pe rty reg ime s. We add th e '·l imite d " p roviso
strictl y be cause use s inco nsiste n t with co nse rvatio n. suc h as und es ired deve lo pm e n t. a re
e xclu de d .
11\S. Na ti o na l En viro nme nt a l P ol icy Ac t o f 1969. 42 U .S.C.

*4:12 1. c t se q . (2002) .

10':!. See B radley C. Karkka in e n, To 1wml u S111 arrer N !:PA: M u niroring und iv!unuging
G m ·em111ell t's F'.m ·iron111 enwl Pe!)un nance. 102 COLU\1. L. RE V. ':!03 . 92 1 (2002) (n o ting
th :ll ne ithe r the sta tut e no r the co urts have impose d a m in imu m ade qu ate stan da rd o ~
NEl' A with re gard to e nviro nm e ntal assessme nts ).
1':!0. S ec Lyn ton K. Cal d we ll. fmplcll/ enting N £ 1'; \: A N o n -Technica ll'u liriml Tusk. i11
E NV I IWN:VI ENT,\ L P OLI C Y AN D N EPA: PAST. PR ES ENT AN D F un; J<E 25. 26 ( Rav C I;H k &
Larry Cant e r c:d s .. 1997): Karkk a in e n , sup m note 189. a t L)71l: Wi lli a m H. R o d ge rs . J r. . T/1 e
f'v! u sl Crm lil ·c tl1on i CI/1s in rh e If isro ry uf En vironm enlllf Law: "Th ,· \11/wrs ". 2Ullll LJ. ILL. L

R EV. I. 3 1 ('·T he most adm ire d o f a ll the e nvironm e nta l la ws is the N E PA . lt is ad m ire d fo r
it s fo rm . its struc ture. a nd it s rob ustn e ss. lt is pra ised fo r its e lo q uen ce o f form u i;Hion a nd fo r
the cleve rne ss in the way it was attached to existin g agen cy mand a tes . lt h:ts be e n e m ul a ted
by a hundre d o th e r initi a tives . l t is celebra ted for a ny nu mbe r o f para d igm s hift s - fro m
simp le public po lic\' e va lu a tio n to impact assessm e nt to com pre he nsiv e ra tio nal it\' to ecologi ca l ex perim e ntation to publi c partici pa tion to integrat e d deci sio n met kin g.··) . 8111 sa Josep h L Sa x. Th e ! Un /l([p p v ) Trurh A bo ur N E P;\. 26 O K!,,\. L. R Ev . 2:1 '!. 23 L! (1'!73 ) ("l
k no w o f no so lid c\· i,k nce to sup po rt the be li e f tha t re qui ri ng a rti c ulat io n. d e tailed fin di ngs
or re ;r so ned op inio ns e nh a nce s the integ ri ty o r pro p riet y o l the admin ist ra ti ve dec is io ns. I
th in k th e c m ph:1 sis o n the re dempt ive qu a lit y of p roced ur al re form is a bout ni ne pa n s 1nvth
and one part coco nul oil. ").
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standing these elfects is as the result of tran sac tion cos ts. NEPA creates repo rttn g cos ts for wo uld-b e -develope rs as a prox y fo r th e
un accounted- for pu bl ic inte rest in enviro nm ent a l protec ti on. and
these costs cle tc::r ce rtain projects at the marg in. 1" 1 Nat urally. this is a
ve rv rou gh proxy. as there is no inh erent corresponde nce betwee n th e
cos ts o f re pon in g a nd th e magnitud e of th e public inte rest.
Fin"l ly. o ur (l ntiprop e ny proposa l thus far. based as it is on creat in ~ hol dout probl e ms throug h the ge nerati on of transa ction cos ts. crea tes on ly a secon d-best so lut ion to the probl e m of preserv in g conserva tion commo ns. O ur mec ha nism does not lead th e rel ev~:m t pa rti es
(d evelop e rs. nei ghbors, ct al. ) to inte rnaliz e fully th e be nefits <mel costs
of co nservat ion <md deve lopment. Ra ther , it leads to e l'fici e nt result s
on the ass um pt ion that clecisionmake rs have co rrec tl y icl c nt ilicd t he
co mmon s as on e: \\·hose id ea l '· us e" is conservation. A s we show in th e
nt: xt Part . a fir st-be:; t so lut io n is atta inable when antiprop e rt y caseme nts m t: comb in ed wit h a not he r key ele me nt in th e law of e ntitl ements: the ta kin gs powe r.

IV .

.Ai\.'TIPlWP ERTY AND El\'TITL EMENTTH EO R Y

Thus far, we have introd uced th e concep t of antipropcrty eas eme nts . situated it within property th eory, and demon strated its normative app ea l as a policy too l. A seeming challenge we have e lud ed so far
is flexibility. To be sure , circ umst ances change. and conse r va ti o n th at
was des irab le at one time may be less so at another. Indeed. it is for
this reason that property law di sfavors perman ent limitations on
a li e nability, 1" 2 and provides tools lik e the power of emine nt do ma in fo r
ove rcomin g hold ou t problems. 1'n In this Part, we show that antiprop erty can be combin ed with o ther powers such as emin ent domain in
o rder to crea te regimes th a t a re se nsitive to change. Indeed . we show
th a t whe n the takin gs power is add ed to th e picture, th e mecha nism of
ant iproperty casements can le ad to first-best outcomes for th e preserva tion of conserva tion commons, giving policymakers two innova ti ve

llJl. Likewise . Thom as :Vlerri\1 ha s a rgu ed for a " due process ta x" to deter th ,· go vern m e n t fro m us ing its ta kin gs powe r excess ive ly . See Merrill. Pu hlic Use . supra no te 136. a t 77~1. T he gis t o f th e proposal is to in sis t th a t .. co urts stric tl v e nforce p roce dura l li m it a tio ns on
th e exercise of e min e n t dum a in ... D.-'. V ID A . D ,>.'IA & THO~ I AS W. l\'l ERRILL. l'R O \' E RT Y:
T .-\KINGS 205 (2UU2). Im ple m en tin g th is prop osa l would increase th e cos t of ta k ings fo r th e
go,·c rn m e nt. a nd e ns u re th a t th e e min e nt do m ai n power is o nly u sed "where th e s urplu s to
the ta Kc' r is greate r than the' due p rocess tax ... !d. a t 206.
llJ2. See. e.g .. Ak x M. Johnso n. Jr .. Cnrrec1lv !nterpreling L o ng-Te r111 Leases Pursu w/1
w M o d em Co nlraCI Lull'.· T owurd 11 Theo n · of Reimional L eases. 74 VA. L. R EV. 75 1. 755
( l lJ0K) (,·ie\\·ing the rest raints on a lie nabil itY wi th d isfavo r) : see also D u KE~II~ I E R & KR I ER.
supra nu te [ .t. at 227 (e xpla in ing th e objec ti o ns to restrai n ts o n a lie na ti o n ).

llJ:;. See. e.g.. Ri chard A. Epste in. A Cimr View of 1h e Cmli edml: Tlw D o lllinoncc of'
P rr>pcrt1· Rules . 106 Y.-'.L E L..l. 20lJI. 2 112 (JLJ07) (resortin[! to emine nt do m a in wh e n holdo u ts prC\'Cil t vo\un t ar~. tra n~ act i o n s).
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approaches for dea ling with the conservat ion challen ge : a
seco nd -best a ncl a fir st-best mec han ism.
Our second-best me chanism is a priva te mech a nism, pred ica tecl o n
voluntary tr ansactin g, which pre se rves parks and gree n sp aces as undeveloped co nserva ti on co mmon s. Our first-be st mechanism requ ires
gove rnm e nt mediati on or de legation, through th e power of e min e nt
doma in. While th e fir st-bes t mec h<1nism all ows for develo pm e nt of
ce rt ain pa rklan cL it gua 1·a ntee s thctt such de velop men t wil l only occ ur
when it is d'l icienl.
Tu demo nstr ate the flcx ibiii tv and utility or a ntipropert y. we co nnect antip rope n y to our prev ious work. ~ and place it within the
broade r fr~1m ewo r ks o f e nt itiem e nt th eo ry and th e law of tak in gs. We
begin by review ing Clu ic.lo Caiabre si ancl Dougl as Me lamed's famous
model ur prupe rtv rule s and liabilit y rulcs. '"5
19

A.

Flnih/e i \ nripm;ienv und P!iahiliry Rules

Ca la bres i and i'vk Iamed 's cLtssic mode l divides th e wor ld o f e ntitkmcnts into thre e types of prot ec tion: prope rty rul es , liabili ty rules.
ancl inali e nab ility rulc s. '''1' Entitl e me nts protecte d by prope rty rules
ma y only be take n with th e consent of the entitlem e nt owner, all ow ing
own e rs to de termin e th e price of th eir entitlement. 1'n Liab ility- rul e
protec tion . by co ntrast, allo ws pok nti al take rs to ava il th e mse lves o f
oth e r peop le's entitlem e nts ~1s lon g as they are willing to pay a co ll ectively dete rmined pri ce that is usu all y se t by a court , a legislator, or an
admini st rative a gency . '''·~ Ina li enabi li ty rules bar transfer of th e entitl ement altoge th e r. ''''' T he differe nces be twee n th e rules may be illustrated with refere nce to th e celebrated case of Boomer v. A rlonric
Cemenr Co .c'K' In B oo m er, hom eowne rs near A tla ntic Cement 's manufacturin g plant complain ed that the plant's pollution gave ri se to an
actionable nuisance. and so ught to en force th eir property rul e protection with an injuncti on that wou ld close clown th e plant. The co urt.
however, decided to gran t th e homeow ne rs onl y li ability-rul e protection, pe rmitting th e pl a nt to continue ope rations, subject to th e payment of permanent da mages to the homeowners.c"'
l 'J.J. See Be ll &: Parc hn tn o,·s k v. Gi• ·in~s . supra no te 27 : Be ll &: Pa rc ho m ovs b ·. Pliuh ifin·
l<uh·s . supru nntc 2S: Bell&: P<HciH>muvskv. "lirkings f\mssessed. supra note 2h.
l lJ5. Guidu Ca \abresi & Dou"\a:; 'vlc\amc'li. Pmf>Crll' Rules. Liuh ilirv Rules. u111l lnolienahilir•·· O n e Vic11· o(ill c Cu rl! erlru l. S.'i li A !l.V. L. R EV . IOS9 (1972).
ll)i)

ld

1'J7. !d.

1% ld
l'JLJ. M

21JIJ. 257 N.E. 2d 870 (N.Y. I'J71J).
20 1. [i(lrul/('r . 7.57

i\.E.~d a t

S75.
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Th e three fo rms id e nti fied b y Ca labres i and M e lamed m ay be
joine d by a fourth va ri e ty. E ntitl e m e nt s are often protected b y ama lga mated ··p liabl e '' prote cti o n that in co rporat es cleme nts of both
property and liability -rul e protection. 2" 2 Pliability, o r pliable, rules are
contingent ru les that provide a n entitlem e nt own e r with prop e rty- or
li a bility-rul e protecti o n as lo ng as some s pecifi ed co ndition obta in s :
o nce the re leva nt condi tio n changes. however , a diffe re nt rul e prot e cts
th e entitlem e nt ~ ei th er li<tbiln y or p rope rt y. as th e c ircumstances dic tate.2n~ For exa mple. in /J oo lll er . the co u rt might have employed 8 twostage rule o r li ab ility-ru le protection fo ll ovvecl by prope rty-rul e prot ec tion. Th e cou rt could han: ac hie ve d thi s by iss uin g 8 11 injunct ion that
wo uld bl oc k th e plant 's ope ra tion. b ut wo uld tak e effec t only in , SC\y.
ten years. In the me antime. th e plant co uld continue operation s in e xchange for th e payment of damages to th e homeown e rs. 2""
Pliabili ty rules arc lkxible too ls: t he shift between differen t s tages
of rule protec tion may be trigge red by time (as in our Boomer
ex ample), cha nged ci rcum stances. m agn i tuJ c or na ture of use o f th e
e ntitl ement, or a combinati o n o f the se f::t ctors. coo F o r o ur purp oses. the
importan ce of pliable rule s lies in their ab ility to con tai n built -in limitations on property-rul e protection.
As we have describe d a ntipropert y ease ments thu s fu , they are e ntitl e m ents formally defe nd e d by prope rt y-rule prot ec tion and s ubs wntively governed by an in a li e n ab ility reg im e .c"6 Indee d , each owner is
empowered to set a pri ce for tran sfe rring her case m e nts; and that
power crea tes the holdout dynamic that in turn m C\ kes each owner's
e asement e ffectively in aliena ble. D ecisionma kc rs may not want a conservation regime to govern a co mm ons forever , howeve r. 207 In s uch
cases, the a ntiproperty casements co uld be given th e characteristics of
pliability-rule protection.
For inst ance, antiproper ty easements may be used to delay or s tC\gge r development , rath e r than to block it forev e r. T o accomplis h this,
decisionmakers may impose a tim e limit on the a ntiproperty easements. Upon the passage of the sp ecifi e d time the ease ments would
expire and the barrier to th e devel opment of the co mmons would be
alleviated. Assume. for exa mple , th at clecisionmak e rs in the town of
202. Be ll & Parchomuvsky . Pliu!Ji!in· l?ulcs . supra 1wtc 2S.
203. !d
204. !d.
205. !d
206. Supra. Parts li. C- 111.
207. CJ Juli a D. Mahon ey . Fe~p c llllil I<esu'icrions on Land and rile Proble111 uf rhe Fu rure . SS V ;\. L. REV. 739. 74-l (2002) (ca u tiuning that . due to th e ir b in d ing effect o n future
ge ne ration s. co n se rvation ca sements " ll1clv furth er th e interests of membe rs uf th e present
ge neration at th e expense of futu re ge neration s"). \Y e discus s conservat ion casemen ts fur ther in Part V.B.3. inji-11.
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Eve rgreen Pa rk. Illinois fores ee a poss ibility that in twenty ye<lrs, the
downtown com m ons curre ntly use d as a park will he more clliciently
used as commercial and reside ntial sp ace. In order to ease the tra ns ition. a nd pr o tect th e commons in th e meantime. Evergreen Park ca n
iss ue twent y-year an tiproperty easements to ne arby ne ighb o rs of the
commons. Pliabilit y- ori e nted antip rope rty ease men ts thu s cre a te an
o ption not on ly for conse rvin g en viron mentally valuabl e resources.
b ut also for reg ul at ing th e speed of deve lopm e nt.
An alternative pliability-oriented a ntiprope rt y e aseme nt co uld
fo llo w up the formal prop e rty -rul e sta ge with liabilitv-rule protec tion.
These an ti property ease ments wou ld re quire th e conse nt o l e ase me nt o wners for transfer of th e caseme nts in the first stage . In re spon se to
chan ge d ci rc um sta nces. or some ot her trigger, ho weve r. th e ee~sem e nts
would e njoy on ly liability-rule protection. Thi s would allow dev e lope rs
to bu ild upo n th e affec ted green space in ex c h ~m ge for the pavment or
damages to e asem e nt own e rs. R e turnin g to ou r prev ious ex am ple, to
a llow development and simult ane ously comp e nsat e affe c ted n ea rby
ne ig hbors . Evergree n Pa rk could iss ue perpetual antipropcrty ease ments which would only e njoy prope rty-ru le prot ec tion fo r twenty
years. Thereafter. others co uld use th e prot ec te d property wit hout the
consent of the ease ment hold ers, so long as they pay dam ages in the
amount stipulated by the municipality or th e court. Th e shift to a
liabilit y-rul e regime eliminates the holdout probl e m a nd re introduces
full ali e nability to the easements.
D ecisionmak ers can u se th e sa me design to adapt the ease m ents to
unforeseeably changed circumstances as the y occur. For example , over
tim e, owing to demographic changes, th ere is a dan ge r that a city park
could become a magnet for illegal drug transactions, and, therefore , a
nuisance to proximate-property owners. To counter this threat , de cisionmakers co uld stipul a te that if there are ove r a ce rtain number of
arrests for serious crimes in th e park in any given tim e pe riod , the
easem e nts would termin a te.
T he above examples demon strate that antiproperty ease m ents do
not ha ve to be con structed to lo ck reso urce s in their und eve loped state
in perpetuity. Rath e r. antiproperty easements a re an adaptable tooL
se nsit ive to chang in g circumstances, that ma y be used in num e ro us
ways by decisionmakers to promote various po licy goa ls. A final ex a mple illustrates how antiprop erty ease ments may be useful for e ns urin g no net Joss of green space within a given region. Aga in, the key
to achieving this policy lies in the use of a pli ab ility mechanism.
Rath e r than starting th e li ability phase upon the passage o f a ce rtain
period of time, decisionmakers co uld stipulat e a different trigger ing
event: liability prote ction would begin once a pote ntial taker of the
easeme nt aggrega te d within he r possess ion a lternate gree n space of
great e r volume th a n th e green sp ace she pro posed to de velop. For
instance. if Co ncre te Jun gle wi shed to convert fort y acres of pro tected

!'v!iclzigan Luw Revictt'

52

[Vul. Iii~ 1

green space into a factory , it could trigger the shill to liability protection h v purchasing more than forty acres of space elsewhere. and clecliclting them to conservation by distributing antiproperty easements to
nearhv neighbors of the new location_cos

B.

Antiproperty, Tukings.

Ofl(/

Gi vings

The government's power of eminent clome~in. also known a~ its
takings power. is seen as the quintessential means fur government to
m:::rcnme strategic problems in the property market.:''" \Nhere it fincls
the n,xcssity to do so, the government may ~1vuid the ordinary market
for pruperty. Instead, it may employ its power l<l L1ke prop e rty. so
lcng ~!S 1\ abides by the constitutional requiren 1 ent that it pay "'just
cornpcnsation." i.e .. the property's fair market v<llue.·
Technically. the Constitution adcls a further rcquiremL~nt b·elure clll
clCl ul eminent domain: the taking must be fur <I "public usc.--' 11 fn
pr,lcticc. however. courts find any purpose as "public usc" for constitution'll purpuscs.' 1c The takings power thLis rcmains <1lmost boundless. lndeecl , the government often uses its U1kings power to assemble
properties for private interests; sometimes. it even delegates its power
uf eminent domain to private actors. 211

2UK. In citing this example, we do not intimate that either ""nu net loss"" ur ""permanent
cunsL"rv;Jtiun"' is a preferred strategy: in1plementing a no-nct-ioss pulicy fur green spdCC
cuuld involw: some difficult legal and factual determinations. Dccisiunmakers might profit
from examining the experience of the federal no-net-loss policv for wetlands. For a discussion of some of the issues that have arisen. see. for example. Michael C. Glumm. Tlrt: Clinron
\Verlunds Pion: No Ner Guin in Werlunds Prorecriun. ') J. LAND Usc:~( Ei\VTL.. L. 203 (llJ'J-+).
and S. Scott Burkhalter. Comment. Oversirnplifiwrion: Value and Funcrinn: Werlund ;'v/irigurioli Bunking. 2 CHAP. L. REV. 261 (1999).
20lJ. See Merrill. Public Use, supra note 136. at 65 (arguing that th e purpose of eminent
is to facilitate transactions that would not occur voluntarily): Clcn 0. Robinson. On
Reji1sing 10 Deal wirtz Rivals. 87 CORNELL L. REV. !177. !!'!2 (2002) (explaining how th<:
government negates the ability of owners to free-ride through the usc of eminent domain):
Rose. supra note 32, at 750 (describing the anti-holdout rationale for the building of public
roads ami \vatcrways).
dom<~in

2lll. See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan ... Paving .. jiH rlw Change: Using F111in1!nl
/Jonwin ro Secure E.wcriom and Sidesl<:p Nollan and Dolan. :-;r \ i ,\. L. Rr:v. 180!. !816
(I 9'!5) (explaining landowners' entitlement to just compensation): l\lichael H. Schill. ln!tTgoveniiiiCnllli Takings and .Ius! Co111pensation: A Quesrion o f" Fedcmlisl/1. !37 U. P.-\. L. RE\"
.~29. Sl)(l ( l 'Ji:\lJ) (justifying the usc of fair market value to calculate jtht co mpenscttion).
2! I. See U S. CONST. amend. V ( .. [N ]or shall priva k pro perty he taken for pub! ic usc.
without jusl compensation.''): Donald J. Kochan. '·Public Us c " ruulrhc fndepmdmr .!udici·
un"" Cundenl!wlion in 1111 !nrcrest-Group Perspecrivc. 3 TEX. REV. L. S: PO! '" .+9 ( llJlJ:-i ) (calling fnr reinterpreting the Takings Clause to reduce private rcnheeking).
2!2. See Merrill. Public Us e . supra note 136, at n3 (characterizing the historv of eminent
domain as one: of extreme deference): Laura Mansnerus. Nutc. Pu/Jiic Use. Privurc Us e. and
Judicio! Fninv in t"mincnr Domain. 58 N.Y.U. L. REV . .+()'). -+10 (lCJi>.') (a cknowlc , kin" that
the: require ment for public use has relaxed considerably).
, ~
213. See Abraham BelL Private Takings (unpublished manuscript. on tiic with autlwrs):
I homas \V. ivle rrill. Til e Lundsc11pe uJ" Cunsrirl/lionol f'mficrlr. ;';(, V.-\. L. R~:v . ;.;:-\). 'J7'J
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Th e power of eminent do mai n thu s provides a pote ntia l escap e
route for de ve lope rs seek in g to evade the res tric ti ons on conservat ion
co mm o ns cre a ted hy a ntipro pe rty ease ments. D evel o pers can us e th e ir
supe ri o r political power to persuade clecisionmake rs to seize a ll th e
rele van t ca se me nts. th e re by pe rmi tt ing de ve lop ment. In the case of a
tak ing. the governm e nt wo ul d be required to pay just compe nsation to
th...: case ment hold e rs. Not hi ng in the cur rent Jaw wo uld require th e
de ve lope r to re im bL<rs.c the public fisc for this expense, or for the va lue
it will be g1 ve n. howcver. c14 Moreover. neither the governmen t no r th e
ck:vc loper wou ld have to make any pay ment to conse rva tion benefi ciaries Lickin g propert y int e rests. Thus. from th e developer"s viewpoint.
th e process wo ul d no t pose any substa nt ia l add itional d e terre nt to inclfi cicnt deve loprn ent. =1' Fur thermore. th e holdout dynam ic wo uld not
p()SC a barr ie r to th e deve lo pment. since ca sement own e rs wou ld not
be <tbl e to block til e go ve rnme nt takin g. \.Yo rse yet, since th e ease ment
hu lcl ers would be tull y co mp e nsated. they wo uld have very li tt le incentive to lobby ag: ,linst th e ineffic ie nt de ve lop me nt. This mean s th a t th e
publ ic's intere st in co nse rvat ion would receive no repres e ntation in
th e case of a taking .
Preve nti ng taki ngs from unde rmining t he e ntire regime of conse rvation com mon s req uires two important steps. First, decisionm a kers
must close th e loopho le in the law of taki ngs which a ll ows pri va te
be nefi cia ri es to enj oy ta ke n p rope rty whil e compensa ti o n is paid from
th e pu blic pu rse. Deve lopers- th e be neficiari es of the act of emi ne nt
domain - must be forced to pa y the just compensa tion out of th eir
own poc kets, or to re imburse th e gove rnm ent for th e va lue of th e givin gs th ey receive (i. e .. th e fair market va lue of the ease ments) . Seco nd .
th e magnitude of th e compensa ti on, or th e charge for th e giving, must
be made to re fl ect the interests of th e wider public that enjoys the
park. Th is may be accomp lished either by applying a multipli er to th e
compensa ti o n that must be paid per easeme nt, or by addin g an additi ona l ease ment th2t represents the public interes t. These two meas-

(20(10) [hereinafter ~krrill. Cunstitutio nal Propertv] (an a lyzing th e e ffect s o f de legating th e
powe r of emi ne nt do ma in): Merri ll. Pu/J/ic Use . supm no te 136. a t 75 (describin g the buil ding
of a n oil pipe line whe re onl\· one feas ib le route exi sts) : cf In re Condemna tio n o f JIll
Was hing wn St .. 7G7 ,\.2d I 1.5-+. 1159 (l'a. Comm w. Ct. 2001) (ho ldin g that powe r of e min ent
dom ain .. 1nay no t be dclcg;:1tccl by a ~r ee ment or cont ract'") .
21-l . In G i•·ings . \\'C noll: cl the in efficient dec isions produced by the fa ilure to rL·qui rc
re cipients o f go vernment la rge sse a fa ir charge for th e givin g parall el to the co mpensa ti on
th c1· would be p:1 id were th e ir propert y ta~ e n . Be ll &: Pa rchomovskv. Gil·ings . supra no te 27.
at ))3. To k sure. a fu ll givings regim e \HJLlld req uire chargin g not just the de ve lopers. hut
also the n<o arb1· neighbor-; who in iti all y receive thc a ntiproperty easeme nt s.
2 1~ . If th e pol it iccd :.Jrocess placed a greater price on takings th an on perm itting clev·L· Iopmenl. the nCCL'S>'i ty o f resorting to e minen t doma in would pose a real ba rri er to the devc lopL' rs . Our mo dt l. hcmcv·e r. has thus far assumed that pol itica l de cisions arc made in accu rda nce vv·ith the magnitud e o f campa ign con tributi o ns . rather than according to a pal' scal e
depe nding on the n;;ture o f th e ac t.

54

Michigun Law Fl. evielv

[V o l. ll12 : I

ures would lead would-be developers to internalize the cost of their
actions, and pave the way for deve lopment only where its benefits
truly outweigh ed the costs. Each of these el e ments warrants further
explanation.
Requiring th e developers to compensate casement hold e rs wc1Ltlcl
force them to account for the cost o f the proposed development, and
thus , would se rve as an internaliza tion mechanism. Legally, this result
may be achieved in one of tw o ways. The gove rnment ma y delegate its
takings powe r to a private de ve loper -- as it sometimes does in the
case of utility companies" 1" - and mand a te that the d e veloper pay
compensation to affected case m e nt holde rs. Alternatively, the government could execute the taking itself. but require the d e veloper who
benefits from the act to re imburse it for the amount paid in just compe nsation. Importantly. in order to ma ke the easements effective, th e
government must speci fy in th e Ci\sc mcnts that they may only be taken
in one of these two ways.
Forcing developers to p ay co mpensation to ease m e nt holders
would not lead them to fully int e rn alize the cost of deve lopment. however, since they would still ignore the cost to the wider public that enjoys use of the park. Thus. the second important step in preventing
takings from undermining the conservation commons regime involves
forcing developers to tak e account of this cost component. To accomplish this, the government can either usc a multiplier to increase the
compensation aware! to each easement hold er in orde r to reflect the
proportionate share of the public value lost.= 17 The drawback of this
solution is that it creates an agency problem. Knowing that they would
be compensated above and beyond their private loss, the easement
holders may conspire with developers to bring about inefficient or
premature development. Therefore , the proportion of the compensation reflecting the public loss should be transferred to a proconse rvation organization, i.e., a body whose utility from preserving
the park would exceed any like ly compe nsation to be paid , or one
required by charter to exercise a fiduciary duty to protect the public 's
interest in preservation. Alternatively, clecisionmakers could award an

216. See Merrill. Consrirurionol!'ruJ! CriV. supra note 213. at lJ 79 (citing th e e xampl e of
de le gation of eminent do main to a private utilitv pri o r to the cre ation of the T e nn esse e Va lley Authority): J. Gregory Sidak & Danie l F. SpultJe r. D cregularo rv Fakings and Breach of
rhc Regulowry Comracr. 71 N.Y.U. L. RE V. 1': 51. 898 (1'196) (discussing the d el egati o n of the
po wer of emine nt domain to rai lroads and utili tie s) . See general/\' Bell. supm note 21 3.

217. Fo r example. if e ach easem e nt is worth SS.lJOU. there are 100 ca se m e nt h o lders. and
the public value/pri vat e va lue ratio is J. th e n ea ch ea se ment ho lde r would receive $ 10.001.1 in
co mpensation. That is. the mul tipli er is 2 in thi s ca se .
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ad dition a l an tiprop c rty c ase me nt that repres e nts the p ub lic int ere st' 1s
to a co nse rva ti o n o rga niza tion to beco me e ffec ti ve upon a taking. 2 19
Of co urse. a gove rnm e nt-m ed iat ed ta kin gs process will not be
costl ess fo r deve lo pe rs. Th e urge to take e ase m e nts through eminent
doma in wi ll no t spo nta neo usly ma terialize, a nd th e po liti cal b urde n
will rest o n th e deve lopers to produce the funds to move th e politica l
pro cess forward. This has the po te ntial of pro d ucin g s ub sta ntial tran sac ti o n cos ts that would bl o ck efficie nt developme nt if deve lopers also
ha d to pay th e full tak ings compensa ti on disc usse d he r e . Thi s di s tortion is s ubst antially mitiga ted . howeve r. by the lik e ly reduc ti o n in
po li tical opposition produced by the paymen t of co m pe n sa ti on . W hi le
the re will be so me owne rs whose su bj ec ti ve attac hm e nt to thei r e ase ments will make the m d issat isfied by the comp ensat io n award. man y
will be sa ti sfied with th e compensation pa id. Even those w ho find th e
co mp e nsa ti o n in ad e qu ate wi ll fine! the margin o f the ir disa ppo in tme nt
less than if the park was d estr oyed without co mp e ns at ion . And so me
owne rs may act ually find that th ey prefer th e compe nsa ti o n to the
eas e me nt. Overa ll. it is quite lik e ly th a t th e compe nsat ion regim e will
su bs tantia lly red uce publi c opposition to deve lo pment, wh ich sho uld
help reduce the de ve lo per's costs in th e politica l arena . rndeccl. in
cases in whi ch full compen satio n makes ease m ent ho lde rs indiffe rent
between conservat io n a nd deve lo pm e nt , so that no lobby in g oc curs,
the takings framewo rk m ay op e n the way to a m a rk e t sol uti o n una ffected by the di stor tion s of the pol itica l process.

C.

A First-Best Solution

Th e takings framework introduces a p ossib ility for atta ining a fi rstbest solution for the conservation probl e m. B y using th e ta kings p o we r
in combi natio n with a ntiprope rt y ease m e nts, a legal reg im e ma y
e m e rge in which develope rs will fully internalize th e costs a nd benefits

2 Jii . T hi s ca se me n t would tec hnica ll v be class ifie d as a nega ti ve casem e nt in gross. but
would oth e rwi se pa rta ke of the qualities o f the a ntip rope ny ea se me nts gr:-a nt e d to
prox imate -propc rtv owne rs.

219. Fo r simp li city 's sa ke . \\'C h av·c ass ume d aw ay . in th e fo rego in g d iscuss ion. the man y
pr::1cti cal problems tha t would li ke l\• accompanv an y att e mpt to ascerta in the m agni tude o f
"jus t compe nsation" fo r an ti pro pcrtv c ~r s cm e n t s. While su ch com pensat ion ordi naril y re ·
fleets the fa ir m a rket value of the p ro pcrl v. in th is case the re is nut lik e ly to be a mark e t fo r
a nti property rights. making it d iffi cul t to e stabl ish a ba se lin e. Me<1Surin g th e llu ctuati o ns in
pro p<:: rty val ue s before and after the grant in g o f an tip,~opcrty ease men ts mi g ht p rov id e such
a benc hm ark . T his. ho weve r. would not lake accoun t of the fact tha t e ve n befo re the ;! ranting of the fo rm al ea se men ts. ne artJ I' neighbors lik e ly be nefite d fr o m de j{I CIO ca sc:m c~t s. J\
ta kin g. on th e o th er hand. should prompt compen sa ti on fo r the fu ll val ue o f th e pro pe rty:
thus. full co mpe ns at io n wo uld right ly in clude not on ly the va lue of the fo rm:il ea se me nt. bu t
th at o f the de fa cio casem e nt as wel l. C/ Theodore Groves & Jo hn Le d yard . O p1inwl A flo calion of l'uhlic Goods: A Solu1ion 10 1h.: "Fra Rider '' Prnh/c/11. -+5 [ CO NO \ ·IET RIC r\ 7 ~}
( l9 77) (pro posing mec ha ni s m fo r reve a li ng prdc rcnces o f con s um ers of p ubli c goods d es pite
absen ce of market ).
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o f their act io ns. lead ing th e m to press forw ard with deve lopm e nt only
when it is sociall y des irable. This possibilit y ste ms fr o m the deve lopers ' pa ymen t of full compensation. The compe nsa ti o n reflects th e
value of the anti property casemen ts. as we ll as th e wid e r public
inte re st. making the o utlay a goo d measuremen t of the soc ia l bcnd'it
prod uced by th e park. Natur J ilv. on th e oth e r side of th e cost-benefit
eq uation. devel opers a !r e<~cly ta ke in to account the profits th ey expec t
to earn from a give n deve lopment project Thus, once co mpen sat ion is
prope rl v calibrat ed. de ve lo pe rs will move for ward on ly \\· hen
proposed deve lopment produces a net social ga in.
In a se nse. th e co mp ensa tion th at developers must pay Cor takin g
an tipropcrty caseme nts nHlY be seen as ··Pigovian ta xes" th at lead w
full in terna liza tion. 22" This may be see n grap hi ca ll y be low.
I.

;Vn Ef/!cienr Oevelopmenl

Ou r fir st grctph illustrat es the eeu nomics of de velop me nt for a single firm in a compet itive marke t where no de velopme nt woul d be th e
mos t efficien t outcome.

220 ... Pi gu,·ian t l .\ Cs ar...: charges fo r ttnits o r an act i vi l ~· tha t 3rc in tende d to inter nalize
CO> t> and th c r ~ h~: hrin f! actc1 rs decisions closer to social o pt imali tv." 1-l c nrv E.
Sm ith. i \111 /Jiguo us Q uo/in· Cl!rlllt;,·s!i'uill Frtx cs unrl Lcgul Nules . A7 U. C HI. L.
h-17. h'i-!
cx t ~ rna\

RL\.

n.l l (21H Hl).
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Q*

Q'

The graph shows th e cost function oF a possible de velopm e nt com pany- which we will ca ll Deve lop m ent. Inc. The margin al cost to so ciety of building up a given qu a ntity of a rea out of parkland is shown
by th e curve M C. This value in clud es not only the cos t or constru ction .
but a lso the o ppor tunit y cos ts of reti ring the pa rk fro m pub lic use. T he
marginal cost bo rn e by D evelopm e nt . In c. for bu ildin g up a g iven
area , however, is sh o wn by curve MC. As ca n be se en. D evelopm ent.
Inc. need bear only a porti o n of the :n arg in al soc id a l cost : fo r a ny unit
produce d , the cos t borne by De ve lopment. Inc. is lowe r than that
bo rn e by society. finally. the marg in a l reve nu e ea rn ed by Development. Inc. for built-up area is shown by th e lin e MR- which appea rs
as a stra ight lin e. since we are ass umin g that the re is a co mpetiti ve
market for developed prop e rty . making D evelopment. Inc. con form to
the price of th e mark e t. The marginal re venue ch us represe nt s the
price at which D eve lopme nt . Inc. ca n se ll each additi ona l un it of bu iltup area.
In thi s situation , Dev el o pm e nt. Inc. is l.;ke!y to pnduce th e qwm ti ty Q' of built-up area. sin ce a ny more tha n this quant i Lv \VOU!c! prod uce a marginal loss fo r Devc!opmen\. fnc .. ami a ny sma ller output
would fail to capture ali Lh e pro fit s th~ll cou ld be m;: ck hy the ctom-
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rx my. This o utput is far g re ater than th e socia ll y op tim a l out p ut , how': vt.:r. Ind eed. th e desirab le a mount ol developme nt in th e sit ua ti o n illu ~;tratecl in the graph is 0, shown as 0 ' '. This is clue to th e fa c t that if
all th e socia l costs we re take n into acco unt. th e marg ina l cost of each
un it of deve lop ment wou ld always exceed the marginal rev e nu e produced by that deve lopment.
Usin g our ea rl ie r term inology. this case is one o r a conse rvatio n
com mon s. T he most e ffici e nt usc of this a rea is conserviltio n (i. e ., non b uil din g) . Sin ce Deve lopment, Inc. needs to ab so rb o nly some o f the
cos ts of building. how·eve r, it will un de rtake in ctlicicn t buildin g. Tn
such a case, the holdout dynamic p roduced by distr ibuting antiprop :.: rtv right s wi ll prod uce th e efficient resu lt. The existe nce of a nti pro p•:rtv right s will block all deve lopment - in this case . <1li ineffi cie nt cle vc lupmen t.
T he ava il ab ility of a takings opti on docs not cha nge this res ult. In
(lrckr to take the an ti propcrty easements that block c.levelupment, Deve lopm e nt , !nc. would hav e to pa y just compe ns<Hion . Th is would
force Development, In c. to bear full y th e cos ts ot it s deve lopme nt. In
:;uch a situat ion, the company will ac t as if its cost curve is MC rathe r
tha n M C. Thus, Deve lop ment, Inc. will av uid all deve lopm e nt, since
;w developme nt wi ll be cost effective.

2.

Efficient Deve/op111enr

In our earli er exampl e, we assum ed that th ere was no efficie nt deve lopm ent. A ntiprop erty rights alon e thus produced the efficie nt result. Situation s may be hypothesized, however, wh e re some develop me nt is effi cien t. fn such situatio ns, th e takings reg ime, when
co mbin ed \Vi th antiprop erty rights, leads to full interna li zation a nd
better o utco mes, as de monstrated in th e followin g g rap h.

Oc tub ~ r

20U3 ]
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p

l

~!R ( o l d)
I

Q*

Q*
(new)

Q'

Q'
(new)

Q

This fi gure shares the ass umptions from th e previous illustration.
with one exception. The price that can be received fr om se lling builtup area developed from the park is higher: conseque ntly, Development, fnc. can expect to receive greater ma rgin al reve nu e from each
unit builL This high e r marginal revenue is represe nted by th e lin e
labeled ''MR (new)"; the marginal reve nue in our previou s example is
labe led ''MR (old)'' for illustrative purposes. On e can imagine th at th e
chan ge in marginal revenue resu lts from an increase in the price of
housin g, or th a t the marginal revenue figures differ because th e
building is in different areas. Th e ot her curves - - i'v!C an d NI C should be famili ar from th e previ ous exampl e.
Given the new expected marg in al [Tve nuc , De,·e lo pme nL lnc.·s
decisions will change. Absent the internalization produced by a takings regime in combination with antip rope rt y righ ts, Deve lopment,
Inc. will fail to take into accoun t costs born e by the public. and it will
build the quantit y specified by th e intersec tion o f M C <lml MR (new).
i.e ., a· (n ew). Much of th e developm ent at the level of a· (new). however. is excessive and refl ects De ve lopment. lnc.·s fa ilure to full y
account for de velopment costs . Once the comp any is for ced to tak e
note of th e full soci al cost o f deve lopment. it will ac t :ts if its ma rgi nal

Micl1igan Lw1' Revie1v

60

cost curve is MC. rather than MC. This will lead Development. Inc. to
produce the much smaller quantity of 0':' (new). meaning that more
parkland will be preserved. Because this calculation takes into etccount
the full COSts and benefits for SOCietY. Q:' (new) is also the efficit~l1t
amount of building for society.
Notably. this result can be reached only with the full internalit<ltion produced by a takings regime that requires payment of fu ll compe nsation for seized antiproperty easements. W e re antiproperl\'
easements to be distributed without the possibility of subsequent tak ings , the lik e ly outcom e would be no building at all. In this situC~tion.
that would be an inell'icient result.
V.

DISC USS!Mi POIT.NTIAL OBJECTIONS

In this Part. \VC discuss some potential objections to an antiprop crty regime and compare our proposal to potential alternative s. \V e
begin by examining the likelv social outcomes of introducing an antiproperty regime. focusing on whether granting antiproperty rights
should be seen as objectionable on distributive grounds. We th e n address the question or whether antiproperty regimes are sup e rior to
their potential competitors. Among our important points of reference
here are the public-trust doctrine , the doctrine of environmental
standing, and conservation easements. After comparing the various
alternatives, we specify the conditions under which each policy tool
should be used, thereby providing a comprehensive menu for land usc
policy that takes account of conservation goals.

A.

Social Impacts of.Anriproperry Regimes
l.

Distributional Effecrs

On the surface. the distribution of antiproperty easements seems
to raise concerns about distributive justice . since the proposal involv es
the transfer of rights over public property to private hands that
already gain unusual benefit from that property. Yet , a closer look
shows that our proposal has quite desirable distributive effects. While
it focuses on certain property owners and enhances the value of their
properties. it also bestows direct benefits on the public at large . This
result is enabled by the fact that antiproperty easements do not
diminish the access and usc rights of third parties; they only serve to
impede development. Thus, the recipients of antiproperty easements
al so be come "trustees'' for the public at large. which otherwise lacks <l
dependable way to prot ect its share in a public good.
Simultaneously. formalizing antiproperty easements places the cost
of conservation on those who receive particular benefits. In the case or
Central Park. for example. the affluent owners of luxury housing bear
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th e burd e n o f prese rvi ng ope n spa ce for a ll cit ize ns. Pe rve rse ly, perhaps. our a nalysis e nhan ce s th e wealth of th e gen e ral pu b lic by re cognizin g prope rt y ri g ht s in th e most a ffluen t memb e rs of o ur soc ie ty.
Own e rs of luxury hou sin g nem o pen spa ce s co ntribute to co nserva ti on
in thre e different ways. First. because th e va lue of their prope rty d epends on th e con tinu ou s ex is te nce of the park. th e own e rs of re alt y
abutting th e park will do ev e ryt hin g in th e ir pow e r to <Hre st ha rmful
d eve lopm e nt. Seco nd. the hi g he r value of t he p ropert y ncar park s
trans lat es into hi gher tax pa vm c nt s that are used. in part. to m a intain
th e pa rk s. Third . and fin ally . s tu dies rev ea l th at owners of luxury
ho usin g nea r pa r b donate d is proport ionat e ly to the m a inte nan ce of
th e park s.'' 1 Thu s. we; sub mit th a t the deve lop me n t of luxury housing
on the frin ges of pa rks <lllcl open spaces is an importctnt key for stabl e
conse rvat io n with desirable distri buti ve effects .
As we s ho w in P~nt V .I3 be low. pr ivate co nserva ti on mech an ism s
clearly ou tpe rform pu blic sc he mes in e ns u ring cost -clTcctive co nse rva ti o n. Our proposa l not only red uc es e nforc e ment and monitoring cost s
that wo ul d otherw ise be horn e by th e p ublic a t large: it a lso makes th e
be nefici a ri es of a ntipropcrty e;1se me nt s responsibl e for th ose re duce d
costs. Th e recipi e nts of the public largesse are thu s a lso the beare rs of
the public respon sibi lity. A ll segme nts of th e public (ot he r than ine ffi ci ent deve lo pers) s hould th e refo re expec t to gain.:"

2.

Dvnwnic Eff'ecrs

By stab ilizing green spaces . a nti prope rty mechanism s ca n e nh ance
th e positive dyn a mics th a t lea d hom eo wn e rs to seck the effici e nt conservation of parks and nature p re serves. Genera ll y. prope rty ow ners
seek to discourage th e nearby loca tion of prope rties that produce
n ega tive ex tern a lities. while e ncouraging th e loca tion o f prope rti es
th a t produce positive exte rnalities. This nat ural te nden cy is responsibl e for th e much rem a rked- upon NIMBY (No t In My Back Yard)
ph e no m enon. in which hom eowners a cknowle dge t he socia l utility of a
particular land use but co mba t its nearby loca tion becau se of loca lized
n egative ex tern a lities. ' 2' The positiv e ext e rnalitie s creat ed by green

22 1. In 2000. for cxa mpk. wcaltll\' nearby ne ighbo r,; donated Sl 9 mil li on to Central
Pa rk. Barbara Stewart. Cenrml l'urk-Lik e Rc/>irrli Is Souglir for Or/ia Parks . N.Y. T ti\IES.
Jan. 27 . 2001. at B l. Th is m:tv he cxp lai n.:d by the spc cial" c ndowmcnt dfcc t.. such prupcrty
owners share wi th respec t to the park. Sec Dan ie l Kahn ema n ct al.. Tile Endo H'IIl t' llf Eff'c cr.
L o:;s ;\ version. und Swrus Qu o !Jill.l. ::\.!. [CON. PERSPECTIVES 1'13 ( 1'iY1 ).
.
to

2:?.2 . A s we show in l'~rt IV. supru. lkxibili t\' c<ll1 be added to an ti pruperl\" mechanisms
red uce th e burd en on de\·cl upc rs :IS well.

227>. See supm note 25. :'>J I!VIBY. it turns o ut. belongs to th e f~m il y o f prope rt v ~c r onv m s
known as LULU r·Loca ll v Und.:sirahlc l.ancl Use .. ). See IJt. iKHII \ IER & KRIER . supru note
1-1. a t 1063 & n.32: d Vick i Been. Wl ltlt's f11im css Gur w /.!o <l'ilh frJ Dn ·ironmcn wf .Jusricc
unci rile Siring o( Loorlh Undcsiml>lc / ., lilt! Ust·s. 7K COR\ [I. L L. R i'.\' iUO! ( I'N3 ).
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spaces can create th e opposite YlMBY (Yes In My I3ack Yard) phenomenon. in which property own e rs will seek the nearby lucation of
th e socia ll y be neficial land use s. A ntiproperty casements enha nce this
tre nd by providing the inv e rse of a nui sa nce suit. Nuis~mc e permits
proximate-property owners to co unt eract negative external iti es
a ffecting the e njoym ent of their property. Antiproperty cZJscmc nt s, o n
the oth e r hand. permit ne arby ne ighbors to brin g enforccm c:: nt acti o ns
to prese rve positi ve externa lities be ne fiting th e ir p ro pe rty. T he
e nhanced Y!MBY effect promot e d by ant iproperty casements should .
in turn. increase th e ex ante in centive to sec k local ckvci op ment ut
pa rk s and gree n spaces.

B.

Policy Alrem(/ri ves

In this Section, we examine the poss ibl e policy ctl\ernc\tivcs to a n
a ntipr operty regim e , focu sing o n the pub li c-trust doctrine. e xpand e d
env ironmental-standing d oc trin es, and the usc of conservation caseme nts. Whil e we dete rmin e that each tool has its use in <I scheme of
conservat ion , non e provid es a complete a ltern ative to the use of antipro perty.

l.

Public Trl/.\1

The public-trust doctrine hold s tha t ·'some resources, pa rticularly
lands beneath navigable waters or wash ed by the tides, are ei ther inherently the property of the public at large , or a rc at leas t s ubj ec t to a
kind of inherent easement for certain public purpos es .. ' 22.j In an influe ntial ar ticl e in 1970, Josep h Sax argu e d for the exp ansio n of the
public-trust doctrine in order to more e ffec tive ly protect natural
res ources.22 5 Sax argued both for a revival of th e large ly dormant doctrine , and for the inclusion of a wide array of e nvironmental good s (in
addition to the traditional water-related resource s) in th e scope of the
cloctrine. 226 Sax hoped that the public-trust doctrin e would become a
tool for courts to e ngage in more probing judicial rev iew of state actions that adversely impact e d publicly a nd privately owned e nvironmental resources .227 In Sax 's formulation , a cou rt should ··took with
considerab le skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is cal-

22.J. Ca rol iVI. Rose. Joseph Sax and !he Idea of !he Puh!ic TniSI. 25 ECOLOCY L.Q. 35 1.
35 1 (llJ98).
225. Joseph L. Sax. Fi1 e Public Trus/ Dourine in Na lu ral Ri'sources Lnv: £/}euive ./udiciul lnlenelllion. 6S iVIICI I. L . R EV. 471 ( 1970) .

22o M
227. /d.
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cuiJ ted either to realloca te th a t resource to more res trictive uses or to
subj ec t public uses to th e self-inte re st of pri va te part ies ."ccx
Sax in te nd ed the public-trust doctrine to produce a trust c! yna rni c
simil a r to that scJUg ht- by anti property easeme nts. Faced wit h distortion s in th e market and a political arena ini mical to co nserva ti on. Sax
sought to appoin t a set of guardi a ns to wa tch ove r the uncl erprotected
environmenta l concern s.
Yet. notwithstan din g co urts' sporad ic use of the public-trust doctrin e tu st rik e down measures pe rceived <lS environmema llv
unfri e ndly. Sax· s c: ftorts fe ll short of his state d go<1 L2''' C ourb have
proved re lucta nt tu acce pt the ma ntle Sax wished to bestow upon
th em. an d eve n \vhe re they have . they ha ve no t necessar ily reache d
th e judg men ts that Sax wo uld prcfer. 230 In o ur analys is. the chief i<lil in g ol SJ':'s prorosa l is its failur e to take into account the incen tives of
th e chosen tr ustees and the vices of the inst ituti ona l actors o n whom
his proposa l so cr iti ca ll y depe nd s.
In the pub li c-trust doc trin e, the gove rnm ent is ex pected to ~; \;c itse lf as a tru stee o f ce rt a in natural reso urces fo r th e be nefit o f th e publi c, and the co urt s a rc ex pec ted to en force th e fidu ciary re lati ons hi p.
Yet it is precise ly the failings in government al cle cisionm ak ing th c!t led
to Sax's proposaL an d o ne co uld hardl y ex pec t th e po li tica l process to
change beca use of the invocati on of the mag ic words '· pub lic trust."
The co urts. therefore. must pl ay a cr ucial role in forc ing the governmen t to ful fill its d uti es. but th e co urts have ve ry little in ce nti ve to do
so. De termining the efficient use of natural reso urces is a timeco nsumin g a nd inform a tion-intensive ende avor of th e kind that co urts
arc ill-equi pped to conc.luct.n' Moreover, even if courts were equip p·.xl
to handl e the ta sk. it can not be taken for gra nted th at they wou ld
arrive at the conclusions desired by Sax. Judges of di ffere nt backgro unds and vi ewpoint s value natural resources differently , an d one
wou ld ex pect th a t so me jurisdiction s would block too m uc h develop-

22:-:. !d. at -+lJIJ (cmpha >io; n:muv<: d ).
220. Sec Sax. supru note 225 (c it ing cases using the pu bl ic-tr ust doctr ine for c' llViro :Jmenta l iss ues): Sharon ivl. Kcll v. :,To te. Tl1c Puhlic Tmstand 1/zc Cunstillttion: Ro ute' 1u Judicial Uvavie«' <JI" Ncsourcc tl-!unugm leiil Occisiulls in Virginiu . 75 VA. L. R EV. ~lJ:i . l) I~ (IS':)') )
(de sc rib ing courts ab il itv to use the pub li c- trust doc tri ne to requ i r ~ en viro nmental im:xtc·t
.
stud ies) .
230. Sec Richa rd .1 . Lazaru s. Changing Conceplions of Pmpcrtv unci Su1 ·erctgnn· in :Vult!·
raJ Resou1n's: Ques1ioning 1he Puhlic Tm sl Dourin e. 71 I OWA L. R EV. 63 1 (t<J:-:6) {rcv!ewin ;:
successes an d fai lures). See also Richa rd Delgado. O ur Bella Natures: A Re\·isirmisl Vi e"· u/·
Joseph Sur 's Puh lic Tm s1 The orv of Environmelllil! ProleCiion , and Sr1 1ne Durk l huuglus nn
rhe l'ossihilin· of L{llv Re/(mn. 44 VA"' D. L. RE V. 1209 ( 199 1).

2:0 I. S,·e Richa rd 13. Ste w~u·t & Cass R. Sun stcin . Public Frogmms und Prim1e i?ig!u.\ . '!"·
H ARV. L. RE\". 119.'. 1306 (1982) ("'[ C]o urts lack the capaci ty to g:Hher and :malyz,, cbta
that are nee ded to gauge the economic be nefi ts o f in creased regubto rv prntcction ... ).
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ment. v:h ii c uthers wo uld block tou littl e.''' Instead ot e ns uring optimal development. th e p ubli c-tr us t doctrin e co uld brin g about too
mu ch and too iitt k co nse n at ion. d epe nding on th e jurisdiction.
By co nlrctsl. our a tlli p roperty m ec hanism avo ids this centra l pitfall.
Our trus te es. th e <lnt;prDperty ease ment hold e rs. have a pecuniary
incenti ve in conservatiun since the va lue s of their properti es d e pend
on the co n tin ued e\ is te nce of parks a nd gree n s paces . Additionall y,
due to th e [r imn~~.:: diak pro'\imity to the con se rve d area , th e nea rb y
neighb o rs a re uniq uc::iy pos ition e d tu monit or it s usc and acquire inform ation cheaply . '/ct. in our syst e m. the tru stees · role is m ost ly passive . Conse rvation c•)mmuns can be prese rved (or di sbande d in the
case Gf tak ings) withum ~:ny sig nifi cant clction o n the part of th e c a se ment ho lders . Indee-:L the: hold ou c!;.'nam ic ge ne ra ted by th e easement s loc ks the caseme n t hold e rs into their rol es as trustee s.
,~n evc: n more: im]XHtant virtu e o f our pr oposa l is its re liance on a
predomin ~mt ly r'r iv ~ tt c ma rket m ec ktnism for ac hi ev ing conservat ion .
Th e re duced public rol e in enforcemen t of con se r vation lowe rs cos ts
and e liminates th e agc n..:y problem that pl ag ues public e nforcement
sche mes . T he id eological dispo sition or the e ase ment hold e rs is irrelevant. as is that of th e deve lop e rs. Moreover. no bribes or other financial inc e ntives arc likelv to un derm in e the co nse rvation-commons
regime . F inall y. absen t naked tres pa ss (a hi ghly unlikel y occurrence),
there is virtuall y no ne e d for e nforceme nt, gr eat ly re ducing th e cos t of
O\'c rsigh l.
2.

En viro111nenwl Srundin g

Similar o bservat ions may be made conce rning proposals for special
standing doctrine s in e n vironm e nt a l litigation. Periodically, proposals
have been made to relax the requirement of sta nding in ord e r to allow
more liti ga nts into co urt to p lea d for environmental protection ,
not withs tanding th e ir lac k of a tradit ional conne ction to the legal
claim. ~·' ' The most ex tr e me and intriguing of th ese suggestions was
mad e by Christopher Stone, who p ropose d gran ting standing to in-

232. Sec . e.g .. Frc: nk B. C rnss & E merson H. Til le r . .Judicio/ Pun isan slrip and Obedience
ro l.eg.;/ Dourine: WIJisilci>!rnt·iJI,<.: on tire Federal Cuurts uf ;\ ppeu!s . 107 Y ,.\L.E L.J. 2155

( 1'.1'}0 l: Ri chard L. Rc,.- c' SZ. Dn ·irunmcniul l<cgulution. l dcolug.'·. and tile D. C Circuit . 83 V A.
L. R E\ . 171 7 ( 1997) \tkscribin~ an ~ mpiri c<d study fin cli n~ tha t icko logv pl avs a n important

rok in judi cia l dcc i sionm<~kint' in the D. C. Circuit ).
2.'3. See . e.g .. Sict-rll Cl uh 1. M o rron . .:!(15 U.S . 727. 751 -55 (1LJ72) (Douglas. J .. dissent in"-): .l L>seph L. Sax. Standing to Sue: A Critical l?n· ie"' of rlrc i'vlin c r<~l King Decision . 13 Nat.
Resource,; .1. 7n (107.~): Cass R. Sunstc in. Wlwr's Standing ;\.ficr Luj an > O f Citi~en Suits.
"Injuries . .. and Article Iff. 91 M ICH. L. R EV. lh3. 165 -h(i ( 1')92) (a rguin g for crea tin g a
hu unly ftH ' t.: l1\-" iromncnta! c:! <Jim<~nts . in orde r to prov ide the: injury -in-fact necessary to t.'Stabl i'\h stan din g) : c( Uuit e1 .' Sru ies L Suule11fs Clwllenging Ncgularury A gen cy Pruced ures
rSC/?; \l' ) . .:!1 2 U.S. hhl) (l'J7 ~ ) (<tllo,x!n g stud ents attenuated standing for an environmental
c l~tim ).
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animate natural objects in order to defend thems elves in cou rt. c'~ The
efforts to relax sta nding should be see n as the proced ural counte rp arts
to Sax· s sugges ti o ns rega rding th e pub li c- trust doctrin e . Both se ts of
claims aim at ex pandin g the courts' rol e in ove rsee ing en viron ment al
protect ion: th e p ublic-trust doctrin e by adding to th e menu o f subst a ntive claims that ca n be brought by e nvi ro nm e nta li st litiga nt s, a nd e nvironm e ntal sta nding doct rines by eli minati ng proced ural barriers.
Nomin all y. ea ch targets a differe nt set of truste es - judges o r enviro nm e nt a lists - but in fac t, both require but h sets o f tru stees in order
to achieve th eir goa ls.
Unfo rtunately, expanded e nviro nm en tal standing, if grant ed .
wou ld likely no t ove rco me the shortcomin gs of th e publi c- tru st doctrin e. Envi ro nm entalists' increased acce s~ to co urts wo uld no t guara ntee th e so licitousness of th e judges or their <tbil it y to oversee the complex info rmati on -ga th e rin g process that wo uld hav e to acco mpan y
the ir dete rmin a ti o n of th e iss ues. Nor wou ld enviro nm enta l standing
doctrin es bring prese rva tion of co nservat ion commons o ut of th e
publi c are na. Unlike Sax, who ca lled for th e creati on a new subst a ntive ca use of actio n, champions or expanded e nvironment al standin g
on ly seek to clear a procedural hurdl e, while re lying on tradition a l
claims under administra tive law for substance. Ye t, a bsent a new substanti ve ca use of action , such as Sax's public-trust doctrin e. it is unclea r th a t e nvironmental litiga nts wo uld fa re well in co urt.
Whil e we do not doubt the genu ine com mitment of envi ro nment al
groups to conse rvation, budget constraints, high monitorin g cos ts, and
the reli ance on litigation as an e nforce me nt mechanism may combin e
to preve nt th ese groups from ach ieving th e ir professed goa ls.
3.

Conservation Easements

A co nservat ion easement is "a negative restrict io n on la nd which
prohibits a landowner from using her land in a mann er that will
cha nge th e eco logical, sce nic, open or natural sta te of th e land. " 235
Co nserva tion easements are widely recog ni ze d in stat e law,236 and are

23-+. Ch ristop he r S to ne . Sh ould Trel!s Hm·e Sw/1{/in.!{; ml Ohjew . 45 S. CAl_. L. RE V. 450 (1972).
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23 5 . K imberly K. Winter. Comment, The Lndungered Species Au Under Allack: Could
Cunse JTOiion Easel/lCIIIS Help Savt" !he ESA?. 13 N. I LL. li. L. Rev. 371. 3g5 (1993) ( footno te om itted ).
Ll6. See ALA SKA STAT. §§ 34. 17.010-34.17.060 (i"vli chie 2002): AR IZ. R EV. ST,\T. ANN.
33-27t to -276 (W es t 2000); ARK . COD E AN N.~§ 15-20-.fll1 to -410 (i'vlichi e 2000): CAL.
Civ CODE~~ l) l 5-g J6 (West 1982); CoLO. REV. STAT.~ § 3g-30.5-101 to -1 I I (2002) : C ONN.
GEN. ST,\T. §* 7-I3tb-cl (2003): D.C. CODE ANN.** 45 -2601 to -2605 (2001 ): FLA. STAT.
ANN . 704.06 (Wes t 2000): G.'\ . CO DE ANN.&§ 44- I 0- I to -S (2002): H Aw. R EV. ST..-\T. ANN.
~2 190-1 to -6 (M ic hi e 1988): ]Dr\110 C ODE~~ 5:5 -211) 1 to -2IIJCJ (M ichie 2003) : 505 l i..L.
CO .\IP. ST.-\ T A'i'i . 35/2-1 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. q~ 32-23-5- 1 to -S (West 2002) : l OW,\
CODFc .-\ NN . ~2 .f57A. 1-457A. R (Wes t 1996): K .-\:\ . ST.\T. AN:\. SS 58 -380:1 to -3809 (1991 ):
~~
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genera lly created by p ri vate ag re e ment be twee n own e rs of th e green
space anJ gove rnm e nt agencies or p rivat e con se rvati o n organizations
th a t p urchase th e co nse rva tion case m e nts. Conservat ion ease me nts
protect I he d es igna ted p ro perty in pe rpetuity, th o ugh th ey us u a lly may
be di scharge d by circu mst a nces th at ma ke it im possibl e for the prope rty to co nti nu e to meet its int e nd ed p ur pose .
Con ce ptually, our a ntip ropc rt y casem e nts di ffe r in three import ant
res pects trom o rdin a ry co nse rvat ion casem e n ts. F irs t , w ith co nse rva ti o n ease me nt s. private p rop e rt y own e rs ge nerally cede n o nposs esso ry ri ghts in priva te ly o wn ed gree n spaces to pub iic (e .g., gov ernme n t age ncy ) o r qua si-pub lic (e .g., a n e nvironme nt a l g ro up)
orga ni za tions. '-' 7 Our an tipr ope rty easements m o ve in the oth e r directi o n: the go ve rnment g rants the ease ment to pri vate property owne rs,
th e rc: h v divesting itsell from o ne of the sticks in its bund le of propert y
ri g hts. Second. a nd re latedl y, us ua ll y th e re is bu t one co n se rvation
ease me m pe r g ree n space. N um ero us anti p ropc n y case ments a re cre a te d for e ach spa ce and own ers hi p in th e m is wid e ly disp ersed . A s we
e xpla in ed ea rli e r. the d isp e rsa l of e asem e nts is critica l to crea tin g a n
a ntiprope rt y re gime that enhances co nse rva tion. Third , conse r vation
e asements are ge ner a ll y th o ught to be im m utabl e and perpet ual. Abse nt the mos t ex trao rdinary circumsta nces, conse rvation ease m e nts
are expe cted no t to be trans ferr e d; th ey protec t the prop erty in it s
p ri s tine s tate fo r ever. Antiprope rt y casements , howeve r , wh e n combined wi th takings regime s, o r when pro tected by pliable pro tecti o n,
m ay be dissolved in orde r to pe rmi t e ffici e nt d eve lopm e nt.
These diffe re nces notwithstanding, conservation e asemen ts and
an tiproper ty easeme nts m ay share certain characteri s ti cs. To the ex te nt that conse rva tion e aseme nts are granted to environmental groups
(as opposed to the governme nt) , bo th m ech anisms s hift enforcem e nt

KY. R EV. ST.:.,!. ANN. §§ 382.1\00-3tQ. 9\l() (M ic hie 2002): L A. REV. STAT. A NN . §~ 0: 12719: 127o (Wes t 2000): ME . R EV . STAT. ANN . l i t. 33. §§ 476 to -479 -B (We s t 1966): MD. CO DE
ANi\ . R EA l_ PRO P.§ 2-1 18 (2003) : M ASS. GEN . L AWS ANN. ch. 184. §§ 3 1-33 (West 2002):
MI CH. CO~IP. L\WS ANC:. §§ 324. 2 140-324 .214 4 (W es t 1'197): MI NN. STAT. AN N.§ § 84C.Il lS4C. 05 (We s t 1995 ): !VI ISS. CO DE A NN . §§ 1\9- l lJ -1 to -1 5 ( 1999): Mo. ANCI. STAT. §§ 6nl70 67. 910 (West 1998) : MONT CO DE ANi" . §§ 76-6-201 to -21 1 (2003) : NEV. RE V. STAT. AKN.
§§ lll. 391l- 11 14-l0 (M ichi e 200 1 ): N.H. REV. ST,\T. ANN.§§ 477:45-477:47 (20lll): N .J. ST.-\T.
AN:-< . ~§ 13:08- 1 to -9 (W es t 2003): N.M . ST1\T. ANN.§§ 47-1 2- 1 to -o (M ichi e 1978): N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. L AW§~ 49-030 1 lll -03 1 1 (Mc Kinney 1997): 0 Ht 0 RE V. CODE ANC:. §§
530 l.67 -530 l.lJlJ (Ande rson llJtl lJ): OR. R EV. STAT. §§ 271.71 5 -271.795 (2001): PA. STAT.
1'. 1\N. tit. 3. §§ 9!4.1 -914.2 (Wes t 1995): R.I. GEN . L -\WS ij§ 34-3LJ -l to -5 (1995): S C. CODE
ANi\. §s 27-t::-10 to -80 (La w. Co-o p . S upp. 1976): T ENN . COD E ANN.§§ ll- 13 - lO l to - ll 7.
66 -9-301 to -309 (1999) : T EX . NAT. RES. COD E ANN. §§ l83 .001-l tl3. 005 (Ve m o n Supp.
200 1) : UT ;\H COD E Ai\i\. §§ 57 -1~- 1 to -7 (2000) : V .-\. CO DE A NN .§§ t O.l-1 009 to - 1016 (M ic hie llJ98): \Y;\ SH. RE V. COD E ANN . § 64.04 .1 30 (\Vest 1994): Wi S. STAT . t-\ NN. §~
61.3-1(3111 ). 700.41J (W es t 20(Jl ).

237. Julia D. Mahonev. Perpetu u/ 1-i.estricrions on Lan d and rl1 e Proble111 of th e Furure. il8
VA. L. R EV. 739.74 1-42 (2002).
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of co nse rva ti o n fr o m publi c to p ri\·ate e n t iti es . 2 ·'~ E ve n th e n, howeve r.
conse rvation c asem e nts s utler fr o m tw o c.lisac.lva nta ges . Firs t, sin ce the
gra nt ees of the ease m e nt d o no t have imme di a te access to th e
prot e cte d reso urce , mo ni to rin g is s ubstantiall y m ore costly. Seco nd ,
cons e rvation e asem e nts a re mu ch less appea lin g p o liti ca lly. Anti p ro perty ease m e nt s s ho uld appea l to politic ia ns beca use t hey ben e fit vo te rs
who are lik ely to be among their constitue nts. The b e ne fi ciaries of antip roperty sc he m es are a ll loca l vo te rs. who a rc lik e ly to repay po liticians who bes to w be nclit s o n the m. Co nserva tion ,eas ements , on the
Dth er hand, do not offer a simil a r qu id p ro quo . Th e beneficiari es of
conse rvat io n case m e nts a rc oft e n nonloca l acto rs. a nc! be nefiting the m
is unli kely to yield meanin gful ret urn s to loca l politi cian s who de te rmin e la nd usc po li cy . T hus . from a pragma ti c standpoint , ant ipropcrty
e ase m e nts a re a prefe r abl e po licy too l.
This is n o t to say , howeve r. th a t con servat io n ease ment s are with ou t me rit. On th e co ntr<try. th ey a rc: a n•..:ccssary co mpl e me nt to a ntiprop e rty ease ment s. In sofar as con serv ation of wildern ess is co nce rn e d. conse rvation ease me nts a rc th e bette r po li cy too l. In s uch
cases, there arc ofte n no ne ighbo rs in whom a ntipro pe rty e aseme nts
can ves t, and decisio ns about conse rvation of such resources a re made
a t the nati ona l le ve l. 2"'! A ddi ti o na lly. co nse rva tion ease m e nts m ay be
a n important component o f a co mbin ed antiproperty -takings regime.
As we noted e arlier ,2-w conse r vat io n ease ments may be use d to acco unt
fo r the va lue of public use of a pa rk no t cap tured in th e value of th e
anti property e asem e nts.
4.

Sumn uuy

W e s umma rize o ur disc uss ion of the policy too ls for co nserva tion
in th e fo llowing tabl e .

238. S ee also T hompson. supm no te 2\1.
2:3\1. See Bradley C. Kar kk<lincn . IJiodin:rsin· unci Lund. 83 COR :'-;E L L L. R EV. 1. 41
( 1997) (descri bing the federal wil de rness svste m as a n "im po rtant conse rvation asset" ). Bur
see John G. Sprankl ing, The Anriwi/dt'nu:ss Hi11.1 in , \ lllerica n Propern· L tnl' . 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519. 564-66 (19\16) (ca lcubting th at thirtv -t hrc·.; milli on wild ern ess acr es a re protec ted
bv preserv ati oni st own ers) .

2.:1tl. See supra Sectio n IV.C.
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Two factors strongly emerge from the tabular comp a rison o f th e
policy alterna tives.
First , the antiprop erty easement mechanism possesses a clear cost
advantage over its compe titors, especially those based upo n e ncouragin g e nvironm ental litigation. A nti property easemen ts create a structure that preserves green space with low monitoring an d enfo rcement
expenses, due primarily to the employment of "trustees '' who ar e posi -

0 ( l 'rupnn· and Anripropenv
ti o ne cl to ove rsee th e con diti o n of the protec te d s pace ctncl "r..: al :o;o
highl y motivat e d to do so . While so me o f th e parti cipant s in mechani sms emp lo yin g publi c tru s t or e xpanded e n viro nm e ntal st<t ncl in g
have a stron g ideol og ic a l motivation for protecting the na tur<1 l asse t.
o th e rs (i .e .. th e courts) m ay lack th a t commitm e nt. In an y eve nt. ne ith e r the courts nor the litigant s enjoy th e e asy m on itoring of nearby
ne ig hbo rs in possess ion of a nti p rope rty ea se m e nt s. \Vh e re conser\'ation c ase ment s are vested in co nserva tion organizations. th e .. trust ees ..
wi ll possess a stron g mo ti vation to ca rr y o ut th e ir dutie s. b ut they too
wi ll not be as we ll pos ition e d as ne ar by n e ighb o rs.
Seco nd. th e cos t adva ntages or a ntipro pe rt y ease me nts \\ il l not be
pr c~c nt in th ose cases where there is no t a ready group o!' nc arbv
ne ig hbors. as in th e case of a la rge and re mote wild e rness me<t. In such
c1 ses . con servation casem e nts may be a preferre d opt ion.
COL'iCLUSJO N

In thi s Arti c le. we introdu ce d the co nce pt of a ntipr openy ease ments - a private co nse rvation me chanism that a llows o nl v sociallv
cksirab!e deve lo pm e nt. cJ! En route to this m e chanism , we s urveye d
th e political a nd m a rket institutions affectin g conse rvation. and dre w
on the sa li e nt strengths a nd wea knesses o f both ins tituti o ns to ens ure
th e p rese rva ti o n of co nse rvati o n common s. 'We also comp a red o ur a nti pro perty m echani s m to o th e r theoretical and doctrinal so lu tion s to
th e con se rvati o n ch a llen ge and elucidated the conditions und e r whi ch
our mecha nis m is s uperior to th e alte rnatives.
T he o re tic a ll y. we d em onstrated that wh e n tran sacti o n costs systema tica ll y bi as the mark e t in fa vo r of a particular int e res t, the bes t
poli cy res pon se may be to grant the initial entitlement to the opposing
int eres t a nd c rea te addition a l transa ctio n cos ts, th e reby making the
entitlement in a lien a ble. An intriguing implication of this count e rintuiti ve insig ht is that a nticommon s regime s - currently vi ewed as
·'tragic" - are actually b e neficial when conservation is the soci a l go a l.
Furth er mo re, we s howed how th e interplay be twee n m a rke t a nd po liti ca l institutions may e ngend e r a super ior e quilibrium to th os e cre at e d by each ins titution a lone . We d e mon strate d th a t whil e th e political p rocess w o uld lea d to too little conservation, and the mark e t to too
mu ch co nse r va tion , th e combination o f pri va te antiprope rt y ease m e nts with a ca refully d es ign ed takings la w may lead to the o ptim a l
bal a nce be twee n conse rva tion a nd d e velopment.
The p racti ca l implications o f the Article are quit e stra ightforward.
It is impe rative to d e ve lo p an effective conse rvatio n too l th at would

2-1 1. .-\ s c.xpl ai nc:d in nur itll rocl ucti on . ou r proposal is intc:ndecl to applv 111 the: cu t1tc.x t
of c:onmwnitics that have a lready iclcntificd conservatio n as the soc ia ll y dcsir:thk usc f<>r
their
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a rres t in effi cie nt d e ve lopm e nt. W e submit that o ur a ntipropc rty caseme nt s are a necessa ry weapo n in th e con serva ti o ni s t a rse na l.
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